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Autonomy Versus Arbitrary Rule

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Contesting Political Differentiation

Abstract

This chapter establishes a normative template for identifying pathological forms of differentiation. It outlines some features of political differentiation, before it discusses the moral value of deliberation as the basis for popular sovereignty and political autonomy. A democratic standard based on constitutional essentials is presented as a way to assess the systemic effects of differentiation. However, non-normative analytical categories are also needed to analyse the present state of ‘irregular affairs’. The chapter adds a set of middle-range categories adapted from sociology and international relations theory; the concept of segmentation grasps the effects of vertical differentiation, while hegemony grasps the effects of horizontal differentiation. Lastly, the chapter examines the dimensions of dominance and specifies the criterion according to which democratic problems can be discerned.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is a French expression, roughly translatable as ‘the EU as it is’, i.e. the rights and duties the EU member-states share. This includes all EU laws and treaties, declarations and resolutions, and decisions made by the CJEU . For a state to be accepted as an EU member, it must fulfil the ‘acquis’ requirements.

  2. 2.

    See the leading cases Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming Van Dend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, case 26/62 (1963) and Flaminio Costa v ENEL, case 6/64 (1964). On the supranational character of EC law, see Weiler (1999), Alter (2001), and Stone Sweet (2004).

  3. 3.

    Article 50(1) TEU states that ‘Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ (European Union 2012).

  4. 4.

    In a referendum on 23 June 2016, The UK voted to leave the EU. Turnout was 72.2%—51.9% voted for Leave and 48.1% for Remain. For the normative problems involved, see Olsen and Rostbøll (2017).

  5. 5.

    There is a new Bonapartianism, see Brunkhorst (2014), Menéndez (2013), Craig (2014), White (2015), Joerges (2014), Somek (2015), Tuori and Tuori (2014), and Joerges and Glinski (2014).

  6. 6.

    See aslo Kreuder-Sonnen (2016) and Kilpatrick (2015).

  7. 7.

    The concept of executive dominance stems from the state’s prerogative in foreign policy: ‘The power to act according to discretion for the public good, without prescription by the law and sometimes against it, is that which is called prerogative’ (Locke 1967 [1689], book II, 160).

  8. 8.

    ‘The precise characterization of the acceptable reasons, and their appropriate weight will vary across views. For that reason, even an ideal deliberative procedure will not, in general, produce consensus’ (Cohen 1997: 414). Consequently, there are various degrees of agreement including discursive disagreement and reasonable disagreement as well as moral compromises and deliberative majorities see Bohman (1996), Grimen (1997), and Gutmann and Thompson (1996).

  9. 9.

    It is precisely because Rawls and Waldron ‘are thinking of a less utopian ideal world’ that they find pervasive reasonable disagreement in the ideal situation (Marti 2006: 28).

  10. 10.

    Be they the liberal principle of toleration or the minimal deontological core of constitutional essentials such as the deontological principles of freedom, human dignity , tolerance, the rule of law.

  11. 11.

    ‘[I]f people’s preferred option is imposed on them rather than chosen, they may develop a preference for an option that was originally ranked lower’ (Elster 2000: 95, fn. 15).

  12. 12.

    On the concept of government as opposed to that of governance, see Eriksen (2009).

  13. 13.

    ‘Whether men are free is determined by the rights and duties established by the major institutions of society. Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms’ (Rawls 1971: 63).

  14. 14.

    See e.g., Luhmann (1997: 479f.).

  15. 15.

    See also Sigfrist (1979). For the present use of the concept, see Cohen et al. (1972).

  16. 16.

    See Plato and Scolnicov (2003) and Estlund (2008: 7, 22, 30–31, 40, 277–278) for the ‘epistocratic’ position.

  17. 17.

    This is a modification of Pettit (1997: 66f.).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Erik O. Eriksen

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Correspondence to Erik O. Eriksen .

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Eriksen, E.O. (2019). Autonomy Versus Arbitrary Rule. In: Contesting Political Differentiation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11698-9_2

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