Abstract
In this chapter, I show how the June 1967 defeat shook the foundations of the Egyptian polity and generated instability, changes in the relative power of social classes, ideological vacuum, national identity crisis, and radicalization of the domestic political landscape—represented by both secular revolutionary leftism and militant Islamism. In this complex case, defeat had variable impacts on state and society. With respect to the state, defeat caused a rightward shift in domestic and foreign policies. Contrary to what some societal forces desired, the ‘state’ pursued neither a shift to the left nor revolutionary transformation. The ignominious fall forced the ruling elites to pursue an alternative foreign policy, one focused on compromises and alignment with the US. However, the impact of defeat on societal actors is a totally different story: the aftermath witnessed increasing leftist radicalization and the resurgence and consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism. The radical left pushed for a complete break with the past; sought total secularization, revolution, and popular war; and held religion itself responsible for the defeat, while Islamic fundamentalists looked for historical roots, advocated a return to the fundamentals of religion, and dreamed of the restoration of an imagined Islamic golden age.
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Notes
- 1.
The first phase began in 1850 with the Arab Renaissance—the reconciliation of Arab/Islamic traditions with European progress; the second phase began right after WWI with decolonization and the struggle for independence; the third phase began in the 1950s with the consolidation of Arab states and the emergence of Pan-Arabism; and the fourth phase began with the 1967 crushing defeat plunging the Arab world into a crisis that persists till this day.
- 2.
Fouad Ajami, “The End of Pan-Arabism,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978), 357.
- 3.
Cited in Shimon Shamir, “Nasser and Sadat 1967–1973: Approaches to the Crisis,” in From June to October: The Middle East between 1967 and 1973, eds. Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978), 189.
- 4.
Shamir, “Nasser and Sadat,” 189.
- 5.
This was evident in works of fiction, plays, songs, movies, and various artistic expressions. Plays that dealt directly with the shame of defeat were heavily censored; writers who were able to publish had to use allegories; some writers were arrested and others had to flee to other Arab capitals, especially Beirut—where artistic expressions were less censored. Mikhail Ruman, Yusuf Idris, and Mahmoud Diab wrote dozens of plays that dealt with the trauma of defeat. These artistic expressions represented part of the Egyptian efforts for morale recovery. Literature Nobel laureate, Naguib Mahfouz, wrote several pieces on the defeat—works that were tellingly published only in 1973. The Egyptian government itself was involved in producing some movies that showed the human and heroic aspects of the 1967 war to raise the morale of its citizens and to demonstrate the resolve of the Egyptian government to fight an honorable war to retrieve occupied Sinai. See Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, “Examining the Reconstruction of Egyptian Morale During the Aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War: An Arab Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal, 2002. Link: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/enein.pdf.
- 6.
Cited in Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1997), 11.
- 7.
Anwar al-Sadat, In Search of Identity (London: Collins, 1978).
- 8.
Bahgat Korany, “The Glory That Was? The Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamic Alliance Decisions, October 1973,” International Political Science Review 5, no. 1 (1984), 50.
- 9.
Egypt presents an exemplary case of the impact of ‘exogenous shocks’ on the fall and rise of ideologies. It also presents a clear case of how changes in the definition of the nation precede changes in foreign policy.
- 10.
Adeed Dawisha, The Arab Radicals (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 11–12.
- 11.
Yvonne Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening,” Middle East Journal 46, no. 2 (1992), 266.
- 12.
Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 190.
- 13.
Hani Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” in Egypt under Mubarak, eds. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (London: Routledge, 1989), 56–57.
- 14.
P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (London: Groom Helm, 1978), 217–219.
- 15.
Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 126.
- 16.
Raymond William Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).
- 17.
In an interview with Ghada Talhami, the Syrian philosopher, Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm, author of Self-Criticism after Defeat and the Critique of Religious Thought—two seminal works of the defeat era—reiterated his suspicion of what the attachment to tradition would do, “I was becoming very conscious of the ability of this body of thought to continually reproduce the values of ignorance, myth-making, backwardness, dependency, and fatalism, and to impede the propagation of scientific values, secularism, enlightenment, democracy, and humanism.” See Ghada Talhami, “An Interview with Sadik Al-Azm—University of Damascus Professor,” Arab Studies Quarterly (Summer 1997).
