Abstract
Part Four responds to the research questions posed (Chap. 1), including the major one: what are the main drivers of development assistance and what explains the extensive variation in the performances of individual countries? It starts (Section 1) by addressing one potential driver that almost disappeared under the radar with the countries selected for scrutiny: the impact of the colonial past on their aid policy. The main conclusion: there is no one policy driver but many, varying from one aid-providing country to another, and over time from one government to the next. Nevertheless, countries basing their policy mainly on ideal domestic societal values (solidarity, humanity), and mainly pursuing international common goods rather than self-serving interests, score highest in relative terms as ODA providers.
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Notes
- 1.
The aid and development policy of the EU—an extensive literature exists—is dealt with only in passing here.
- 2.
For an early discussion, inter alia, Vital (1970).
- 3.
The literature on colonialism and the decolonization processes is extensive; any shortlist will be arbitrary and may omit important aspects as well as outstanding authors. For some good overviews, see, inter alia, Heinlein (2002), Springhall (2001), Darby (1987), Kent (1992), Waites (1999), Chamberlain (1999), 2nd edition; Howe (1993), and Ryan and Pungong (2000).
- 4.
In the wake of colonial administrations, private sector and civil society actors from the imperial power appeared on the scene, all with an agenda of their own, exploiting the resources and making a profit (private sector actors) or spreading the Gospel (in the case of missionary societies). Nevertheless, pursuing their primary interests, these various actors facilitated the transmission of new technologies, capital and knowledge (mainly private sector enterprises), and social services, such as health and education (mainly the missionaries). In the early “aid era” and even later, such activities were given priority by donor countries, even activating the same kind of change agents (private sector actors and NGOs)—although with an important difference: in principle, the recipient governments had a say.
- 5.
As documented in the literature, after Independence Day the former colonial powers channelled a generous share of their bilateral development assistance to the newly independent states (for Britain see, inter alia, Horesh 1984: 110ff; for France see, inter alia, Hugon 1984: 187ff). Philippe Hugon, however, broadened the perspective in the case of France, asserting that the development cooperation did not emerge with the ending of colonization, “but corresponded historically to a new phase in the relations between the former parent states and the former colonies; a phase in which the direct, political presence of the former parent state was no longer indispensable to the maintenance of its economic and cultural interests and when economic relations with the ‘periphery’ tended to loosen (with the exception of countries producing strategic products), whilst the costs of sovereignty were rising” (p. 179). The aid policy of France existed within the geopolitical framework of defence of the French language and culture, of France’s military presence and policing role in francophone Africa, of this region’s integration in the French monetary zone, of France’s quest for security and for supply of raw material—but also of assistance and development within francophone Africa, Hugon observed.
- 6.
Although started by the Commonwealth countries, it opened its membership to other countries both within and outside the region—including the US and the members of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The model involved development cooperation not only between industrial countries and developing countries, but also between countries within the region, especially involving technical assistance (HMSO 1964).
- 7.
By 1975, the share going to the Commonwealth had been reduced to about two-thirds of bilateral ODA. In 1980, independent Commonwealth countries received 59.6% of the total bilateral ODA of the UK; the share of its main recipient—India—was 10.7%. In addition, 3.9% went to dependent Commonwealth. Non-Commonwealth developing countries received 24.5% of total UK ODA, of which Pakistan received 3.4% and the Sudan 4.2%. Joint Commonwealth/non-Commonwealth recipients received 12.2% of total bilateral ODA that year. Although about 130 countries received bilateral ODA, the assistance was highly concentrated—the ten largest recipients were allocated half of the net disbursement. All ten, except Pakistan and the Sudan—countries with strong imperial and Commonwealth connections—were in the Commonwealth, Edward Horesh noted. He added that “[a]lthough it is hard to find official confirmation of this, remarks by ministers of both leading political parties indicate the importance of Commonwealth ‘ties’” (Horesh 1984: 110–111).
- 8.
The civil and administrative costs of the DOMs (Département d’Outre-Mer—French overseas departments) and the TOMs (Territoires d’Outre-Mer—French overseas territories) made up a high share of total French ODA into the 1970s—about 42% calculated by Philippe Hugon. It amounted to 43.5% of total ODA in 1977, declining to 41.3% in 1980. The “ordinary” bilateral ODA—administered by the Ministry of (Development) Cooperation to about twenty-six developing countries—amounted to 24%. Hugon put it into perspective: “The Magreb countries and the French-speaking African countries receive 90% of the aid given to Africa, i.e. 30 times more than Latin America and 100 times more than India” (Hugon 1984: 186–188; quotation 188). As noted earlier, the inclusion in the ODA statistics of the expenses related to the DOMs and TOMs was controversial but accepted by the OECD DAC into the 1980s. At times, however, the DAC provided data that showed the performance both with and without the assistance to the DOMs and TOMs included.
