The Science of Strategy: Deterrence and Coercion Theory

Klinger, Janeen M.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11251-6_3

The Science of Strategy: Deterrence and Coercion Theory

Janeen M. Klinger²

Chapter
First Online: 08 February 2019

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Abstract

One of the novel features of the post-World War II strategic environment that created uncertainty for policy-makers was the invention of atomic weapons. Social scientists sought to understand the implications of the new weapon, specifically how it might be used to support national security policy. RAND Corporation outlined deterrence and coercion theory for this purpose. The chapter describes two signature methodologies developed at RAND, systems analysis and game theory that provided a basis for much of RAND’s theorizing. The chapter compares the ideas of the leading theorists of deterrence and coercion, which include Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling.

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Notes

1.
David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 12, 14.
2.
William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), 23.
3.
Stephen Maxwell, “Rationality in Deterrence,” Adelphi Papers 50 (August 1968): 2.
4.
Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, 4.
5.
Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1 (July 1949): 467–488.
6.
Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), xiv.
7.
Thomas D. White, “The Defense Intellectuals,” The Saturday Evening Post 236 (May 4, 1963): 10–13.
8.
Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 901.
9.
Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1958), 2.
10.
Martin J. Collins, Cold War Laboratory: RAND, the Air Force and the American State, 1945–1950 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002), 33.
11.
Collins, 14.
12.
Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 3.
13.
Colin S. Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” Foreign Policy 4 (Fall 1971): 112.
14.
Alex Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire, (New York: Harcourt, Inc. 2008), 32.
15.
Abella, 13.
16.
Collins, 94.
17.
Abella, 12–14.
18.
Collins, xii.
19.
In this, RAND differed from the Navy’s Office of Naval Research that evaluated research proposals based on general scientific merit rather than any utility to the Navy. See Lyle H. Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences in the National Military Establishment,” American Psychologist 4 (May 1949): 137.
20.
Collins, 146.
21.
Robert J. Leonard, “War as a ‘Simple Economic Problem’: The Rise of an Economics of Defense,” in Economics and National Security, ed. Craufurd D. Goodwin (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 270.
22.
Abella, 63, 139–140. By 1961, General LeMay was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and he was furious at what he viewed as RAND treason against the interests of the Air Force which had done so much to nurture and protect RAND.
23.
Collins, 117–118, and Abella, 21.
24.
Collins, 213.
25.
Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 332.
26.
Margaret Mead would agree to work as a consultant for RAND. Collins, 126.
27.
Collins, 135, 133.
28.
Collins, 149–150. For a more negative appraisal of life in that monastery, see Anthony Russo, “Inside the RAND Corporation and Out: My Story,” Ramparts (April 1972): 49.
29.
Abella, 28–29.
30.
Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 48. John Williams by the 1950s, becomes disappointed in the social sciences division because he thought Speier hired too many people who were using RAND as a base to research their doctoral dissertations. See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983), 76.
31.
Kaplan, 76. One added element that may have aggravated tensions between the physics division and others was the fact that for security reasons, they were separated from the others by an electronic locking door.
32.
Kaplan, 121.
33.
Daniel Bessner, “Organizing Complexity: the Hopeful Dreams and Harsh Realities of Interdisciplinary Collaboration at the RAND Corporation in the Early Cold War,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 51 (Winter 2015): 33.
34.
Abella, 108–109.
35.
Bernard Brodie, “The McNamara Phenomenon,” World Politics 17 (July 1965), 679.
36.
Gray, 119.
37.
Kaplan, 73.
38.
Critics of this rational approach that seemed to ignore culture and other factors informing strategic decisions may not appreciate the extent to which the novel characteristics of the weapons made such oversight reasonable. See Bessner, passim. For an analysis of nuclear deterrence that denies its universal applicability and rather links it to US culture, see Adam Garfinkle, “The Anglo-Protestant Basis of US Foreign Policy,” Orbis (Winter 2018): 116.
39.
William Polk, “Problems of Government Utilization of Scholarly Research in International Affairs,” in The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, ed. Irving Horowitz (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 263.
40.
Collins, 119 and Abella, 23.
41.
Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) 55.
42.
Collins, 173.
43.
Abella, 57.
44.
Charles Hitch, “Economics and Military Operations Research,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 40 (August 1958), 200.
45.
Malcolm W. Hoag, “An Introduction to Systems Analysis,” Memorandum RM1678, April 18, 1956. Downloaded from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchmeoranda/2006/R1678, March 2014.
46.
Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, “Techniques of Systems Analysis,” Memorandum, RM 1829–1-PT. June 1957, downloaded on March 31, 2014 from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchmemoranda/2006/R
47.
Leonard, 272.
48.
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 384.
49.
Hoag, “An Introduction to Systems Analysis,” Memorandum RM1678, April 18, 1956. Downloaded from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM1678
50.
Quoted in the Official Biography of Robert McNamara, at http://history.defense.gov/McNamara.shtml
51.
