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Conclusions

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Contemporary Oligarchies in Developed Democracies

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Abstract

In order to explain the problematic nature of contemporary political economies this book first conceptualized a prominent and unusually powerful segment of the business community as an oligarchy. Second, it entailed a reconceptualization of oligarchy. More specifically, it argues that an oligarchy is not a formal regime, but an informal political–economic institution. Furthermore, the oligarchy should not be understood in terms of the wealth of its members, but rather through the economic processes and social relationships that allow very few individuals to garner substantial influence on the political economy and its decision makers. It also maintains that the objectives of the oligarchy are not exclusively focused on wealth defense, but mainly on wealth and power accumulation, while hampering economic competition, executed through various social and political means, such as biased credit allocation and regulatory capture.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is evidenced, for example, by various sanctions imposed by the European Union, subjecting progress in Israel–EU trade relations to progress in the peace process. For more on this conditionality in the EU–Israel relationship (see Pardo and Peters 2010; Casarini and Musu 2007; Smith 2005).

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  1. City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), City, University of London, London, UK

    Shelly Gottfried

  2. Beit Berl College, Beit Berl, Israel

    Shelly Gottfried

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Gottfried, S. (2019). Conclusions. In: Contemporary Oligarchies in Developed Democracies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14105-9_7

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