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Legislation as Balancing

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Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 5))

Abstract

I will argue that balancing is the core of rational lawmaking. Balancing has been intensively analysed as a form of judicial reasoning. Legislative balancing, however, has features that are distinct from judicial balancing. In particular, it is open because the legislature may, in general, pursue its political objectives without further legitimation and is not necessarily bound to consider only legal principles. It is “pure” as the issue of control and its effects on the structure of balancing are not present in legislative balancing. And it is complex for it is not restricted to claims advanced in a judicial procedure. The aim of this contribution is to explore the distinctive features of legislative balancing as a method of rational decision-making. In particular, I will analyse complex problems of balancing and ask in which way the model of balancing that has been developed for the elementary case of two principles in conflict must be amended or modified in order to cope with more complex problems of balancing.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Alas, it is only one aspect of legislative rationality. For more comprehensive accounts of legislative rationality see Atienza (2018) in this volume; Oliver-Lalana (2013) and Wintgens (2012).

  2. 2.

    As to the “culture of justification” see also Dyzenhaus (1998, p. 11 ff.; 2015, p. 425 ff.).

  3. 3.

    See Alexy (2002), Clérico (2001), Petersen (2015), Sieckmann (2018); or Marcilla (2018, in this book).

  4. 4.

    The idea of optimisation is ambiguous and contested. For a critique see for example Slote (1989). Nevertheless, it seems at least possible to integrate critiques, such as the suggestion that one should choose a second best solution, into a more complex model of optimisation. In addition, it is not clear whether the critiques against optimisation apply to the model of autonomous balancing proposed here.

  5. 5.

    See also Hurley (1989, p. 70); Barry (1990, p. xxxix); Steiner (1994, p. 164); Jansen (1997, p. 29 ff.; 1998, p. 112 f.); Rivers (2006, 2007); Sieckmann (2012, p. 90 ff.).

  6. 6.

    This goes beyond the original meaning of this criterion and also of its use in economics and practical philosophy. See, e.g., Sen (1970, p. 152 ff.); Nozick (1981, p. 487 ff.). However, the criterion explicates a central feature of rational decision-making when choices between incompatible options must be made. There is no need to restrict it to the positions, utilities or preferences of individuals.

  7. 7.

    Dworkin (1986, p. 87 ff.; 1996, p. 87 ff.) suggests that the quest for objectivity does not make sense. However, his position ignores a crucial philosophical problem and is convincingly refuted, for example, by Rodriguez-Blanco (2004).

  8. 8.

    Binding in a strict sense. Still the legislator might be under an obligation to consider arguments that are in principle valid. See Sieckmann (2018).

  9. 9.

    Cf. for a similar view Trapp (1988, p. 67).

  10. 10.

    This also holds with regard to the non-numerical approach of Sartor (2013).

  11. 11.

    Sartor (2013) suggests to use non-numerical functions. This, however, will not suffice to cope with complex problems of balancing.

  12. 12.

    For different aspects of universalisability see Alexy (1989, pp. 65, 116, 190, 203, and 222–223).

  13. 13.

    A similar idea is Dworkin’s thesis of rights as trumps, see Dworkin (1984, p. 153). However, this thesis proposes the priority of rights against policies, it does not exclude balancing.

  14. 14.

    For the notions of competence (power), subjection, and immunity and their relations see Hohfeld (1923, pp. 36, 50 ff.); Alexy (2002, pp. 155–156).

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  1. Institut für Rechtsphilosphie, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Jan-R. Sieckmann

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  1. Faculty of Law, Universtiy of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain

    A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana

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Sieckmann, JR. (2019). Legislation as Balancing. In: Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12068-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12068-9_6

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