Abstract
This chapter focuses on various attempts to revive the nationalist movement within and outside Rojhelat. The foci of the investigation are the small communities of exiles in the Soviet Union, primarily in Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent in Moscow and in Iraqi Kurdistan. The exile groups were highly heterogeneous, politically and ideologically, and their attempts to create unified and coherent political organisations with effective leadership fell victim to internal discord and rivalry, making it impossible to establish active links with the potential centres of opposition to the state and mobilise their support to revive the nationalist movement. This task was accomplished by the younger generation of Kurdish nationalists who had their schooling in the civil and military organisations of the Republic. The early clandestine activities to revive the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) took place against the background of a growing political crisis precipitated by the nationalisation of Iranian petroleum industry which considerably weakened the centralising functions and security processes and practices of the state in Kurdistan. The KDPI, though still weak and disorganised, contained the early representations of the ethnic nationalists and the Marxist-nationalists, the two competing political and ideological groupings vying for supremacy in the decades to come.
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- 1.
For Barzani’s speech and the new party programme, see Hussami (op. cit. 1997, pp. 33–45). Hussami’s reading of the speech is rather uncritical, avoiding reference both to the Soviet influence and to the contradictions and inconsistencies in the speech and the proposed programme. He attributes the failure of the initiative solely to Bagherov and his clique in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, overlooking the decisive influence of the Soviet strategy in the region, especially its approach to the Kurdish question in Iran and Iraq at the time.
- 2.
Barzani’s exposition of the existing class structure of Kurdish society shows clearly the paramount influence of the Soviet official discourse; see Hussami (op. cit. 1997, pp. 41–42).
- 3.
The three main figures among the Kurds of Iran who were prominent in the growing left-wing opposition to Barzani and believed to have been active in his fall from favour in exile in the Soviet Union were Rahim Saif Ghazi, Ali Galawej and Aziz Shamzini; all three were part of a group of Kurdish students sent by the Republican administration to study in the USSR. Aziz Shamzini was from an influential Shaikhly clan with substantial following in Kurdistan, whose best-known member was Shaikh Ubayyed Allah Nahri, his great-grandfather, who led a well-known rebellion against the Ottoman state in 1881–1882. Aziz’s father, Seyyed Abdullah Afandi, was active in the nationalist politics in the Iranian Kurdistan and took part in the events leading to the formation of the KDPI and subsequently the Kurdish Republic. He is said to have had a long-standing conflict of interest and rivalry with Barzani and the hostility between the two was widely known to their peers in the nationalist circles in Kurdistan. Shamzini’s perception of Barzani and his place in the Kurdish national movement is clearly reflected in his book (Shamzini 1998).
- 4.
A few joined the Firghe including Rahim Saif Ghazi and Ali Galawej. This issue was discussed with Hassan Ghazi, in an early interview in Sundsvall in December 1994.
- 5.
Hussami’s account of the failure of Barzani’s initiative is a clear example of the first kind of approach. For him Barzani was a genuine nationalist whose initiative to revive the nationalist political project fell victim to power struggle within the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Hussami op. cit. 1997). Hussami overlooks the exigencies of the Soviet strategy in Iran and the region and its consequences for the Kurdish question. The late Nushirvan Mustafa Emin holds a different view, casting doubt not only on the nationalist credentials of Barzani altogether but also on his aims and intention to plan and accomplish a genuine nationalist project for the greater Kurdistan at any time in his political career (Emin 1997). Emin, however, characteristically overstates the Soviet influence at the expense of other and especially internal processes and practices, as in his account of the rise and fall of the Kurdish Republic in Iran (Emin 1993) and my critique of this position (Vali op. cit. 2011).
- 6.
I owe this information to Hassan Ghazi. He also mentioned during our discussions in Sundsvall that the Kurdish leadership in exile started a radio programme in Kurdish aiming to cover Iranian Kurdistan. The Kurdish radio programme in exile most likely was only a short slot in the Azeri radio managed and directed by the Kurdish members of the Demokrat Firghesi in Baku. For the conditions of publication and the fate of Kurdistan in exile, see (Hassanpour 1992).
