Abstract
The judgment of proportionality—i.e. the weighing or balancing of two or more competing legal principles—is often said to be the core of legal reasoning. One of the premises underlying such a contention is that judges (should) adhere to a non-positivistic legal approach: when justifying their rulings, that is, they are certainly “bound by the Law”, but not as this is understood within legal positivism. A non-positivistic conception of law entails the claim that judges interpreting and applying legal norms do combine, in fact, legal and moral reasoning. On the other hand, constitutionalism , as a paradigm in law and jurisprudence, implies that a culture of justification extends to all public authorities, i.e. not only to the executive branch and the judiciary but also to legislatures. Thus, the sole fact that a parliament has been democratically elected is not enough to entirely satisfy its claim to legitimacy—in other words, winning elections cannot be the only basis of legislative authority. Against this backdrop, the focus of this chapter is to explore the possibility of broadening the principle of proportionality , as characterized by Robert Alexy, to legislative decisions. Additionally, and in connection with the non-positivistic legal approach just mentioned, the second part of the essay will highlight some misunderstandings about the study of lawmaking which one can find in the province of legal theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Alexy (2002).
- 2.
See Alexy (2014, p. 52).
- 3.
García Figueroa (2017, pp. 523–547) connects both perspectives, i.e. constitutionalism and postpositivism, with the meaning of the principle of proportionality; in the referred article he focuses on discussing and rejecting Alexy’s Exklusionstheorem, though.
- 4.
Prieto (2013).
- 5.
- 6.
Wintgens is a pioneer in criticising standard legal theory for largely ignoring the role of legislator—a role which remains undertheorised—, and for dwelling on the false premise underlying the “legalistic” approach to legal studies, namely that the law is the result of political decision-making within the impure realm of politics—whereas the realm of law would be the place for neutral and objective methods of reasoning and decision making. Wintgens (2012) provides an indispensable new perspective for legal theory, focusing on “the role of practical reason in the creation of legal norms upon which norm givers are considered not merely political actors but legal actors as well”. Of course, he is not alone in the legisprudential project: a number of authors including very well-known legal theorists have inspired and contributed to his approach (Wintgens mentions, among others, Aarnio, Alexy, Atienza, Bankowski, Besson, Calabresi, Campbell, Gardner, MacCormick, Michelmann, Oliver-Lalana, Ost, Paulson, Peczenik, Sartori, Teubner, Timmermans, Tropper, van der Kerchove, Voermans, Waldron, or Xanthaki, among others). On the place of legisprudence in legal studies, see further Chap. 11 and Chap. 12 in this volume.
- 7.
As explained in Chap. 8, Atienza now prefers the phrase “systematic rationality”.
- 8.
After having identified these five levels of rationality, Atienza adds a level of efficiency as a transversal kind of rationality which implies achieving a balance between all other levels (upon considering the goals of legislation). For instance, clarity and systematicity might be pushed into the background if, though contributing to legal certainty, they are an obstacle to political consensus. With a focus on this criterion of lawmaking efficiency, in several of his writings Atienza has outlined a detailed model of argumentation in the context of legislation. See, among other works, Atienza (2018; Chap. 8 in this volume). Díez-Ripollés also refers to the ethical or axiological level of legislative rationality. However, he links this level of rationality to “social ethics” rather than to “critical ethics”. In his view, when an ethical controversy arises, it is a political agreement on convictions that solves this controversy, instead of legal-moral reasoning. See his contribution to this book (Chap. 3).
- 9.
On legislative lobbying, see further Chap. 10 in this volume.
- 10.
As Calvo highlights (2018), a closer look at the contexts and new realities of “regulation” reveals a transition from the regulatory State to a post-regulatory State that incorporates these new developments in state regulation and deploys new regulatory techniques of private nature that even replace official regulation in some areas, especially in economic and financial matters.
- 11.
Noll (1973).
- 12.
- 13.