Green, 21, 91. Green is especially critical of Herman Kahn’s use of systems analysis in his book, On Thermonuclear War, and says that Kahn’s “calculations” are merely assigned values.
52.
Gray, 111.
53.
Green, 98.
54.
Kaplan, 91.
55.
Kaplan, 64.
56.
Oskar Morgenstern, “The Cold War is Cold Poker,” The New York Times Magazine, February 5, 1961. Downloaded from www.nytimes.com/mem/archive on March 6, 2014. Although Morgenstern admits that American pressure on her allies was the reason for the British and French withdrawal from Suez, the fact that world opinion attributed the withdrawal to the Soviet threat meant that this event constituted a “win” for the Soviets.
57.
Some outside observers believed the concern with credibility to be excessive and attributed it to the peculiarly American “engineering approach” to foreign policy. See Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 144.
58.
Kaplan, 177–178.
59.
Quoted in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 169.
60.
Green, 109, 98.
61.
This straightforward and broad definition of deterrence applies to shaping a variety of choices in international politics. A more narrow definition of deterrence that sees its function as merely the prevention of war can be found in Raoul Naroll, “Deterrence in History,” in Theory and Research on the Causes of War eds. Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1969), 150–164.
62.
Collins, 30.
63.
Rosenberg, 11, 28.
64.
Janet Farrell Brodie, “Learning Secrecy in the Early Cold War: The RAND Corporation,” Diplomatic History 35 (September 2011): 657.
65.
Hans Speier, “Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance,” World Politics 9 (April 1957): 315, 322. Speier’s discussion of the Suez Crisis, which is couched entirely in East-West terms, is indicative of a kind of tone deafness toward other aspects of international relations—like Arab nationalism—that pervaded RAND analysis of nuclear issues.
66.
Bessner, 35.
67.
Bernard Brodie, “Implication for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 76.
68.
Kaplan, 79, 82, 84. Reinforcing Oppenheimer’s opposition was a manifesto issued by Bertrand Russell in 1955 and signed by such notables as Albert Einstein and Linus Pauling, that called for an assembly of scientists to discuss the threat of nuclear weapons. For one RAND member’s view that questioned the role of scientists in formulating military policy and weapons choice, see Albert Wohlstetter, “Scientists, Seers and Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 41 (April 1963): 466–478.
69.
Thomas Schelling, “A tribute to Bernard Brodie and (incidentally) to RAND,” downloaded on March 11, 2014 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P6563.pdf
70.
Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 81.
71.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 147, 225.
72.
Brodie, “War in the Atomic Age” and “Implications for Military Policy,” passim.
73.
Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 73–74, 107, 76, 95.
74.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 302.
75.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 393.
76.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 55.
77.
Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 467–488.
78.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 386,388, 389.
79.
Bernard Brodie, “War in the Atomic Age,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 28.
80.
Abella, 92.
81.
William Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in Military Policy and National Security, ed. William Kaufmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 19.
82.
George and Smoke, 27.
83.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 250.
84.
Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” 19.
85.
Scott Sagan, “The Nuclear War Planning Briefing to President Kennedy,” International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 23.
86.
Rosenberg, 4–5.
87.
Kaplan, 263–285.
88.
Farell Brodie, 651.
89.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 562. Kahn subsequently revised his view of people who saw deterrence as automatic. See Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1965), 246.
90.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 22.
91.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 98, 564. For all of his assertions concerning the scientific basis of his analysis, the book is heavily weighted with outlandish scenarios and analogies. For example, when discussing the risks that city dwellers are likely to accept, he makes a comparison with lions running loose in the city, 376. What is more, even though Kahn casts the book as representative of systems analysis, it is difficult to gain an understanding of the methodology from the book.
92.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 553, 554, 523.
93.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, viii. Philip Green’s critical account of Kahn’s work suggests that most of his analysis was so hypothetical and the information mostly supposition, that it hardly qualified as science. See Green, 38–39.
94.
Kahn, On Escalation, 201.
95.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 21.
96.
Abella, 103.
97.
Kaplan, 124. Wohlstetter’s concern with surprise attack may have been influenced by his wife Roberta’s famous study of Pearl Harbor. See Abella, 82. And, of course, the Pearl Harbor analogy begs the questions of whether the Japanese would have bombed even a tempting target if they could expect retaliation with ten or more Nagasaki-sized atom bombs.
98.
Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, “Controlling the Risks in Cuba,” Adelphi Papers 17 (February 1965): 11.
99.
Kaplan, 104.
100.
Kaplan, 104.
101.
George and Smoke, 32.
102.
Kaplan, 144. Abella, 111, 113. For a critical appraisal of the Gaither Committee, see Greg Herken, “Commentary: In the Service of the State: Science and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24 (Winter 2000): 107–115.
103.
Kaplan, 145.
104.
Herken, 112.
105.