- 18.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 267.
- 19.
Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 213. Yusuf al-Seba’i, a major intellectual and novelist, expressed this view. We should also keep in mind that at the time of the crisis, the opposition had no easy access to mass media to express their viewpoints.
- 20.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 267. An example of leftist writings would be found in al-Tali’a editorials, especially the ones written by Lutfi al-Kholi.
- 21.
Talhami, “An Interview with Sadik Al-Azm.”
- 22.
Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980), 489.
- 23.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 267.
- 24.
Muhammad Abd al-Hakim al-Khayyal, “al mugtama’a al-‘aqa’idi,” Al-Da’wa 13 (1977), 17–19.
- 25.
Alistair Drysdale and Gerald Blake, The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 225.
- 26.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959).
- 27.
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Autum of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983).
- 28.
Nasser was shrewd in depicting what was actually a military defeat in 1956—since the Egyptian armed forces showed no competence in fighting—as a victory, boosting his legitimacy and his leadership of the Arab world. However, a probably surprising effect of the 1967 defeat was a revisionist reading of the 1956 war, which was now discovered to have been a defeat. After 1967, many Egyptians thought that the Suez War (1956) had actually been a forerunner of what was to come in 1967. See Hani Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” in Egypt under Mubarak, eds. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (London: Routledge, 1989).
- 29.
Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- 30.
Fouad Ajami, “The Sorrows of Egypt,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 5 (1995), 79.
- 31.
Tawfiq al-Hakim, The Return of Consciousness (New York: New York University Press, 1985).
- 32.
Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the costs of war: Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 82.
- 33.
Joseph Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity (Westview Press, 1990), 25.
- 34.
Adeed Dawisha, The Arab Radicals (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 22–23.
- 35.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 84.
- 36.
“Egypt’s ‘great power’ role in the region has been the result of a number of circumstances, both permanent and temporary.” No doubt that Egypt population size was a major variable in determining Egypt great power status; but Egypt’s population was also, relative to other Arab countries, well educated and professional. Egypt’s geographic central location between the Eastern and Western Arab world gave her increasing power; Egypt’s military force and intelligence—no matter how bogus they turned out to be—caused Arab leaders many worries. The Arabs grew dependent on Egypt—a fact obvious even nowadays and throughout the modern history of the Arabs—no war (against Israel) without Egypt, the Arabs never tired of saying, the truth remained that no Arab country seriously contemplated war with Israel as long as Egypt wasn’t on board. This also meant that Egyptian leadership could always find and count on Egyptian supporters in various Arab countries; Egypt’s reach seemed natural and not contrived. See Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 37–38.
- 37.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 83.
- 38.
Malcolm H. Kerr maintained that Egypt had a “universal presence” in the Arab world, akin to the American presence in Europe or Latin America. The Arabs, from the 1950s till the 1970s, were socialized into the belief that Egypt was a major regional power, entitled to this role by virtue of its history and accomplishments. It was a normal scene to see Egyptian professionals in Arab capitals. All Arabs used to watch Egyptian movies and soap operas, listen to Egyptian music and songs, and read Egyptian books and newspapers. All Arabs understand the Egyptian dialect. What transpired in Egypt mattered for all Arabs; but, for Egyptians, what happened in other Arab countries might be marginal—a fact that became also apparent during the recent Arab Revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. See Kerr, The Arab Cold War.
- 39.
Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy (New York: Halsted Press, 1976), 2.
- 40.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 89.
- 41.
George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III: Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen and Libya (New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers Inc., 1973), 81.
- 42.
Both Cairo Radio and Voice of the Arabs Radio were successfully utilized as propaganda tools because the early 1950s witnessed the spread of cheap transistor radio which allowed the peasants and the urban poor to buy many of these radios and which in turn meant that peasants and the poor had become available for mobilization.
