Abstract
We study a vertical control distribution channel in which a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer. The state variables are the cumulative sales and the retailer’s motivation. The manufacturer chooses wholesale price discount while retailer chooses pass-through. We assume that the wholesale price discount increases the retailer’s sale motivation thus improving sales. In contrast to previous settings, we focus on the maximization of retailer’s profit with respect to pass-through. The arising problem is linear with respect to both cumulative sales and the retailer’s motivation, while it is quadratic with respect to wholesale price discount and pass-through. We obtain a complete description of optimal strategies and optimal trajectories. In particular, we demonstrate that the number of switches for change in the type of optimal policy is no more than one.
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References
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Acknowledgments
The work was supported in part by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, projects 16-01-00108, 16-06-00101 and 18-010-00728, by the program of fundamental scientific researches of the SB RAS No I.5.1, project 0314-2016-0018, and by the Russian Ministry of Science and Education under the 5-100 Excellence Programme.
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A Appendix
A Appendix
1.1 A.1 Assumptions About the Input Data of the Model
In this Section we show (4) and (5).
The Choice of Pass-Through Upper Boundary. The choice of \(B_2\) is carried out from the following considerations. It is clear that the retailer can not receive a negative profit. We will assume that in the “most unfavorable” case for the retailer, i.e., when \(\beta (t)=B_2 \ \forall t \in [t_1, t_2],\) the profit is zero, i.e.,
Hence, since \(x(t_1)=0,\) we obtain \(\alpha p(1-B_2)=0.\) Therefore, \(B_2=1.\)
Thus, (4) holds.
The Concavity of Under the Constant Pass-Through. Let the control \(\beta (t)\) be constant, i.e., \(\beta (t)=\overline{\beta }\ \forall t\in [t_1,t_2].\) This means that the wholesale price is constant throughout the sales period. Then it makes sense to assume that buyers “forget” about the discount provided by the firm (and retailer). We assume that in this case the function x(t) is concave, i.e., \(\ddot{x}(t)\le 0 \ \forall t\in [t_1,t_2].\) This happens when the market is mature and saturation occurs. Moreover, since x(t) is accumulated sales, we assume that the coefficients of the model are such that \(\dot{x}(t)\ge 0.\) The latter should be performed, in particular, for any constant control.
Consider the system
We get
If \(a=0\) then it is not possible to obtain concavity of x(t) due to (12).
Let \(a\ne 0.\) Then we get from (11)
where \(C(\overline{\beta })=a\delta \overline{M}+b\overline{\beta }-c.\)
Due to (13), \(\ddot{x}(t)=-C(\overline{\beta })e^{a(t_1-t)}.\) So the cumulative sales function is concave for every \(\overline{\beta } \in [B_1,1]\) if and only if \(C(\overline{\beta })\ge 0 \ \forall \overline{\beta } \in [B_1,1],\) i.e.,
Note that (14) can be only if the condition
holds. Moreover if (15) holds then (14) is true if and only if
holds. Now we get (5) by substituting (6) to (16). Remark that assumption (16) implies (15).
1.2 A.2 Solution of Retailer’s Problem
Equivalent Problem. Let us introduce the new control
and the new state variable
Then the Retailer’s problem can be rewritten as
where \(u_1=B_1-1<0, \ \ y_1=\delta \overline{M}+\eta _\alpha >0\) while definition of a, b and c see in (6), (7) and (8). Note that
So due to (16) we get
Solution of Equivalent Problem. Consider the Hamiltonian function
and the Lagrangian function
Due to the Pontryagin Maximum Principle one has that if \(u^*(t)\) is the optimal control and \(x^*(t), y^*(t)\) are optimal state variables, then continuous and piece-wise continuously differentiable functions \(z_0(t)\) and z(t) and piece-wise continuous functions \(\mu _1(t)\) and \(\mu _2(t)\) must exist such that (cf. p. 546 of [1])
where, as usual, \(L^*=L(y^*,x^*,u^*,z,z_0,\mu _1,\mu _2)\); moreover slackness complementary conditions
hold. Note that in our case \(\displaystyle \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial x}\equiv 0.\) Therefore from (18) we get \( z_0(t)\equiv 0. \) So equations \(\dot{z}(t)= - \displaystyle \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial y}\) and \(\displaystyle \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial u}=0\) in (18) are
Lemma 1
Functions \(\mu _1(t)\) and \(\mu _2(t)\) are continuous.