- 7.
Ghassemlou (op. cit. 1985), Blurian (op. cit. 1997) and Hussami (op. cit. 1997) provide different views on the process and conditions of the revival of the nationalist politics after the Republic, giving different weights to internal/Kurdish and external/non-Kurdish factors in the reconstruction of the organisational structure of the KDPI in the region.
- 8.
The only surviving original issues of Rega were at the time in possession of Karim Hussami, part of his vast and valuable personal collection. Rega , states Blurian, was produced by Hassan Ghizilji and himself in Sitak in Kurdish and Farsi. They called it ‘Organi Komalay Jiyani Kurd’, the ‘Organ of the Association of Kurdish Life’, rather than the organ of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, in order not to encourage the Iranian government to intensify its already harsh treatment of Kurdish Republican activists in Iranian prisons (Blurian op. cit. 1997). I am grateful to Hassan Ghazi for providing me with copies of both issues of Rega obtained from Hussami.
- 9.
Memories, autobiographies, and personal accounts and recollections of the leading members of the KDPI, although at times intensely subjective and personal, are nonetheless invaluable sources for the study of the revival of the nationalist movement after the fall of the Republic. In addition to Blurian, Hussami and Ghassemlou already cited, there are also memories of the former secretary general of the KDPI (Hassanzadeh 1995; Said Kaweh (Kostani) 1999), a former senior member.
- 10.
- 11.
Ali Karimi’s book is the prime example of this mode of approach attributing an uninterrupted continuity to Zabihi’s discourse and practice as an uncompromising all Kurdistan/territorial nationalist (Karimi 1999, esp. the preface). The late Amir Hassanpour in his introduction to the same volume further elaborates this view, locating it in a broader global and regional context of the rise and development of socialist revolutionary movements. His historicist account, though largely devoid of Karimi’s political generalisations, is beset by another and no less intractable problem. Hassanpour attempts, in a characteristically Hegelian-Marxist fashion, to assign a socialist revolutionary spirit to Zabihi’s political career, whereby his discourse and practice not only are influenced by the revolutionary movements of the time but also express their socialist essence. Hassanpour’s Hegelian essentialism would have been consistent in its own terms had he provided us with some plausible medium of historical reductionism such as social class relations or even expressed ideological commitments to socialism by Zabihi. Instead he attempts to extract this assumed socialist essence from his own interpretation of the meanings given to selective vocabulary by Zabihi in his dictionary. It is true that all meaning is subjective and therefore ideological, but it is also true that words and concepts are fundamentally different. It would be a mistake to look for evidence of ideological relations in dictionaries, especially for a learned linguist, as he admittedly was. Zabihi might have been, and indeed was, a socialist, but his socialism never surpassed the political and economic limits of the agrarian populist collectivism which characterised the discourse of the Komalay JK. Admirable as this is in the political and cultural circumstances of Kurdistan in the 1950s, it hardly qualifies him as the Kurdish subject of a global revolutionary socialist movement in the manner perceived by Hassanpour.
- 12.
The assertion by Ezzadin Mustafa Rasoul concerning the publication of Nishtman in exile suggests that Zabihi continued the path already charted by the Komalay JK unabated. The alleged issue no. 10 of this publication, however, is a mystery; it has not been seen by anyone else among Zabihi’s surviving contemporaries. Blurian, a co-editor of Rega , in his recollections in the same volume dismisses the point, as do the other contributors. It is at best the word of one man against another, and in the absence of any evidence, one is inclined to conclude that Ezzadin’s assertion and the supporting statements are simply personal. See Karimi (op. cit. 1999).
- 13.
All citations from the editorial of Rega , no. 1. English translations are mine.
- 14.
The dearth of intellectual and financial resources seems to have been responsible for the closure of Rega , although the lack of an active political organisation in exile also encouraged some of its founders and contributors to return to Iranian Kurdistan. See Ghani Blurian, memories cited in Note 9, and Shapasand interview in Karimi (op. cit. 1999).