Following the steps of enlightened authors such as Beccaria, Bentham or Montesquieu, the Italian legal scholar Gaetano Filangieri coined the term “science of legislation” in his six-volume essay entitled Scienza della Legislazione (1780/1784). The book was translated into several languages and had a great impact on the modernisation of both the European and American legal system, especially with regard to the need of accuracy when drafting criminal norms and penalties, as well as to the need of focusing on due process guarantees when drafting criminal procedural norms. See Maestro (1976).
- 14.
Carnelutti (1930) is the first one who referred to this phenomenon as crisi della legge. After that he addressed La crisi del Diritto (1946) and La morte del Diritto (1953). See also Ripert (1949). In the nineties, some Spanish legal theorists deepened into the relationship between the gradual rise of legal drafting studies and the law crisis phenomena. See Laporta (1994), Hierro (1996) and Prieto (1998).
- 15.
In this regard, see, for instance, the book recently edited by Araszkiewicz and Pleszka (2016), who show how contemporary logic may be useful to analyse legislative drafting and reasoning, even if one considers that the process of lawmaking includes political, social or economic aspects. These aspects stimulate a number of inquiries about the role of logical tools in lawmaking—which does not diminish the significance of logical analyses of law.
- 16.
The concept of “symbolic legislation” is complex. Symbolic legislation could be understood as a kind of legislation serving politicians’ propaganda purposes, whereby the actual need of legislating is not considered. In this connection, symbolic legislation has been often associated with “populism” and “demagogy”. This is especially worrying when it comes to penalising behaviours, for both material and procedural guarantees are thereby sacrificed. See, for instance, Campbell (2008), Hunt (2012), Díez-Ripollés (2017) and Pratt and Michelle (2017). On a different, non-pejorative understanding of symbolic legislation, see Bart van Klink’s piece in this volume (Chap. 4).
- 17.
Here, the phrase “current legal positivism” is meant to cover those conceptions of law which endorse both the “social sources thesis” and the claim that there is not a necessary relationship between law and morals (“separation thesis”).
- 18.
Maximalism has been related to objectivist ethics and political views. See, for instance, Khan (2006). Needless to say, both terms—minimalism and maximalism—have a different meaning in philosophy of language. On the differences between the minimalist (say, Austinian) and maximalist (Strawsonian) programme from a law and language perspective, see, for instance, Stelmach and Brozek (2006, p. 77).
- 19.
See her chapter in this book (Chap. 2).
- 20.
García-Amado relates legal-reasoning and legislative drafting to diverse conceptions of the rule of law (“Estado de Derecho”). In his view, lawmaking makes sense once a legal system complies with at least certain formal requirements, as Lon Fuller pointed out (1964). See also Zapatero’s contribution to this book (Chap. 1). Zapatero also claims that legislative drafting should be based on formal patterns. Lawmaking requires general, public, non-retroactive, clear, consistent, stable, feasible norms. These ideas, born in classical Athens, “resist the passage of time”, and “constitute one of the main elements of the rule of law” insofar as according to Joseph Raz, “the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it”. However, a harder concept of lawmaking may be necessary. In this regard, Bart van Klink (2018, Chap. 4 in this volume) compares what he calls LAS (Law as Symbol model) to LAI (Law as Instrument model). In the first model, legislation has authority to the extent that it can be proven to be the outcome of social interaction between the legislator and various social actors and to give expression to fundamental values. Within the LAI model, authority becomes indistinguishable from power, since there are no reasons to offer to accept the state’s claim to legitimacy. Law is a series of commands or directives that the legislature imposes on society to achieve specific policy goals without no intrinsic moral value. It consists of detailed norms that are backed up with sanctions. Bart van Klink recognises that he finds a formal notion of authority more appealing. However, the LAI model fails to provide a moral foundation of the formal notion (authority) it endorses.
- 21.
