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Abstract

Most of our colleagues are either dogmatists or justificationists. This makes friendship with them a delicate matter: one constantly faces the dilemma of either doing them the (closed society) curtesy of overlooking their faults, or offering them the (open society) service of readiness to criticize their opinions. Bunge is one of the few who make both friendship and criticism easy: he avoids both dogmas and justifications.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Bunge (2003, 2011) for the wide range and the diversity of his ideas.

  2. 2.

    Russell objected to Popper’s anti-inductivism. He said, we distinguish between the ravings of a mad person and an Einstein. And whatever Popper says is the advantage of the one over the other may count as his principle of induction. Popper admitted that this is so, and that it makes sense, yet he found this kind of preference significantly different from justification, since it is possibly erroneous, hopefully given to improvement, and should apply well also to our preferences of scientific theories which have already been openly acknowledged as refuted, over the madman’s ravings.

  3. 3.

    For a rich list of references see Bunge (1961a, 120–149); see also the 12 chapters in Bunge (1963).

  4. 4.

    Sadly, Ludwig Wittgenstein found the search for philosophical explanation irksome, Wittgenstein (1953, §§109, 116, and 255).

  5. 5.

    For more details of the story see Agassi (2012).

  6. 6.

    Popper (1963, Chapter 10, note 31).

  7. 7.

    Bunge (1961b, p. 279) offers a competing view: he prefers science with confirmations even at the cost of refutations.

  8. 8.

    Bunge (1961a).

  9. 9.

    Bunge (2017, pp. 3–12).

  10. 10.

    Bunge (1967, p. 342). Bunge allows scientific theories to include untestable hypotheses. He claims that in this he disagreed with Popper (Bunge 1961a,b 136, note 25); this is a slip of his pen.

  11. 11.

    Bunge (2017).

  12. 12.

    Agassi (1996) Reprinted in Agassi (2003, pp. 152–163).

  13. 13.

    Bunge (2017). There is a slip of the pen here: he overlooks Hume’s assertion that as Newton’s theory survived the test by foreigners, it will never be refuted (Hume 1742, p. 122).

  14. 14.

    Bunge (2009, pp. 64, 82–3, 90, 290).

  15. 15.

    For more details see Lejewski (1954–1955). See also Bochenski (1990) and Agassi (1990), as well as Bunge’s “Replies”, all in Weingarten and Dorn (1990).

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Agassi, J., Bar-Am, N. (2019). Bunge contra Popper. In: Matthews, M.R. (eds) Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16673-1_15

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