- 43.
Nazih Ayubi argued that “Middle Easterners have a strong sense of history” and thus invoking historical memories of religious wars resonated deeply with the public. See Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980), 486.
- 44.
Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 96, 99.
- 45.
Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981).
- 46.
Foreign military estimates concluded that the Egyptian army would lose the war against Israel. While visiting the Egyptian army on May 12, 1967, the British war hero, Field Marshal Montgomery, frankly said that the Egyptian army would lose a war with Israel. American estimates (CIA) concluded that Israel enjoyed qualitative military superiority over all Arab forces combined. See James, Nasser at War, 99.
- 47.
Michael Barkun, Disaster and the millennium (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 57.
- 48.
Ahmad Abdallah, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923–1973 (Cairo: Al-Saqi books, 1985), 218.
- 49.
Ibid., 153.
- 50.
The era was one of heightened mobilization. Indeed, from 1956 to 1967, there was a feverish propaganda campaign to whip up Pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism, and anti-colonialism sentiments. Nasser’s speeches carried the message loud and clear; Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) radio broadcasting from Cairo was the most popular news outlet at the time as mentioned previously.
- 51.
James Heaphey, “The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation Building,” World Politics 18, no. 2 (1966), 191.
- 52.
Derek Hopwood mentioned that Nasser’s energies were mostly focused on creating and consolidating “bonds between himself and the Egyptian masses.” See Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945–1981 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 102.
- 53.
Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy (New York: Halsted Press, 1976), 107.
- 54.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 62.
- 55.
Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 29.
- 56.
None of the three different political organizations that Nasser created was labeled a ‘party.’ Instead, Nasser called them “rally,” and “union.” Political parties back then did not enjoy good political reputations—based on the performance of political parties during the monarchical era.
- 57.
Ghali Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a President, 1971–1981. Translated by Margaret Cole, and Donald Typesetters Lyn Caldwell (London: Zed Press, 1981), 38.
- 58.
Shoukri called these organizations “pseudo-popular.” See Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a President, 38.
- 59.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 62–63.
- 60.
Nasser accused existing parties of representing “class interests” and an “alliance between feudalism and exploiting capital.” See Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. Translated by Charles Lam Markman (New York: Random House, 1968), 343.
- 61.
Iliya Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt.” World Politics 26, no. 1 (1973), 85.
- 62.
Fayez Sayegh, “The Theoretical Structure of Nasser’s Socialism,” in St. Antony’s Papers Number 17; Middle Eastern Affairs no. 4, ed. Albert Hourani (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 38–39.
- 63.
The National Union was formally announced in 1956 but was actually organized in 1959. See Leonard Binder, “Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt,” in Political Parties and Political Development, eds. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 220.
- 64.
Leonard Binder, “Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt,” 232–233.
- 65.
Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,” 86.
- 66.
An absurdly high number for a population of 30 million at the time.
- 67.
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 247; Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy (New York: Halsted Press, 1976), 119–120.
- 68.
Kirk Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 165–166.
- 69.
Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 310.
- 70.
A popular Egyptian newspaper, Rose al-Yūsuf, sarcastically spoke of ASU rallies in the countryside in which individuals wearing fine suits participated, saying that those were the ‘popular working classes’ that Nasser wanted to recruit. Cited in Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 166.
- 71.
Hasan Afif El-Hasan, “Democracy Prevention in the Arab World: A Study in Democracy Prevention in Egypt,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California, Riverside, 2005), 35.
- 72.
Harik, Iliya. 1973. “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,” 87; Raymond Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 89–92.
- 73.
In organizational terms the ASU resembled a single party in totalitarian systems; it had a pyramidal structure that consisted of four levels: The basic units were at the bottom (7000 in total), which operated and organized the public in each village, factory, town, and city; the second level consisted of 26 units—corresponding to 26 governorates—which grouped the basic units. The third level was the General National Congress, which convened every two years. Finally, there was the Supreme Executive Committee, which consisted of 25 members and which actually controlled decision-making. This elite unit consisted of Nasser and his best allies in the regime. See Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany: State University of New York, 1971), 145–152.