- 15.
See Blurian (op. cit. 1997). It should however be noted here that Blurian’s account is most likely coloured by his ideological affinity with the Marxist left, and hence his emphasis on the communist inclinations of the membership and their sympathy towards the USSR. He refers to the organisation simply as the Lawan, implying that it did not have a well-defined and specific status among the practitioners of clandestine politics.
- 16.
Hussami emphasises the transitional character of the Komalay Kommonisti Kurdistan, representing a stage between the Komalay Lawan and the new Tudeh-dominated KDPI (op. cit. 1997, pp. 65–66).
- 17.
According to Hussami, after the merger with the Lawan, the leaders of the Communist Association of Kurdistan approached the Soviet authorities in Iran asking for help to establish a communist party in Kurdistan. The Soviet authorities, he further maintains, refused to help, indicating that there was already a communist party in Iran and another would be superfluous. The Soviet authorities in Tehran further advised the Kurdish communists to reorganise themselves as the KDPI but on the Tudeh lines, thus emphasising the primacy of social class relations and struggles over ethnic and national oppression and the right of self-determination in the discursive representation of their party programme. Hussami contends that the leaders of the Communist Association duly followed the Soviet advice, hence turning the revived KDPI into the operational branch of the Tudeh Party in Kurdistan, especially in 1950, when the Iranian oil crisis began to gain momentum (Hussami op. cit., pp. 65–66). Whatever the wider political significance of Hussami’s account, it has implications for his own narrative, highlighting inconsistencies in his representation of his own position in the process of the revival of the KDPI, for, on the one hand, he emphasises his central role in the formation of the Lawan and its clandestine nationalist activity, and on the other hand, he downplays his own well-known pro-Soviet, and some say pro-Tudeh, sympathies in the process of the revival of the KDPI and its subsequent domination by the Tudeh Party. Hussami is also silent on his position in the process of the merger between the Lawan and the Kurdish Communist Association, implying that he was almost an outsider and was carried by the course of the events at the time. If this is correct, then one cannot but conclude that, contrary to what he wanted us to believe, he was not such a central figure in the clandestine organisation of the Lawan and as such could not have played a leading role in the process of the revival of the KDPI.
- 18.
Blurian clearly admits that poor ideological knowledge and organisational skills were the main reason for their initial approach to the Tudeh Party; they approached the party leadership to ask for help after they were given cold shoulder by the clandestine organisation of the Azerbaijan Demokrat Firghesi (Blurian op. cit. 1997). A similar argument is implicit in Ghassemlou’s account of the revival of the movement after the collapse of the Republic, though he does not dwell on his own role as the first and principal Tudeh agent charged with the crucial task of incorporating the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Tudeh Party (Ghassemlou op. cit. 1367/1988). Hussami, on the other hand, is characteristically evasive; he tries to remain an active insider from the outside and a passive outsider from the inside; an impossible task especially as he tries rather unsuccessfully to separate the Soviet foreign policy from the position of the Tudeh Party, thus identifying with the former as an insider and dissociating from the latter as an outsider (Hussami op. cit. 1997).
- 19.
This issue is variously considered in the memories of the leading figures of the KDPI cited above, of which Blurian’s account is particularly significant since he was a member of the Mahabad committee, which was instrumental in the representation of the party’s position in the election campaign (Blurian op. cit. 1997).
- 20.
