Abstract
This chapter consists of a brief discussion on some legal aspects concerning scientists’ responsibility in risk prevention processes. After proposing some introductory considerations on scientists’ responsibility as such, the author deals with the L’Aquila earthquake crisis of 2009, when a strong quake destroyed significant parts of L’Aquila (Italy) and surrounding villages, killing more than 300 people. The chapter focuses on the relations between scientific knowledge, normative expectations, decision-making and criminal negligence for ‘failed’ risk assessment and management, paying particular attention to the role of ‘regulatory science’ in constructing the ‘reasonable person’ normative standard of care in the theory of criminal negligence. This allows explaining why the first judgement in the L’Aquila trial (2012) is not convincing, having misunderstood how policy-relevant science should participate in prevention processes and the construction of normative standards. In his conclusions, the author suggests some reasons for the recent tendency to blame experts when natural or technological disasters occur.
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Notes
- 1.
He did not publish much in terms of quantity. He published nine articles before his disappearance (Recami 2006) and a tenth article, whose manuscript was found by Majorana’s brother among his files, was published in 1942 in the Italian journal Scientia, now available also in English in Quantitative Finance (Mantegna 2006).
- 2.
The term ‘we’ might refer to anyone (members of society, academics, judges, institutions of law enforcement, etc.).
- 3.
For instance, according to the Italian Criminal Code (Article 40.2), “whoever, against a legal duty of preventing an event, does not prevent it, shall be liable for its commission” (translated by the author).
- 4.
See, in this regard, footnote 11.
- 5.
Let us specify that according to the so-called theory of ‘objective imputation ’ – objektive Zurechnungslehre –, in order to fairly impute a harmful event to one’s conduct, judges should also verify the existence of certain specific ‘relations of risk’ between the supposed negligent conduct and the resulting event (e.g. Roxin 1994; Gimbernat Ordeig 1985; Forti 1990; Donini 2006; Perin 2018). Moreover, in order to maintain the existence of criminal negligence, judges should finally evaluate whether the defendant can be possibly excused (‘individual culpability’), for being subjectively unable to comply with the duty of care (e.g. Fletcher 1971; Westen 2008; Castronuovo 2009), or otherwise turning to the ‘principle of excusability’ – Zumutbarkeit – (e.g. Fornasari 1990; Melendo Pardos 2002). However, for the purposes of this chapter, we shall focus only on the judicial reasoning oriented to the construction of the objective ‘duty of care’, which appears to be similar – although not identical – in Common Law and Civil Law traditions (Fletcher 1971).
- 6.
We must highlight that the committee that met on March 31 was not the National Commission for the Prevention of Major Risks, because its 21 official members had not been invited. Only some of them were present, together with other parties. This is of crucial importance, because it entails that it is not possible to hold the six accused expert participants liable on the basis of the regulation that provides the duties (of care) for the National Commission members.
- 7.
Former president of Italy’s National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV).
- 8.
Former vice-president of the Civil Protection Agency.
- 9.
This declaration, recorded before the meeting, is available on line: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLIMHe0NnW8. Accessed 9 Oct. 2018.
- 10.
Director of the Southern California Earthquake Centre at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, and chair of the International Commission on Earthquake Forecasting (ICEF).
- 11.
Let us just note the twentieth century normative theory of negligence has been based (by most European Continental criminal law scholars, at least) on a positivist concept of ‘scientific law’. This means that only a definitively confirmed nomological ‘base of knowledge’ (i.e. a ‘scientific law’) would allow consider harmful events objectively ex ante foreseeable, and therefore imputable (e.g. Forti 1990). Nevertheless, the growing difficulty in distinguishing ‘scientific laws’ (already confirmed) from ‘mere hypotheses’ (still under discussion, not yet corroborated) inevitably affects this mainstream normative construction of ‘criminal negligence’. Indeed, this ‘crisis of the nomological model’ (Perin 2014) might also explain the central importance of the ‘Precautionary Principle ’ in the recent academic debate on this field (e.g. Pardy 2002; Romeo Casabona 2004; Roets 2007; Pulitanò 2008; Castronuovo 2012; Perin 2017). Quid iuris when the available scientific knowledge is uncertain, i.e. not yet definitely confirmed by the scientific community? Can we establish ‘duties to act’ – that is, ‘duties of care’ –, turning to controversial or not yet generally accepted nomological statements?
- 12.
Not in the sense of ‘scientific uncertainty’. Of course, the nature (and the degree) of uncertainty can vary. For instance, there can be uncertainty about the (effectiveness of) measures that could be implemented to reduce, or to prevent certain possible (although not foreseeable) events (De Jong 2013).
- 13.
- 14.
Indeed, the Tribunal did not clearly determine how the defendants ought to have acted.
- 15.
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Ilaria Campagna (PhD, University of Trento) for her insightful and helpful comments. The author also gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of Gabriele Fornasari (Full Professor of Criminal Law, University of Trento) and Dónal O’Mathúna (co-editor).
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Perin, A. (2019). When Risk Management Systems ‘Fail’: On Criminal Negligence and the Limits of Scientists’ Responsibility. In: O'Mathúna, D., de Miguel Beriain, I. (eds) Ethics and Law for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear & Explosive Crises. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11977-5_17
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