Proof
(Cf. p. 546 of [1].). Function \(u^*\) is continuous since the Hamiltonian function H is strictly concave w.r.t. u (see e.g. p. 86 of [18]). So also \(\mu _1(t)-\mu _2(t)\) are continuous due to (21). From (19) we get \(\mu _1(t)(u^*(t)-u_1)=\mu _2(t)u^*(t)\) therefore \((\mu _1(t)-\mu _2(t))u^*(t)=\mu _1u_1.\) Thus, functions \(\mu _1(t)\) and \(\mu _2(t)\) are continuous.
Lemma 2
\(\mu _2(t)=0 \ \forall t \in [t_1,t_2].\)
Proof
(Cf. pp. 546–547 of [1].). Suppose, conversely, that \(\exists \ \tilde{t} \in (t_1,t_2): \mu _2(\tilde{t})>0.\) Due to Lemma 1, an interval exists where \(\mu _2\) is positive. Let \((\rho _1,\rho _2) \subset (t_1,t_2)\) be the interval of maximum length such that
Due to (19), \(u^*(t)=\mu _1(t)=0 \ \forall t \in (\rho _1,\rho _2).\) Hence in \((\rho _1,\rho _2)\) (21) becomes
where
Let us consider the all possible cases.
-
Let \(\rho _1=t_1,\rho _2=t_2.\) Since \(y(t_1)=y_1>0, z(t_2)=0,\) we get from (23), (24) and (15)
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(t)=-p\alpha \left( y_1 e^{a (t_1-t)}+\frac{c}{a}\cdot \left( 1-e^{a (t_1-t)}\right) \right) <0, \ t \in [t_1,t_2], \end{aligned}$$(25) -
Let \(\rho _1=t_1,\rho _2<t_2.\) Then
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(t_1)>0, \ \mu _2(\rho _2)=0 \end{aligned}$$(26)and, moreover, for \( t \in [t_1,\rho _2]\) we get
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(t)=-p\alpha \left( y_1 e^{a (t_1-t)}+\frac{c}{a}\cdot \left( 1-e^{a (t_1-t)}\right) \right) -a\eta _\alpha z(\rho _2)e^{a(t-\rho _2)}. \end{aligned}$$(27)Hence to keep (22) we need
$$\begin{aligned} z(\rho _2)<0. \end{aligned}$$(28)We get from (27)
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\mu }_2(t)=a^2 \cdot \left( p\alpha \left( a y_1 -c\right) e^{a (t_1-t)} -\eta _\alpha z(\rho _2)e^{a(t-\rho _2)}\right) , \ t \in [t_1,\rho _2]. \end{aligned}$$(29)From (17), (28) and (29) we get \(\dot{\mu }_2(t)>0, \ t \in [t_1,\rho _2],\) which contradicts (26).
-
Let \(\rho _1<t_1,\rho _2=t_2.\) Then
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(\rho _1)=0, \ \mu _2(t_2)>0 \end{aligned}$$(30)and
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(t)=-p\alpha \left( y(\rho _1)e^{a(\rho _1-t)} +\frac{c}{a}\cdot \left( 1-e^{a(\rho _1-t)} \right) \right) , \ t \in [\rho _1,t_2]. \end{aligned}$$(31)Moreover, (31) becomes due to (30)
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(t)=-\frac{p\alpha c}{a}\cdot \left( 1-e^{a(\rho _1-t)} \right) , \ t \in [\rho _1,t_2]. \end{aligned}$$(32)From (32) we get \(\dot{\mu }_2(t)<0, \ t \in [\rho _1,t_2],\) which contradicts (30).
-
Let \(\rho _1<t_1,\rho _2<t_2.\) Then
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _2(\rho _1)=\mu _2(\rho _2)=0. \end{aligned}$$(33)Moreover
$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{\mu }_2(t)=a^2\left( -p\alpha C_y e^{-a t}-a\eta _\alpha C_z e^{a t}\right) =a^2\left( \mu _2(t)+\frac{\delta \varepsilon \varOmega }{a}\right) , \ t \in (\rho _1,\rho _2). \end{aligned}$$Hence, due to (15) and (22), we get \(\ddot{\mu }_2(t)>0, \ t \in (\rho _1,\rho _2),\) i.e., function \(\mu _2(t)\) is strictly convex in \([\rho _1,\rho _2]\) which contradicts (22) and (33).
Lemma 3
Let for some \(\rho _0<\rho _1<\rho _2<\rho _3\) be
Then
where \(E_2=\displaystyle \frac{a c}{4\eta _\alpha }\) while \(D_1,D_0,E_1,E_0\) are some constants.
Proof
Due to (34) and (35), we get from (36)
Hence \(y^{*}(t),z(t)\) and \(u^*(t)\) in \([\rho _0,\rho _1]\cup [\rho _2,\rho _3]\) satisfy
In \([\rho _0,\rho _1]\) and in \([\rho _2,\rho _3],\) the solution of (38) has a form
Hence (37) holds.