One reason that Eisenhower did not succumb to the panic over the missile gap is because of the intelligence provided to him by the U-2 flights which were kept secret from both the public and the Congress. Consequently, the evidence from the U-2 flights was not made available to the Kennedy campaign so that his assertion of the missile gap was not a deliberate fabrication. George and Smoke, 455. Furthermore, one scholar has suggested that the motive for Eisenhower’s famous speech warning of the military-industrial complex was the leaking of the Gaither Report and its impact on the 1960 elections. See Abella, 132.
106.
Kaplan, 169, 110, 289. The need for the United States to engage in such an arms race was questionable because the Discoverer reconnaissance satellite in August 1960 revealed a nearly ten to one missile gap in favor of the United States. Even after JFK learned that the missile gap was in the US favor, he continued to accelerate the missile programs and tripled the rate of construction of Polaris submarines and doubled production capacity of minuteman rockets. See Jerome H. Kahan and Anne K. Long, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context,” Political Science Quarterly 87 December 1972): 565.
107.
Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37 (January 1959): 222.
108.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 278. Brodie differed from Wohlstetter in another important way. While Wohlstetter seemed to accept the inevitability of nuclear war, Brodie sought to avoid it by all means. See, Abella, 88.
109.
Thomas w. Milburn, “What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (June 1959): 139, 142–143.
110.
Kaplan, 253.
111.
Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” July 1968, downloaded on February 22, 2014 from http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883. Although Ellsberg outlined his ideas in a lecture in 1959, he put them in a document form only in 1968 in response to requests for his analysis.
112.
Kaplan, 249.
113.
White, 10. Some of the preferences of the military reflected in SIOP reemerged in another guise when President Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger enunciated the Weinberger Doctrine in 1984. One of its principles was to use overwhelming force, with the clear intention to win.
114.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 309, 310, 314, 312.
115.
Bernard Brodie, “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10 (October 1957): 114–115, 117.
116.
Alain Enthoven, “American Deterrent Policy,” in Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings, ed. Henry Kissinger (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 121.
117.
William Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” in Military Policy and National Security, ed. William Kaufmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 129.
118.
Kaplan, 219.
119.
Kaplan, 78.
120.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 121.
121.
Kaplan, 245.
122.
Rosenberg, 18.
123.
Kaplan, 270, 283.
124.
McNamara’s announcement had one unintended effect. Because it suggested that the United States could locate the Soviet Union’s strategic arsenal, it added to their concerns regarding their nuclear inferiority and added another incentive for them to deploy missiles to Cuba. See Kahan and Long, 566.
125.
Abella, 73.
126.
Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” 118.
127.
Kaplan, 47.
128.
For a critical analysis of the shift toward the view of military force as a coercive tool, see Stephen Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security 7 (Fall 1982): 83–113.
129.
Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 478–479, Strategy in the Missile Age, 361.
130.
Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” 117.
131.
Kaplan, 198.
132.
Thomas C. Schelling, Interview downloaded from www.gametheorists.com/interviews/schelling on March 28, 2011.
133.
Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War From Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 137.
134.
Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Some Like It Cold: Thomas Schelling as a Cold Warrior,” Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (December 2007): 461–462. The same source also notes that Schelling served briefly as advisor on the film, Dr. Strangelove.
135.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), vi.
136.
Colin Gray for one, conceives of Schelling’s influence as such. See his preface in Robert Ayson’s book, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science, vii–viii.
137.
Richard Ned Lebow, “Reason Divorced from Reality: Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining,” International Politics 43 (2006). For an example of a recent use of Schelling’s framework, see Tyler Cowen, “Crimea, Through a Game-Theory Lens,” The New York Times (March 16, 2014): 6. Because our interest lies in the early Cold War period, our discussion does not include Schelling’s later works.
138.
Green, 131, 134.
139.
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (May 1960): 109, 108. For an example of Schelling’s work that is less theoretical and more policy oriented, see Thomas C. Schelling, “Managing the Arms Race,” in Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings, 361–375.
140.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), vi, vii.
141.
Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 110.
142.
This was a proposal made during a Geneva Summit meeting attended by Britain, France and the USSR. The proposal called for the United States and USSR to exchange maps showing the exact location of all military installations so that the maps would enable surveillance and ensure against surprise attack. The Soviets rejected the proposal, and two months later, President Eisenhower approved the use of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.
143.
Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” in NATO and American Security, ed. Klauss Knorr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 191.
144.
Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 15 (December 1959): 414. This article is a shorter version of the chapter in the Knorr volume cited earlier. Robert Ayson stresses in his book on Schelling, that his concern with stability was a consistent aspect of his thinking. Ayson, 1.
145.
Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 413.
146.
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Inflicting Costs,” in Issues in Defense Economics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 114.
147.
Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 416.
148.
Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” in NATO and American Security, 188–189, 176.
149.
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament,” Foreign Affairs 40 (April 1962): 399, 397.
150.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 300–301.
151.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3, 6, 33.
152.
Schelling, “Managing the Arms Race,” 362, 374.
153.
Quoted in Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Psychology and Deterrence eds. Robert Jervis, et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 138.
154.
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 40.
155.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 38–40.
156.
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 37.
157.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 40. Stephen Maxwell is one who suggests that Schelling seems to regret that it is not possible for a state to deliberately choose to be insane and seems to recommend recklessness or irrationality. Maxwell, 10.
158.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70–71, 81.
159.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 84, 91, 94–95.
160.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 99.
161.
Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” 129.
162.
Maxwell, 13.
163.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 201. Although Schelling does not explicitly make a distinction between coercion and coercive diplomacy, Alexander George does and says that the latter requires some genuine concessions and compromises with the opponent, which incidentally must also be credible. See Alexander George, “The Development of Doctrine and Strategy,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam eds. Alexander L. George et al. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), 25–26.
164.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 109, 166.
165.
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 193.
166.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 114–115, 264.
167.
Thomas C. Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in the Berlin Crisis,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 56. Downloaded on June 18, 2013 from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d56. Schelling composed a more academic version of the paper, “Nuclear Strategy in Europe,” World Politics 14 (April 1962): 421–432.
168.
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (September 1958): 205.
169.
Schelling, Interview.
170.
Schelling, “Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” 203.
171.
Schelling, “Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” 207.
172.
Thomas Schelling, “Communication and Limited War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (March 1957), 32, 35.
173.
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 77. Schelling also expected that the dynamics at work in a tacit bargain would apply to cases of overt negotiation, 67.
174.
Thomas C. Schelling, “Nuclear Weapons and Limited War,” US Air Force Project RAND Research Memorandum RM-2510, (Santa Monica, 1959), 10.
175.
Schelling, “Communication and Limited War,” 32.
176.
Enthoven, “American Deterrent Policy,” 127. John T. McNaughton, “Arms Restraint in Military Decisions,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (September 1963): 228.
177.
Kaplan, 301.
178.
Speier, 308. Speier also notes that while the target of such atomic threats in peacetime sees them as blackmail, the country making the threats prefers to see them as deterrence.
179.
George and Smoke, 238, 450, 451.
180.
Sent, 459.
181.
Lebow, 442. Lebow also sees Schelling’s work as representing the broader intellectual development of the colonization of the social sciences by micro-economics, 430.
182.
Albert O. Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society,” Political Theory 22 (May 1994): 213.
183.
Kenneth E. Boulding, The Impact of the Social Sciences (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966), 68.
184.
George and Smoke, 503, 39, 54.
185.
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 31, 162.
186.
Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 104.
187.
Richard N. Goodwin, “The Unthinkable and Unanalyzable,” The New Yorker (February 17, 1968): 127.
188.
Abella, 35, 36.
189.
Kaufmann, “Introduction,” in Military Policy and National Security, 3.
190.
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 313.
191.
Kaplan, 125.
192.
Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, 9.
193.
Herbert S. Dinerstein, “The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking,” Foreign Affairs 36 (January 1958), 249, 252.
194.
George and Smoke, 160, 465.
195.
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 398.
196.
Bernard Brodie, “What Price Conventional Capabilities,” in Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings, ed. Henry Kissinger, 324, 321.
197.
Vojtech Mastny, “Planning for the Unplannable,” The Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security downloaded on April 7, 2014. From http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?ing=en&ID=15365
198.
Quoted in Neil MacFarquahar, “Amid a Revived East-West Chill, Cold War Relics Draw New Interest,” The New York Times (April 30, 2014): A8.
199.
Beatrice Heuser, “Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO Aims and Strategies,” Contemporary European History 7 (1998): 326.
200.
Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Psychology and Deterrence, 142–143.
201.
George and Smoke, 80.
202.
Green, 259. Abella, 21.
203.
Wohlstetter, “Scientists, Seers and Strategy,” 478.

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Klinger, J.M. (2019). The Science of Strategy: Deterrence and Coercion Theory. In: Social Science and National Security Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11251-6_3

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