- 74.
Another indication of the frailty of the ASU and other political organizations that Nasser created was the fact that public protests took the form of street demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes—since the public didn’t have access to institutionalized channels of articulating their protests either through the party or through free and fair elections.
- 75.
Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany: State University of New York, 1971), 233.
- 76.
Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, 89–92.
- 77.
Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, 192–199.
- 78.
Iliya Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt,” World Politics 26, no. 1 (1973), 100.
- 79.
Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,” 93.
- 80.
Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, 122.
- 81.
Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement.”
- 82.
Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm, 35–64; Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement.”
- 83.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 166.
- 84.
Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a President, 38.
- 85.
Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,” 96–97.
- 86.
Hamid Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 144–145.
- 87.
J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 142–143.
- 88.
By mid-1968, Nasser almost restored the party to what it had been prior to Ali Sabri’s experiment. See Harik “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,” 97.
- 89.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 219.
- 90.
Huntington maintained that “the Egyptian organizations were [not] able to perform the functions required of political institutions. They included everyone while power remained concentrated in a few. They neither reflected the structure of social forces nor served as vehicles through which the dominant social force could extend, moderate, and legitimize its power.” See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 248–249.
- 91.
Nazih Ayubi, Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt (London: Ithaca Press, 1980); Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980); Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm, 326–371.
- 92.
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, “Bi Sarah,” Al-Ahram (18 and 25 October 1968).
- 93.
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, Birnamij al-‘amal al-watani (Programme for National Action) reproduced in Al-Tali’a, vol. 7, no. 10 (October, 1971), 164–177.
- 94.
Nazih Ayubi, Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt (London: Ithaca Press, 1980), 450–451.
- 95.
Gregory J. Kasza, “Parties, Interest Groups, and Administered Mass Organizations,” Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 1 (April 1993), 85.
- 96.
Kasza, “Parties, Interest Groups,” 85.
- 97.
El-Hasan, “Democracy Prevention in the Arab World,” 31.
- 98.
Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a President, 48–49.
- 99.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 44–45.
- 100.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 44–45.
- 101.
It is telling that there were no calls in Egypt after the Egyptian Revolution (2011) to trim presidential powers.
- 102.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 44–45.
- 103.
Muhammad Fawzi, Istratijiyyat al-musalaha (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, 1986).
- 104.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt.”
- 105.
Michael W. Suleiman conducted a public opinion survey of Arabs in the US. He found that Arabs in general were in favor of war. He mentioned that Arabs found it hard to accept the fact of defeat. In response to a question regarding the best way to deal with Israel, about two-thirds expressed willingness to ‘continue the struggle to eventual victory’ and only 8% were ready for a settlement. See Michael W. Suleiman, “Attitudes of the Arab Elite Toward Palestine and Israel,” The American Political Science Review 67, no. 2 (1973), 485.
- 106.
The Writers’ Association and a group of prominent intellectuals wrote an open letter in which they prodded their government for action and protested the intolerable status quo. See Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the costs of war: Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 126.
- 107.
Nasser was so interested in university students’ protests that he requested an analysis of the slogans they raised. See Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 232.
- 108.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 214.
- 109.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 106–107.
- 110.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 214.
- 111.
Hamid Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 175.
- 112.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 51–52.
- 113.
Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, 129–130.
- 114.
The Free Officers Movement was divided and fractured along ideological lines; some officers subscribed to traditional, conservative Islamism (Kemal ad-Din Hussein), some were simply technocrats (Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi), others held more radical, mostly leftist, populist stances (Ali Sabri, Kemal ad-Din Rifa’at).
- 115.
Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, 252–254, 309; Robert Stephens, Nasser (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 511–537.
- 116.
John Waterbury, “Egypt: The Wages of Dependency,” in The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Hope, ed. L. Udovitch (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976).
- 117.
Nasser issued the Law of Encouragement of Capital in June 1968.
- 118.
Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, 253–309; Iliya Harik, The Political. Mobilization of Peasants: The Study of an Egyptian Community (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1974).
- 119.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 66.
- 120.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 107–108.
- 121.
Sayyid Marei, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Documents] (Cairo: The New Egyptian Library, 1978).
- 122.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 112.
- 123.
Two particularly prominent works, Self-Criticism after the Defeat (1968) and Critique of Religious Thought (1969), were penned by the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-Azm. He basically criticized the half-hearted secularism of the Arab world and attributed backwardness to the powerful impact religion and other traditions and mores had on political thinking and practices and called for a total revolution in ideas and practices in order to pull the Arabs out of their stagnation and incompetence. The Syrian playwright Saadallah Wannous wrote a shocking play entitled A Joy Party for the 5th of June, mocking the security apparatus and the secret police. Adonis, a Syrian poet and intellectual, mockingly likened the way Arab pilots treated their MIGs firefighters like a Bedouin treated his camel. Nizar Qabbani, the most revered Arab poet, wrote of the repression of women in the Arab world and called Arab ways with women the ‘harem mentality’ and wondered what this mentality would generate compared to the phenomenon of Israeli female soldiers. See Isam al-Khafaji, “Beyond the Ultra-Nationalist State,” Middle East Report no. 187–188 (1994), 35.
- 124.
Al-Khafaji, “Beyond the Ultra-Nationalist State,” 35.
- 125.
Joel Beinin, “Criticism and Defeat: An Introduction to George Hawi,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) no. 118 (1983), 16.
- 126.
Ghada Hashem Talhami, Palestine and Egyptian National Identity (New York: Praeger, 1992); Fouad Mattar, Hakim al-thawrah: qissat hayat al-Doctor George Habash (London: Highlight Publications, 1984).
- 127.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 218.
- 128.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 74.
- 129.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 266.
- 130.
There were several reports of the appearance of the “Virgin Mary.” Al-Ahram newspaper even published what it claimed to be an authentic photo of Mary on its front page; Egyptians of all walks of life became obsessed with the story until authorities became worried that this was spinning out of control and decided to play down the story. See Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980), 489–490.
- 131.
There was a noticeable increase in the use of salient religious imagery, particularly that of the Crusades. Two alleged statements were recalled: General Allenby who, after victoriously entering Jerusalem after WWI, allegedly said, “The Crusades are at an end” and General Gouraud of France who after entering Damascus allegedly visited Saladin’s tomb and said, “Saladin, we have returned.” The 1973 War was a vivid example of the rising salience of religion for both state and society; the war itself was called “Ramadan,” after the holy month of fasting for Muslims; the operational code name for crossing the Suez Canal was “Badr,” a reference to a famous battle fought by the prophet against infidels. Of course, myths about divine intervention, miracles, and white angels fighting alongside the Egyptian army were rampant. The emergence of this imagery was part of the efforts to historicize the loss and depict defeat as part of a universal struggle against unrelenting modern Crusaders who undermined the Ottoman Empire, created secular nation-states and established Israel in the heart of the Arab world. See Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 281–282. Similar image of the Mongols invasion of Baghdad in 1258 were to be evoked after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.
- 132.
Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam,” 487–488.
- 133.
Before 1967 Nasser had abolished Sharia’ courts (Islamic courts), nationalized Islamic endowments, repressed the Muslim Brotherhood, refused to join Pan-Islamist international organizations, and censored the Friday prayers. See El-Hasan, “Democracy Prevention in the Arab World,” 181.
- 134.
Cited in El-Hasan, “Democracy Prevention in the Arab World,” 181.
- 135.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 269.
- 136.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 93–94.
- 137.
Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel,’” 273.
- 138.
Hamid Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 218.
- 139.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 79–80.
- 140.
Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 103.
- 141.
Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Society Vs. the State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 59–65.
- 142.
Adeed Dawisha, The Arab Radicals (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 90.
- 143.
Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam,” 492.
- 144.