- 9.
In the beginning of the 1980s, technical cooperation (credits) made up more than 60% of the bilateral assistance. About one-third of the technical assistance personnel in the world were French—the number of French technical assistance (TA) experts were estimated at about 29,000, of which about half (14,400) were in the Maghreb countries. The share made up of teachers was high and increasing. The technical and cultural assistance provided employment to 30,000 persons and, depending on the geographical area in which they were stationed, 50–72% of the expenses of the TA personnel was spent in France or on French products (Hugon 1984: 188–189, 199; quotations [text], 189).
- 10.
In the analysis of Robrecht Renard, the dramatic and bloody events during the first five years of independence “had a profound impact on Belgian public opinion and political thinking. The effect on policymaking was all the more pervasive, since the new aid agency was staffed mostly with people who had just returned from the colonies, many taken by surprise by the chain of event leading up to independence, and not a few traumatized by the impact of their personal lives. Together with a sense of failure over the colonial period, there grew up a feeling of disillusion with the new, independent regimes of Africa” (Renard 1984: 88).
- 11.
Ibid: 97, 98 (Table 4).
- 12.
Ibid: 91ff. Towards the 1980s, the aid to Zaire came increasingly under pressure, particularly from the Flemish Socialists and the media, “exposing the virtual collapse of the Zairian economy, the country’s poor score on welfare indicators, the extensive corruption, and the amassment of enormous private fortunes by the elite” (p. 97). Human rights came up during the Carter presidency in the US, “but tended to elicit embarrassing questions about Zaire. In fact, among the six main beneficiaries of Belgian bilateral aid, one finds Zaire, Burundi, Morocco and Indonesia, all of which are notorious for their violation of human rights” (p. 92). Selfish economic interests are identified as a major driver of the policy—“[p]ractically all bilateral aid is tied, whether technical assistance, project grants or Treasury loans. Exceptions exist”. The procurement-tying of aid was backed by the political parties. And “parts of the ODA are openly used as instruments of export promotion” (p. 106; also 91). A foreign policy concern was added, with especial reference to Zaire, “a strong preference for pro-western regimes” as recipients of bilateral aid (pp. 91–92). Belgium provided military technical assistance to Zaire and to a lesser extent also to Rwanda. Such decisions were taken at high Cabinet level. Although “attacked by Socialists and Communists, and individual members of other parties in Parliament and Senate, and by the whole aid lobby outside, successive governments have left it intact. One justification often advanced is that the presence of senior military advisors from Belgium may help to protect Belgian citizens living in Zaire from the violence committed by undisciplined and unpaid soldiers” (p. 103).
- 13.
Alessandrini (1984: 264ff). A public report in 1976 stated that “people are so much interested in the serious domestic problems, that they don’t care much about the relations with the Third World”, an observation confirmed by an opinion poll in 1981 (p. 265). The aid policy switched “from an ethical and altruistic approach to a more self-interested one” when the economic situation was worsening towards the end of the 1970s (pp. 265–266).
- 14.
Ibid: 268ff and Tables 1 and 2. Between 1976 and 1979, “bilateral ODA dropped to less than 10% of the total ODA. […] The multilateral component was allocated to more than 60–70% to EEC contributions and to IDA subscriptions. During this period, Italian participation in the multilateral institutions was not very active” (p. 281). In the 1950s and 1960s, “Italian aid policy was almost non-existent, diffuse, unregulated and insufficiently well defined in aims and purposes. The collaboration programme with Somalia described in the bill 1376/1967 was an exception” (p. 262).
- 15.
Ibid: 169. Furthermore, the guidelines for selecting recipient countries were vague, “namely genuine cultural and historical ties (for instance, the existence of long-standing communities of Italian nationality) or economic relations, in order to achieve integration or to mobilize available natural and financial resources or to facilitate the use of complementary resources among developing countries” (pp. 269–270).
- 16.
Ibid: Table 3. Two additional countries received above 5% of the bilateral ODA—Mozambique and Pakistan, 6% each (unallocated, 15%).
