Abstract
This final chapter provides concluding observations of NATO’s risk governance posture with respect to the security consequences of climate change. This chapter ties together insights from the previous analysis (Chapters 2–6) to capture a risk-informed understanding of NATO’s environment and what effects that understanding. This discussion is structured to match the sections of the IRGC Risk Governance Framework. In addition, I distill recommendations for NATO based on the results of the analysis, and I also offer a critique of the IRGC Risk Governance Framework.
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Notes
- 1.
The IRGC framework provides guidance “intended to promote thinking about whether an organization has the right procedures in place to deal with risks as they are recognized, even risks that are only vaguely known or the full ramifications of which are not yet understood.” International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 10.
- 2.
“The IRGC framework integrates a variety of aspects and recommends a formal scientific risk assessment (including environment, health, and safety and ethical, legal and other social issues) and concern assessment (assessment of risk perception and the societal context of risk, as well as political and security issues and human development issues).” Renn and Walker, Global Risk Governance Concepts Practice Using IRGC Framework, xix.
- 3.
NATO, “AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine,” 2010, 4.
- 4.
According to the IRGC, risk governance deficits result when there is a lack of scientific evidence about the risk, or of the perceptions that individuals and organizations have of the risk; application of inappropriate methods, models, or scenarios to derive this evidence; and failure to understand or take account of available knowledge. International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 11.
- 5.
Ibid., 10–11.
- 6.
Since 2016 (and, pursuant to a NATO conference on risk-based planning in 2011), NATO has developed a more generalized framework for risk-based strategic planning. The NATO Risk-Based Framework for Strategic Planning provides a methodology to apply comprehensive risk management to analytical support of strategic planning for NATO and member nations. It seeks to allow systematic integration of risk management into defence planning processes. Specifically, it is concerned with two types of risks: risks affecting the objectives of the actions in a strategic plan, and risks inherent to the strategic planning process used. Moreover, the authors of the framework indicate that it has broad applicability, independent of the definition of risk or planning process being used. It provides a menu of options for how to support planning and risk management rather than prescribing a specified way of how to carry out analyses and processes. Slawomir Wesolkowski et al., “Risk-Based Framework for Strategic Planning” (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2016); Slawomir Wesolkowski et al., “Analysis Support Guide for Risk-Based Strategic Planning” (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2018).
- 7.
Publicly available documents failed to indicate or suggest what NATO believes is a worst-case scenario.
- 8.
Risk Governance deficiency B1, Responding to early warnings. The IRGC defines this deficiency as the failure to respond and take action when risk assessors have determined from early signals that a risk is emerging. This risk management deficit arises when signals indicating a risk is emerging are picked up and assessed, but no decisions or actions are taken to prevent or mitigate the risk. The detection of early warnings is useful only if they are then prioritized and followed by a response that is commensurate with the significance of the potential risk. The failure to respond may occur for a variety of reasons. In this case, NATO was prevented by a lack of consensus. International Risk Governance Council (2009), 35.
- 9.
John Kriendler, “NATO Intelligence and Early Warning” (Watlington: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2006).
- 10.
International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 12. Risk Governance deficiency A1—Early warning system.
- 11.
OECD, “Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse,” 3.
- 12.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 2017 and 2018 the NATO Science and Technology Organization created two projects (‘Guideline for Scenario Development’ and ‘Establishment of a NATO Scenario Repository’) that could be useful with respect to scenario development efforts within NATO. NATO Science and Technology Organization, “Guideline for Scenario Development”; NATO Science and Technology Organization, “Establishment of a NATO Scenario Repository.”
- 13.
NATO Science and Technology Organization, “Modelling & Simulation Support for Crisis and Disaster Management Processes and Climate Change Implications” (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2016).
- 14.
This is risk governance deficiency A2—Factual knowledge about risks: The IRGC defines this as the lack of adequate knowledge about a hazard, including the probabilities of adverse events and the associated consequences, or the extent of damages that can result, or may occur because of insufficient efforts, or the requisite knowledge may be difficult to obtain. This risk governance deficit is most likely to occur when risks are in their emergent phase, when the cause–effect relationship is not yet established, such as with climate change. Also, risk governance deficit A9 is relevant—the use of formal models (over- or under-reliance on models and/or a failure to recognize that models are simplified approximations of reality). Despite the usefulness of models, there may be situations where too little is known about a system or set of scenarios to permit useful modeling. Climate change and its consequent security risk is just such a situation. International Risk Governance Council, 2009, 14, 29–30.
- 15.
Lester B. Lave, “Health and Safety Risk Analyses: Information for Better Decisions,” Science 236, no. 4799 (1987): 291–95; John D. Graham and Lorenz Rhomberg, “How Risks Are Identified and Assessed,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1996, 15–24.
- 16.