The construction of the European Union is a clear example of the crisis of the Westphalian State. Constitutionalism and cosmopolitism are, respectively, appropriate normative and moral models for this progressive construction. Further research is needed in this field which provides for a realistic foundation of supra-national organisations. Turegano (2018) analyses different models in order to deal with this pervasive problem.
- 22.
- 23.
Marcilla (2018, forthcoming).
- 24.
Weber says: “Denn Parteinahme, Kampf, Leidenschaft – ira et studium – sind das Element des Politikers. Und vor allem: des politischen Führers. Dessen Handeln steht unter einem ganz anderen, gerade entgegengesetzten Prinzip der Verantwortung, als die des Beamten ist (…). Gerade sittlich hochstehende Beamtennaturen sind schlechte, vor allem im politischen Begriff des Wortes verantwortungslose und in diesem Sinn” (Weber 1919, p. 32, italics added).
- 25.
Alexy (2015).
- 26.
See Sieckmann’s chapter in this book (Chap. 6).
- 27.
Ferrajoli stipulates an unusual meaning for “antinomies” and “legal loopholes”. For him, antinomies are the result of a law-making defect consisting in drafting a legal statute which violates material constitutional norms; and legal loopholes are the result of a law-making defect consisting in omitting the drafting of a legal statute that must be drafted according to a constitutional norm. See Ferrajoli (2013: vol. I. Chapter IX). Therefore, the Italian author shows a huge interest in “the science of legislation”. In fact, he considers judges’ discretion a result of bad-lawmaking practices (Ferrajoli 2006). Yet, it is difficult to conciliate his view of a complete and coherent legal system with his reluctance to admit that legal and moral argumentation are intertwined.
- 28.
See Díez-Ripollés’ contribution to this book (Chap. 3).
References
Alexy R (2002) A theory of constitutional rights (trans: Julian Rivers). Oxford University Press, Oxford. See the original version from 1986: Theorie der Grundrechte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Alexy R (2014) Constitutional rights and proportionality. Revus: J Constitutional Theory Philos Law 22:51–65. At http://revus.revues.org/2783
Alexy R (2015) Human dignity and proportionality analysis. Joaçaba (Edição Especial) 16(3):83–96
Araszkiewicz M, Pleszka K (eds) (2016) Logic in the theory and practice of lawmaking. Springer, Cham
Atienza M (1997) Contribución a una teoría de la legislación. Civitas, Madrid
Atienza M (2018) Legislation and argumentation: towards a model for the analysis of legislative reasoning. In: Oliver-Lalana AD (ed) Conceptions and misconceptions of legislation. Springer, Cham. (in this volume)
Calvo García M (2018) Back to regulation. In: International conference on legisprudence - Zaragoza 22/24 February 2018 (Proceedings). Faculty of Law, Zaragoza
Campbell L (2008) Criminal justice and penal populism in Ireland: the clash between the judiciary and the legislature. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1162135
Carnelutti F (1930) La crisi della legge. Rivista di diritto pubblico e della pubblica amministrazione in Italia 22:424–431. Available at http://storia.camera.it/bpr/faccette/all?aut=Carnelutti%20Francesco
Carnelutti F (1946) La crisi del Diritto. Jurisprudenza italiana 4:65–78
Carnelutti F (1953) La morte del Diritto. In: Balladore Pallieri G (ed) La crisi del Diritto. Cedam, Padova, pp 172–190
Díez-Ripollés JL (2017) El abuso del sistema penal. Revista electrónica de ciencia penal y criminología 19:1–24. Available on https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5789782n
Ferrajoli L (2006) Diritto e Ragione. Teoria Del Garantismo Penale. Pref. Di N. Bobbio. Laterza, Roma
Ferrajoli L (2013) Principia iuris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia. 3 vols. Laterza, Roma
Filangieri G (1780/1784) Scienza della legislazione (trans: Ribera J) as Ciencia de la legislación (1823). Madrid: Imprenta de Don Pedro Beaume. See Ciencia de la legislación (2012). Buenos Aires: Ediar
Fuller L (1964) The morality of law. Yale University Press, New Haven
García-Amado JA (2000) Razón práctica y teoría de la legislación. Derechos y libertades: Revista del Instituto Bartolomé de las Casas 9:299–318