Heikal who championed the argument that Egypt was a state with national interests but also a revolution that knew no boundaries and that embodied “an idea, a tide, a historical movement” now “grudgingly conceded that the state has triumphed over the aspirations of Pan-Arabism.” See Fouad Ajami, “The End of Pan-Arabism,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978–79), 356.
- 145.
George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III: Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen and Libya (New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers Inc., 1973), 132–133.
- 146.
Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, 133–134.
- 147.
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969–1970: A Case Study of Limited Local War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
- 148.
In response to Nasser’s conciliatory policies, the radical Palestinian factions launched large demonstrations against the ceasefire and against Nasser whom they called a “coward.” Iraq denounced Nasser as well. Nasser responded by imposing some sanctions on Palestinian guerrillas and by mocking those who were trying to outbid him by calling upon them to send their armies and join the struggle.
- 149.
Aijaz Ahmad, “The Arab Stasis,” Monthly Review 27, no. 1 (May 1975); Robert Stephens, Nasser (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 511–520; John Waterbury, “Egypt: The Wages of Dependency,” in The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Hope, ed. Udovitch (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976).
- 150.
Only three days after accepting UN Resolution 242, Nasser addressed his military commanders that “Everything you hear us say about the UN resolution is not meant for you… Please remember what I have said before—what has been taken by force can only be recovered by force. This is not rhetoric: I mean it … so you don’t need to pay any attention to anything I may say in public about a peaceful solution.” See Laura M. James, “Military/Political Means/Ends: Egyptian Decision-Making in the War of Attrition,” in The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–73, ed. Nigel J. Ashton (New York: Routledge, 2007), 93.
- 151.
Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1997), 29–30.
- 152.
A. M. Farid, Min mahadir ijtima’at abd al-nasir al-‘arabiyya wa al-dawliyya (Beirut: Dar al-Muthallath, 1979), 119.
- 153.
Farid, Min mahadir ijtima’at abd al-nasir, 136.
- 154.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 107.
- 155.
Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Middle East Research, 1980), 192–195.
- 156.
Shukrallah, “Political Crisis/Conflict in post-1967 Egypt,” 70.
- 157.
Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 119.
- 158.
Nobody knew exactly the rationale for this move; some believed that this unexpected decision was an expression of Egyptian displeasure at Soviet reluctance to provide them with sophisticated weapons; others say the move reflected Egypt’s increasing worries over Soviet influence within Egypt; still other explanations depicted the move as part of Sadat’s strategic plan of deception—a weak Egypt would not dare launch a war against Israel without Soviet support. Israel would thus be lax in its vigilance providing Egypt with an opportune moment for war.
- 159.
Sadat sent his envoy Hafiz Ismail to hold secret and open meetings with the Americans.
- 160.
Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (London: Collins, 1978), 238.
- 161.
Bahgat Korany, “The Glory That Was? The Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamic Alliance Decisions, October 1973,” International Political Science Review 5, no. 1 (1984), 52.
- 162.
Sadat, In Search of Identity, 237.
- 163.
Egyptians understood their limitations and were careful in formulating limited war objectives. They also identified Israeli weaknesses: lengthy borders and multiple fronts; long interior lines of communications; limited capacity for prolonged wars; and Israel’s overconfidence and underestimation of Egyptian capabilities and resolve. This understanding formed the basis for the Egyptian military plans.
- 164.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Little Brown & Co., 1982), 460. However, going to war was not simply due to popular demands and protests, or to break the diplomatic stalemate; there were also tremendous economic pressures that exacerbated the political predicament. Sadat mentioned that “Securing a loaf of bread in 1974 was not on the horizon. We had debts due for payment in December according to international regulations, and there was no way we could repay them. We did not have 1 mil’s worth of hard currency. This was one of the factors that contributed to my decision to go to war, because if 1974 were to come with us in that state, Israel would not have needed to fire a single shot.” See Barnett, Confronting the costs of war, 118.
- 165.
Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat, 35–36.
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Zabad, I.M. (2019). Egypt: Defeat and the Transformation of State and Society. In: The Aftermath of Defeats in War. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13747-2_2
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