Note that \(y^{*}(t)\) and z(t) in \([\rho _1,\rho _2]\) satisfy
i.e.,
where
Lemma 4
Either \(\mu _1(t)=0 \ \forall t \in [t_1,t_2]\) or only one interval \((\rho _1,\rho _2) \subset [t_1,t_2]\) exists such that \(\mu _1(t)>0, \ t \in (\rho _1,\rho _2).\)
Proof
Due to Lemma 3, if for some \(t_1 \le \rho _0<\rho _1<\rho _2<\rho _3\le t_2\) (37) holds, then (see (39)) \(u^{*}(t)=u_1 \ \forall t \in [\rho _1,\rho _2]\) while function \(u^{*}(t)\) is strictly larger than \(u_1\) and strictly convex in \([\rho _0,\rho _1] \cup [\rho _2,\rho _3].\) Hence function \(u^{*}(t)\) strictly decreases in \([\rho _0,\rho _1]\) and strictly increases in \([\rho _2,\rho _3].\) Hence function \(u^{*}(t)\) strictly decreases in \([t_1,\rho _1]\) and strictly increases in \([\rho _2,t_2].\) Hence \(\mu _1(t)=0 \ \forall t \in [t_1,\rho _1] \cup [\rho _2,t_2].\)
Corollary 1
The optimal control \(u^*\) has the form
where \(E_2=\displaystyle \frac{a^2 c}{4b}\) while \(D_1,D_0,E_1,E_0\) are some constants.
Lemma 5
The optimal control can has no more than one switch.
Proof
Let, by contradiction,
and
Since \( y^{*}\left( t_1\right) =y_1\) and \(z\left( t_2\right) =0\) we get
Due to (44) and continuity of \(y^{*}\) and z we get
Due to (44), (45) and continuity of \(u^{*}\) we get
where
Due to (44)–(47) and continuity of \(y^{*}\) and z we get
where \(L_{1}:=1+4\cdot {\displaystyle \frac{ay_{1}+bu_{1}-c}{c}}\) and \(L_{2}=1+{\displaystyle \frac{4bu_{1}}{c}}\). Note that
due to (17). Let us rewrite (48) as
Let \(z_{1}+{\displaystyle \frac{L_{1}}{z_{1}}}=-\left( z_{2}+{\displaystyle \frac{L_{2}}{z_{2}}}\right) .\) Then due to (50) we get \(e^{a\left( \rho _{1}-\rho _{2}\right) }=1\) in contradiction with (43). Let \(z_{1}+{\displaystyle \frac{L_{1}}{z_{1}}}=z_{2}+{\displaystyle \frac{L_{2}}{z_{2}}}.\) Then due to (50) we get
Since \(z_{1}>1\) and \(a\left( \rho _{1}-\rho _{2}\right) <0\), we get \(\left( z_{1}+1\right) ^{2}+L_{1}-1>0>\left( z_{1}-1\right) ^{2}+L_{1}-1\) and moreover \(\left( z_{1}+1\right) ^{2}+L_{1}-1<-\left( z_{1}-1\right) ^{2}-L_{1}+1,\) i.e., \(L_{1}<-\left( z_{1}\right) ^{2}<-1\), in contradiction with (49).
Due to Lemma 5, only two cases are possible, namely \(\rho _2=t_2\) and \(\rho _1=t_1\).
Lemma 6
(i) If \(\rho _2=t_2\) then the optimal control is
where
while \(q_{1}=a\left( \rho _{1}-t_{1}\right) \in \left[ 0;a\left( t_{2}-t_{1}\right) \right] \) is the root of the equation
(ii) If \(\rho _1=t_1\) then the optimal control is
where
while \(q_2=a\left( t_{2}-\rho _{2}\right) \in \left[ 0;a\left( t_{2}-t_{1}\right) \right] \) is the root of the equation
Proof
As in the proof of Lemma 5, we can write the form of \(y^*(t), z(t)\) and \(u^*(t)\). But now we have only one switch. To finish the proof we need only use the conditions \(y^*\left( t_1\right) =y_1, z\left( t_2\right) =0,\) continuity of optimal trajectories and optimal control, and straightforward calculations.
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Bykadorov, I. (2019). Dynamic Marketing Model: Optimization of Retailer’s Role. In: Evtushenko, Y., Jaćimović, M., Khachay, M., Kochetov, Y., Malkova, V., Posypkin, M. (eds) Optimization and Applications. OPTIMA 2018. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 974. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10934-9_28
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