This event is explained in some detail by both Hussami and Blurian. They are unanimous on the swift response of the Kurdish landlords and their alliance with the central government against Sarim al-Din Sadeq Vaziri, the Tudeh candidate, but lay different emphases on the active presence and role of the Tudeh Party in the process. Blurian, who is less apologetic about his Tudeh past, has no qualms about the decisive role of the party in the campaign. Hussami, on the other hand, tries to save face by referring to a small band of ‘independent’ men in the Mahabad committee who, according to him, influenced the course of events during the election campaign. The identity of this band of independent men however remains undisclosed. Blurian’s account seems more akin to the actual course of events leading to the integration of the KDPI local structure in the expanding organisation of the Tudeh, as was explained above. But the crucial point latent in both accounts is the widening rift in the organisation of political authority in Mahabad, between the civilian governor and the military commander of the district, who pursue quite different methods and at times have diverse objectives during the election campaign, reflecting the growing political rift and factionalism in the Iranian state spreading from the centre to the provinces. Blurian and Hussami overlook this crucial point and its implications for their analyses of the situation at the time; see Blurian (op. cit. 1997) and Hussami (op. cit. 1997).
- 21.
The 1953 coup d’état proved to be more than just an event, however colossal, in the annals of struggle for democracy in Iran. Rather it turned out to be a process, dynamic and multifaceted, with a multiplicity of effects on the social, economic and political development of Iranian society for decades to come. The role of the Tudeh Party and its political position in the crucial years leading to the coup and after have been extensively discussed, especially after the 1979 revolution. The coup and its consequences will be considered in some detail in the following chapter.
- 22.
Abdullah Ishaqi, alias Ahmad Towfigh, who subsequently became the secretary general of the party in exile in the Iraqi Kurdistan, was a prominent example of this trend in the party at that time. He was clearly unhappy with the increasing domination of the Tudeh-inspired left and planned to respond and curtail it, as the course of events leading to the displacement and exile in Iraqi Kurdistan subsequently showed.
- 23.
Detailed interviews and discussions with Ghassemlou in numerous occasions about his membership of the Tudeh, especially interviews in February 1982 in Paris and January 1985 in London. He was often reluctant to talk about his role as the Tudeh member and organiser in Mahabad and later on in Tehran, but was quite keen to talk about the internal relations and power struggles and the existing or evolving systems of political patronage in the party. Ghassemlou talked extensively about the Tudeh leadership, their political opportunism and lack of principles, especially during the exile years in Prague and Berlin, which he thought was directly related to its opportunistic support for the hardliners in the Shi’i leadership in the Islamic Republic after the revolution. He clearly expressed his hostility to the Tudeh leadership, the members of the political bureau and especially its chairman, Kianouri, his arch-enemy, who, according to him, was largely responsible for ousting Eskandari from the leadership of the party and the current anti-KDPI position in the Tudeh Party. Throughout these interviews he remained silent about his close association with Radmanesh and Eskandari, preferring not to discuss it publicly.
- 24.
Interviews and discussions with Ghassemlou cited in Note 23.
- 25.
As the course of the events subsequently showed, Ghawam had successfully led the Soviets to believe that he genuinely supported their quest to obtain oil concessions in the north if only to strike a balance with the British in the South. The main objective of Ghawam’s skilful diplomacy was to secure the Soviet withdrawal from Iran and pacify her support for the Azari and the Kurdish democrats (Azimi op. cit. 1989; Abrahamian op. cit. 1982).
- 26.
According to Azimi, the Tudeh Party gave up its opposition to granting concessions to foreign powers in order to accommodate the Soviet demand, and some in the leadership like Tabari went as far as arguing for the ‘renewal of negotiations to grant oil concessions not only to the Russians but also to the British and the Americans’ (op. cit. 1989, p. 109). It should however be indicated here that the Tudeh leadership was divided on the issue of participation in the government, some expressing strong doubts and misgivings about its rationale, likely outcome and long-term benefits for the party. The issue was quickly settled by the Soviet intervention strongly advising the leadership to leave aside doubts and hesitations and join Ghawam’s cabinet (Azimi, ibid., pp. 149–179).
- 27.
The Firuz-Pishevari Agreement of 13 June 1946 went a long way to deal with most of the contentious issue in the ongoing negotiations between the central government and the Azeri regime. The Agreement had the approval of the Soviet Union and the support of the Tudeh Party. The latter welcomed the Agreement after having waited for it impatiently for some time. For the details of the agreement, see Azimi (ibid., p. 152).
- 28.