García-Figueroa A (2017) The ubiquity of principles. Some critical remarks on Robert Alexy’s Exklusionstheorem. In: Borowski M, Paulson S, Sieckmann J-R (eds) Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert Alexys System. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 523–557
Hierro L (1996) El imperio de la ley y la crisis de la ley. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho 19:287–308
Hunt A (2012) From control orders to TPIMs: variations on a number of themes in British legal responses to terrorism. Crime Law Soc Change 19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2235805
Karpen U (1986) Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Gesetzgebungslehre in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 1:5–32
Karpen U (ed) (2008) Gesetzgebungslehre – neu evaluiert/Legistics – Freshly evaluated. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Khan A (2006) The challenges of maximalist democracy. Global Dialogue. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=935576
Laporta FJ (1994) El imperio de la ley. Reflexiones sobre un punto de partida de Elías Díaz. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho 15(16):133–146
Maestro M (1976) Gaetano Filangieri and his science of legislation. Trans Am Philos Soc 66(6):1–76
Marcilla G (2005) Racionalidad legislativa y crisis de la ley. La nueva ciencia de la legislación. CEPC, Madrid
Marcilla G (2010) Balancing as a guide to legislative reasoning. Legisprudence 4(1):93–104. https://doi.org/10.1080/17521467.2010.11424703
Marcilla G (2018) Deontologismo y consecuencialismo en la ponderación de principios constitucionales. In: Ródenas A (ed) Repensando los derechos humanos. Palestra-Temis, Lima, pp 161–219
Noll P (1973) Gesetzgebungslehre. Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbeck bei Hamburg
Oliver-Lalana D (2018) Legislative deliberation and judicial review: between respect and disrespect for elected lawmakers. In: Oliver-Lalana AD (ed) Conceptions and misconceptions of legislation. Springer, Cham. (in this volume)
Pratt J, Michelle M (2017) Penal populism: the end of reason. The Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research, 2017(2). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2903819
Prieto L (1998) Ley, principios, derechos. Dykinson, Madrid
Prieto L (2013) El constitucionalismo de los derechos. Ensayos de filosofía jurídica. Trotta, Madrid
Ripert G (1949) Le déclin du Droit. LGDJ, Paris
Sieckmann J-R (2018) Legislation as balancing. In: Oliver-Lalana AD (ed) Conceptions and misconceptions of legislation. Springer, Cham. (in this volume)
Stelmach J, Brozek B (2006) Methods of legal reasoning. Springer, Dordrecht
Turegano I (2018) Modelos de cosmopolitismo para Europa. In: Bengoetxea JR (ed) Nuevas Narrativas para Europa. ¿Qué Europa Reconstruir tras 60 años de los Tratados de Roma? Dykinson, Madrid, pp 57–72
van Klink B (2018) Legislation, communication, and authority. How to account for the bindingness of law? In: Oliver-Lalana AD (ed) Conceptions and misconceptions of legislation. Springer, Cham. (in this volume)
Weber M (1919) Politiks als Beruf. Dunker & Humblot, München
Wintgens L (2012) Legisprudence. Practical reason in legislation. Ashgate, Aldershot
Wroblewski J (1987) Law-making and hierarchies of values. Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig
Zapatero V (1994) De la jurisprudencia a la legislación. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho 15/16:769–789
Acknowledgements
This contribution is part of the Research Project DER2017-82484-P (“Precedent and legal reasoning. A comprehensive vision of precedents in civil law systems”), directed by Marina Gascón and Leonor Moral, and supported by the Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación de Excelencia of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Marcilla, G. (2019). Proportionality in Lawmaking. In: Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12068-9_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12068-9_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12067-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12068-9
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)