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Hegemony Through Self-Inflicted Subservience

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Contesting Political Differentiation
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Abstract

This chapter deals with external horizontal differentiation through the case of the associated non-members. Specifically, it looks at the case of Norway as a party to the EEA Agreement, which provides access to the Single Market to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The chapter examines the agreement and how sovereignty is transferred, and shows how the EEA members have voluntarily subjected themselves to the EU. Then the chapter takes a brief look at Switzerland and their bilateral arrangement with the EU. Although the EU allows access without membership, it does so on terms entirely determined by the EU. The EU thus dominates the associated non-members—it makes them ‘rule takers’, not rule makers. Therefore, this kind of differentiation leads to hegemony because of asymmetric power relations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this chapter I draw on material published in Eriksen and Fossum (2015), see in particular Eriksen (2015).

  2. 2.

    Or EC and EEC at that time, The European Economic Community (EEC) was a regional organisation which aimed to bring about economic integration among its member states. It was created by the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Upon the formation of the European Union (EU) in 1993, the EEC was incorporated and renamed as the European Community (EC).

  3. 3.

    See Ringdal (1995: 51) and Esborg (2008: 189ff.).

  4. 4.

    Prior to the incorporation of EC Regulation No. 216/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the implications for the Constitution were considered. The regulation authorises EASA to request the Commission to impose fines on national companies for breaches of the provisions of EASA rules. On 18 January 2010, the Legislation Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice concluded: ‘In principle, transferring the power to impose sanctions directly on Norwegian undertakings [to a body outside Norway] must be regarded as a considerable encroachment on Norway’s administrative authority. On the other hand, the transfer of powers in this case has limited substantive scope, in that it will only have an impact on undertakings that already have or later obtain certificates issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency. Currently, this only affects four Norwegian undertakings. Furthermore, it does not appear to be politically controversial to put further sanctions at the disposal of the European Aviation Safety Agency in addition to its already existing power to withdraw certificates. This would make it possible to respond in a more balanced and proportionate way to breaches of the rules, and would be beneficial for the Agency’s work on aviation safety. On this basis, we are inclined to conclude that, all in all, the transfer of powers set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 is not too much of an encroachment on constitutional powers, so that the Regulation can be incorporated into the EEA Agreement , provided that the Storting gives its consent in accordance with Article 26, second paragraph, of the Constitution. As mentioned initially, however, the Storting’s views on the constitutional assessment will be of importance in cases of doubt’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012: 18).

  5. 5.

    In the Schengen Area, there is no reservation/veto right. The Schengen Agreement simply ceases to exist for countries that do not incorporate it into national legislation. Here, however, Norway has been accorded observer status with a right to speak, but not a right to vote.

  6. 6.

    Article 115 of the Norwegian Constitution (1814) reads: ‘In order to safeguard international peace and security or to promote the international rule of law and cooperation, the Storting may, by a three-fourths majority, consent that an international organisation to which Norway belongs or will belong shall have the right, within specified fields, to exercise powers which in accordance with this Constitution are normally vested in the authorities of the state, although not the power to alter this Constitution. For the Storting to grant such consent, at least two thirds of its Members shall be present, as required for proceedings for amending the Constitution. The provisions of this Article do not apply in cases of membership in an international organisation whose decisions only have application for Norway exclusively under international law.’

  7. 7.

    However, Eivind Smith, professor at the Department of Public and International Law, Oslo University, has characterised the EEA Agreement as a constitutional catastrophe (Stortinget 1997: 37).

  8. 8.

    In Norway, legislative authority is exercised by the Storting under Articles 49 and 75 of the Constitution. According to Art. 3, the government (‘executive power is vested in the King’) has executive power, whereas Articles 88 and 90 grant judicial power to the courts, with the Supreme Court as the highest authority (see Christopher Eriksen 2013: 379)

  9. 9.

    See also Stavang (2002: 118ff.).

  10. 10.

    The Norwegian Supreme Court has postponed one case while awaiting a decision in the The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) .

  11. 11.

    See Arnesen (2004: 245). Henrik Bull refers to a long list of sources claiming the EEA Agreement involves the same principles of precedence and direct effect as EU law, but the EFTA Court has not been willing to accept this (Bull 2011: 260).

  12. 12.

    As the two-pillar system is in place, the rulings of the EFTA Court do not have direct effect on Norwegian law. They must be adopted by the Storting as well, as we have seen.

  13. 13.

    Moreover, the EEA Agreement is increasingly perceived by the EU as a burden where the EU does not get enough in return. Within the EU, there is waning interest in maintaining it (European Commission 2012).

  14. 14.

    This is in addition to its 1972 free trade agreement with the EEC.

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Eriksen, E.O. (2019). Hegemony Through Self-Inflicted Subservience. In: Contesting Political Differentiation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11698-9_5

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