NATO Science and Technology Organization, “Modelling & Simulation Support for Crisis and Disaster Management Processes and Climate Change Implications.”
- 17.
This is risk governance deficiency A7—Understanding complex systems: The IRGC defines this as a lack of appreciation or understanding of the potentially multiple dimensions of a risk and of how interconnected risk systems can entail complex and sometimes unforeseeable interactions. Also, a risk governance deficit A10 is relevant, assessing potential surprises. This occurs when decision-makers and risk assessors fail to overcome cognitive barriers to imagining events outside of accepted paradigms (“black swans”). Given the relatively modest understanding of climate security, it is reasonable that consideration of “black swan” events remains in its infancy. International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 32.
- 18.
Kunreuther and Gupta, “Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies,” 37.
- 19.
This is risk governance deficiency A8—Recognizing fundamental or rapid changes in systems. The IRGC defines this as the failure to reassess in a timely manner fast and/or fundamental changes occurring in risk systems. Risk assessment is most straightforward when the analyst uses established tools in a stable environment. When risks emerge unexpectedly, reactions are often slow or nonexistent because analysts and decision-makers do not expect or recognize them. International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 27.
- 20.
NATO, “NATO’s Military Committee Visits the CCOMC at SHAPE,” 2013, http://www.aco.nato.int/natos-military-committee-visits-the-ccomc-at-shape.aspx. Note that CCOMC was established at NATO’s military headquarters (SHAPE), as opposed to the political headquarters.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 45.
- 23.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2014. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. R. K. Pachauri and L. A. Meyer (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 17.
- 24.
Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 47.
- 25.
NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communique.”
- 26.
Renn, Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework, 52–53.
- 27.
SPS was originally established to bring scientists together on common security challenges. Climate change presents some similarities.
- 28.
The World Bank has established a wide range of activity with respect to Disaster Risk Management. The objective of these efforts, to reduce the risk associated with natural disaster as a result of climate change, is consistent with the interests of NATO, “The World Bank—Disaster Risk Management,” accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/disasterriskmanagement.
- 29.
NATO Research and Technology Organisation, “Joint Operations 2030—Final Report (Opérations Interarmées 2030—Rapport Final),” 47.
- 30.
Briggs, “Arctic Environmental Security and Abrupt Climate Change,” 7; Briggs, “Environmental Security, Abrupt Climate Change and Strategic Intelligence,” 2.
- 31.
Chad M. Briggs et al., “Project Descriptions and Final Status Report (UNCLASSIFIED)” (Montgomery: USAF AIR University MINERVA, 2012). Cutter and Osman-Elasha note “Prior to the development and implementation of management strategies and adaptation alternatives, local entities need baseline assessments on disaster risk and the potential impacts of climate extremes.” S. Cutter et al., “Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes at the Local Level,” in Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , ed. C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 320.
- 32.
Events of this nature have been conducted previously, “Expect the Unexpected: The Scenario Creation Workshop on Energy and Environmental Security Risks Facing the Alliance” (Brussels: NATO, 2012).
- 33.
Briggs, “Climate Security, Risk Assessment and Military Planning,” 1055.
- 34.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.”
- 35.
Steinbruner, “World Affairs Council Keynote Address: The International Security Implications of Climate Change.”
- 36.
Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 48.
- 37.
Ibid.
- 38.
NATO ACT, “Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report,” 11. ACT observed “NATO could capitalize on such changes by establishing new partnerships and exploring opportunities for new forms of co-operation.”
- 39.
The OECD suggests that resilience can be improved through risk governance; NATO can potentially assist in the response or emergency management component that requires military support. OECD, “Boosting Resilience Through Innovative Risk Governance” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014); OECD, “Future Global Shocks.”
- 40.
Holtsmark, “Towards Cooperation or Confrontation? Security in the High North,” 11.
- 41.
Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 49.
- 42.
Ibid., 19.
- 43.
Ibid., 45.
- 44.
Ibid., 46.
- 45.
Ibid.
- 46.
NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communique.”
- 47.
The OECD has considered various means for international actors to “do no harm” in the context of international support. OECD, “Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding” (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012).
- 48.
Renn, “Risk Governance—Towards an Integrative Framework,” 19.
- 49.
Renn, “White Paper No. 1: Risk Governance—Towards and Integrative Approach.”
- 50.
Christopher B. Field, “Connecting the Dots” (Stanford University Woods Institute, 2014).
- 51.
Rühle, “NATO and Emerging Security Challenges: Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm,” 278–79.
- 52.
Climate security risk is the potential for climate change to result in a worsening of security.
- 53.
International Risk Governance Council, “Risk Governance Deficits: An Analysis and Illustration of the Most Common Deficits in Risk Governance,” 11.
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Lippert, T.H. (2019). Major Findings. In: NATO, Climate Change, and International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14560-6_6
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