Ghassemlou seems to favour this approach, for he too believed Javid held more moderate views on the main issues of dispute with Ghawam’s government and was generally better disposed towards the Tudeh’s political position. He nonetheless was not quite certain about the Soviet support for the Tudeh’s attempts to help organise an anti-Pishevari faction within the Firghe to engineer his downfall. Interviews cited in Notes 23 and 24.
- 29.
Although Ghassemlou liked to show that he always had strong doubts about the Tudeh, especially its policy regarding the Kurdish question, it was nonetheless clear that he was wholly committed to the political programme and ideological position of the Tudeh when he joined the party and for many years after. It was only in mid-1960s in Eastern Europe that first doubts set in and he began to question the Tudeh Party’s position and his own association with it. In the course of the interview several times he came close to saying that the Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring in August 1967 and the Tudeh’s unequivocal support for the military invasion of Czechoslovakia were the turning points in this respect.
- 30.
This important event in contemporary Kurdish history is often referred to in passing or just overlooked by scholars and commentators. Historians and social scientists writing about social and political movements in contemporary Iran are not only oblivious to it; they simply do not know about it. For them the boundaries of Iran as the object of their investigation are defined by Persian ethnicity and language. Ervand Abrahamian and Farhad Kazemi’s essay on the reason for the absence of a large-scale peasant movement in Iran is a prime example of such scholarship (Abrahamian and Kazemi 1978). Ali Galawej, a prominent Kurdish personality in the leadership of the Tudeh Party, writing about the Iranian peasants and their struggle for liberation, makes no reference to the peasant movement in Mukrian in the 1950s; Hezb-e Tudeh Iran: Cheh va Penj sal Peykar-e Khasteginapazir Dar Rah-e Sazmandehi va Raha-ye Dehghanan-e Iran, 13366/1987; see also his Monasebate Arzi va Frupashie Nezame Ashire’ie Dar Kurdistan, 1360/1982. Hemin in his Tarik u Roun, Binkay Peshawa 1353/1974 refers to the movement but only marginally, as does Hussami (op. cit. 1997). Amir Hassanpour’s work is the notable exception in this respect. His pioneering and sympathetic study, based on primary sources, oral histories and archival material, focuses on the socio-economic causes and political consequences of the peasant movement in Mukrian, highlighting some hitherto unknown aspects of the rebellion in the wider social and political context of the Kurdish community in Iran. Hassanpour is said to have planned an extensive historical project comprising three volumes, the first of which had been completed just before his untimely death last July. A detailed outline of his research project was recently published in the first issue of Dervwaze ‘Raparini Werzerani Mukriyan le 1952–1953: Projey Lekolinewyek, May 1, 2017. My account of the peasant rebellion in Mukrian and the analysis of its development and outcomes are benefited largely from an earlier version of this project which he wrote soon after the completion of his field research (oral history) in 1995–1996. I remain deeply indebted to him for giving me a copy of this draft paper before the construction of the final version of his project. Hassanpour’s project proved influential in inspiring a number of Kurdish historians and political activists to write about the Mukrian rebellion; see, for example, Sultani, A. Raparini Sali 1953 khalki Bokan u Werzerani Nawchey Faizollahbegi, Gzing, no. 36, 2002, and Asri, M.O. Raparini Werzeran La Nawchey Mukrian, Gzing, No. 37, 2003.
- 31.
Agrarian relations, forms of landed property and property relations, the process and relations of production and conditions of tenancy, and mechanisms of extraction of surplus in rural Kurdistan did not vary from other parts of Iran significantly (Vali 1993). For a detailed examination of the agrarian relations and the terms and conditions of tenancy in rural Iran at large before the land reform of 1962, see Lambton (1953, 1963), Keddie (1963) and Soudaghar (1979).
- 32.