- 17.
Although committing itself, in principle, to the ODA target set for the first UN development decade, later Italian governments did not commit themselves to the 0.7% target (ibid: 268).
- 18.
The main conclusion of a major public scrutiny of the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan (2001–2014)—headed by a former minister of foreign affairs—may perhaps apply beyond the Norwegian case: the assistance had served to maintain (and strengthen) Norway’s security policy relations with the US—the key pillar of the Norwegian security and foreign policy. Almost full stop (NOU 2016, 8: 9, 193).
- 19.
The United Nations can rightly claim ownership of the Millennium Declaration and its follow up. Nevertheless, other main international actors were also at work, not the least the OECD. In a way, the process began with the 1996 policy document, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation (OECD 1996), based on the outcomes of the several global UN conferences in the late 1980s and the first part of the 1990s.
- 20.
Of the EU member states that had not yet achieved the 0.7% target, only Belgium and Ireland committed themselves unequivocally to increasing their ODA regularly. France was most strongly opposed to a binding timetable (European Commission 2002). In 2003, however, the European Union, whose member states, on average, provided 0.35% of their GNI in ODA (the DAC average was then 0.25%), committed its members to increasing this share to 0.39% by 2006—a commitment that also included the ten new member states. During the following few years, several EU member governments made commitments to increase their ODA performance (Hoebink and Stokke 2005: 27–28).
- 21.
By mid-2015, the EU had 28 members. Most of the new member countries joined the EU in 2004, and the last one to join was Croatia, in 2013. Most of the countries that joined in 2004 have agreed, within the EU framework (2015), to provide 0.33% of their GNI in ODA by 2030 (OECD 2016).
- 22.
For a recent overview and discussion of the various dimensions of the Nordic and Scandinavian cooperation, see Strang (Ed.) (2016); in the context of development cooperation, particularly Strang (2016), Olesen and Strang (2016), and Kettunen et al. (2016). For post-Cold War initiatives by the Nordic Council to explore the possibility of a closer Nordic cooperation within the area of their foreign and security policy, see Stoltenberg (2009).
- 23.
Finland “has assumed the role of model pupil within the EU and has adopted the ‘EU average’ as the main yardstick for its aid efforts […] The old kind of political motive to recover the aid level was therefore lacking even when the recession came to an end and the economy was booming again”, the authors added (idem). However, as shown in Table A1 (Appendices), the volume started to increase again.
- 24.
For an early overview and discussion, see Peace-keeping, Experience and Evaluation—The Oslo Papers (Frydenberg 1964). Up to the early 1990s, operations involving the participation of the Scandinavian countries and Finland were almost always initiated by the United Nations. Since the mid-1990s, however, such operations have increasingly been initiated by the US and have taken place under a NATO umbrella. Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues, in a recent analysis of the Danish case, that after NATO took over from the UN in Bosnia in 1995, this engagement “and subsequent participation in NATO and US-led missions created a new warrior identity. This identity and the Danish interest in maintaining a close relationship to NATO’s great powers make a major Danish return to UN peacekeeping unlikely” (Jakobsen 2016: 741). In the case of Norway, however, Karlsrud and Osland (2016), kept the possibility of such a return open. Sweden’s neutrality policy did not keep the country entirely out of NATO- and US-led military interventions of this kind.
- 25.
Stokke (1997: 232–234).
- 26.
For the assistance from the frontrunners (and Finland) to Ex-Yugoslavia/Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1999–2000, see OECD (2002): Table 32.
- 27.
Into the new century, Iraq and then Afghanistan were top recipients of US development assistance—most of the time way above the amount (in USD) that the number three recipients received, as conveyed in Chap. 9, note 26. That pattern continued. For the patterns of the four frontrunners—including the three NATO members Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway and neutral Sweden—see OECD (2004: Table 32 (2001/02); 2006: Table 32 (2003/04); 2007: Table 32 (2004/05); 2008: Table 32 (2005/06); 2009: Table 32 (2006/07); 2011: 152–190 (2008/09); 2014: 290–379 (2011/12); 2016: 184–276 (2013/14)).
- 28.
This was the main conclusion arrived at by a Norwegian official enquiry headed by a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. It gave few if any references to core objectives set for the Norwegian development policy, such as improved conditions for women, and so on. (NOU 2016, 8: 9, 193).
- 29.