On this issue see Vali (1980) and Vali (op. cit. 1993). Abrahamian and Kazemi attribute the absence of large-scale peasant rebellions to the low level of the development of class consciousness among the Iranian peasantry (Abrahamian and Kazemi 1978). This essentialist approach is informed by a subjective conception of class and class political action supposedly derived from uniform class consciousness, much in the same way as E. P. Thompson explains the formation and development of English working class in terms of the development of working-class consciousness while structural conditions are relegated to the background as mere supports of this historical process (Thompson 1968). Thompson’s Marxism is the decisive theoretical influence on Abrahamian’s historiography of modern Iran. In the case of Iranian peasants the use of such an essentialist concept of social class creates further theoretical problems if the structural fragmentation of the peasantry as a social entity is taken into consideration, thus making it difficult to qualify it as a social class in Marxist terms. The case in point here is the social differentiation of the peasantry, which is said to undermine the peasants’ structural unity, and hence the difficulty of theorising them as a social class and attributing uniform class consciousness, class position and action to them in Marxist theory. Marxist theoreticians have generally attributed the social differentiation of the peasantry either to the level of the development of commodity relations in agriculture and engagement of the peasant household in production for market, or to the degree of the employment of wage labour by the peasant unit of production (Banaji 1976; Lenin 1967). The social differentiation of the peasantry has been a subject of intense theoretical debates and political controversies among the Marxist theoreticians in Western Europe and Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution and after in the years leading to the collectivisation of agriculture in the Soviet Union (Hussain and Tribe 1981). In Marxist theory as such the variegated political consciousness among the mass peasantry and related forms of political position and action are defined by the level of structural dynamics of peasant economy and society. Hassanpour is right to criticise approaches such as those taken up by Abrahamian and Kazemin in their essay for their overwhelming subjectivism and overall theoretical poverty, but his own explanation in blaming the Tudeh Party for the organisational weakness and strategic failure of the Mukrian movement comes close to falling into the same subjectivist trap. For an intelligent analysis of the peasant movements in the twentieth century emphasising the pivotal role of the structural relations, in particular the level of the development of commodity relations in agriculture, see Wolf (1973).
- 33.
In this respect the conditions in Kurdistan were not significantly different from others parts of Iran where increasing involvement of the landowning class in commodity relations had also resulted in the redefinition of the term and conditions of tenancy and the intensification of exploitation. Kurdish share-croppers experienced relatively harsher conditions mainly due to the harsher conditions of tenancy which traditionally prevailed in Kurdistan. See the works of Vali (op. cit. 1980, op. cit. 1993, especially chap. 7) where the agrarian relations and in particular the terms and conditions of tenancy and the division of the produce between the landlord and the share-croppers are discussed in detail. See also Lambton (op. cit. 1953, op. cit. 1969), who also notes the harsher conditions prevailing in the Kurdish countryside.
- 34.
- 35.
See Asri (op. cit. 2003).
- 36.
The Kurdish peasants came to refer to the government legislation regarding the conditions of tenancy and the division of the crop as the 20% bill. See Molla Omar Asri (op. cit. 2003).
- 37.
I visited Erbil in April 2004 hoping to meet with Haji Ghassem and discuss the peasant movement with him, to ask his opinion about its causes, social structure and political formation, and the reasons for its fall. I found my way to his shop in the town centre, in a roundabout opposite the heavily fortified Parezga (the governor’s office), only to be told by his brother that Haji Ghassem passed away nearly a year ago, in 2003, shortly after the fall of the Ba’th regime and liberation of Kurdistan by the Peshmerga. Haji’s brother agreed to have a chat rather than an interview about the peasant rebellion and Haji’s role in the movement. The bulk of the information provided by him is reflected in this chapter. The old man was still running his tailoring outfit actively and efficiently. He had not abandoned the old Marxist radicalism. He reminisced about the past, retelling the story of the rebellion in distinctly social class terms; it was to him a theatre of class war with clear lines drawn in blood. Hemin, the prominent Kurdish poet and political figure, laments the suppression of the movement in moving terms (Hemin 1974).
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Vali, A. (2020). The Revival of the Nationalist Movement. In: The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran. Minorities in West Asia and North Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16069-2_3
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