Although the instrumentality of the French development assistance policy is crystal clear, a social development dimension associated with solidarity has nevertheless been part of the political web (for excellent overviews, see Migani 2013; Frisch 2013; Dimier 2013, related to France’s efforts to secure privileges for its overseas territories and itself in the negotiations with the EEC; for sharp analyses, also Hugon 1984 and Gabas 2005). Its ODA volume has been among the highest within the DAC. Directed to improving education, health and public administration, it has contributed to social and economic development as well. The development assistance has been part of the domestic public and academic discourse that involved the political parties along a right-left axis, academia, the mass media and civil society institutions, including an active “aid lobby”.
During the early years, the development cooperation policy of the UK was largely bipartisan—in the mid-1970s, poverty orientation became the stated policy. With the incoming Thatcher government in 1979, a dramatic change took place, ushering in a neo-liberal ideology, making cuts in ODA, prioritizing the promotion of British economic interests (aid-tying and a concern for the return flow) and siding with the international hardliners (Horesh 1984; Cumming 2013). It took the incoming Labour government (1997) to initiate changes, gradually increase the ODA volume and bring back the previous poverty orientation. The government set an international example through its efforts in untying British ODA (Morrissey 2005). Interestingly, the ODA volume continued to increase under the subsequent coalition government of Conservatives and Liberals—meeting the 0.7% target in 2015.
In the 1970s, the FRG committed itself to the 0.7% target, but with no date set. From the very start, foreign policy concerns had top priority. More “traditional” development cooperation concerns came increasingly to the fore in the early 1980s—promotion of peace, economic and social development, with fighting absolute poverty as the overriding objective—but with an eye also on opportunities to promote exports (Hofmeier and Schultz 1984). Since the early 1990s, the conceptual approach became more comprehensive and ambitious. In an excellent overview and analysis, Guido Ashoff observes that the aid policy has always been part of the federal government’s overall foreign relations. “The development policy, like every other government policy, is subject to the constitutional imperative ‘to benefit the German people and avert danger from them’ […], and is therefore obliged to serve German interests” (Ashoff 2005: 267–268). The FRG’s aid policy fits into a realist foreign policy tradition. Nevertheless, its development assistance has primarily been geared towards promoting economic development, and increasingly also liberal values such as democracy, human rights and good governance—associated with a development-oriented—even altruistic—aid policy.
- 30.
In 2001/02 (averages), Afghanistan ranked as the eighth largest ODA recipient of the UK; the tenth largest for Germany (the seventh largest for the US); in 2003/04, Afghanistan ranked 13th for the UK, eighth for Germany (fifth for the US), while Iraq ranked fourth for Germany (first for the US); in 2008/09, Afghanistan ranked third for the UK, fifth for Germany (first for the US), while Iraq ranked second for the UK, first for Germany (second for the US); and in 2013/14, Afghanistan ranked sixth for the UK, third for Germany (third for the US). Where no ranking is given: the two countries are not ranked among the top recipients. The glaring exception is France: Afghanistan and Iraq did not appear among its main recipients (OECD 2004: Table 32 (2001/02); 2006: Table 32 (2003/04); 2011: 152–190 (2008/09); 2016: 184–276 (2013/14)).
- 31.
For a description and analysis of the emergence of Luxembourg as a major aid-providing country in relative terms during the 1990s, see Hoebink (2005). NGOs and civil society institutions were driving the issue and influenced the forming of policy as well, much in line with the traditional patterns for DAC countries.
- 32.
For an analysis by this author of the changing international and conceptual environments of development cooperation after the Cold War, see Stokke (2005: 32–112).
- 33.
China’s investment and trade policy in Africa is often given as an example of the different approach. Deborah Brautigam has scrutinized this policy for years (i.a., Brautigam 2010). For an interesting analysis of the development cooperation patterns of Brazil, see, inter alia, Weiss and Abdenur (2014: 1752, 1755) and Browne and Weiss (2014: 1895–1897). Weiss and Abdenur found that the actual practice did not always match the rhetoric. Although all the BRICS emphasized the important role of the state for socio-economic development, this did not necessarily constitute the basis for their external cooperation, “particularly given that many emerging powers have tended to promote trade and the production of commodities through the distinct mechanism of South-South cooperation” (ibid: 1755).
- 34.
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Stokke, O. (2019). The Drivers of ODA: What Can They Tell About the Future?. In: International Development Assistance. EADI Global Development Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06219-4_10
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