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Member State Interests and EU Internal Market Law

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show to what degree Member States’ choices in pursuing their national interest is limited by EU internal market law. Additionally, the question is raised whether the EU legal framework is apt to accommodate measures emanating from diverse social, cultural and political settings at the national level. The present study seeks to improve our understanding of the capacity of the European Union to tackle particularistic Member State behaviour. It argues in line with other academics that the current extensive reach of internal market rules as developed by the Court of Justice should be rolled back in order to preserve more room for national public policy choices. On the other hand, the paper takes note of the fact that drawing a precise line between legitimate national policy measures and hidden regulatory or other protectionism is a difficult exercise.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the Court of Justice’s interpretation, the internal market has always comprised of the four freedoms and the principle of competition. See Judgment of 11 June 1991, Commission v Council, C-300/89, EU:C:1991:244, paragraphs 14–16. Competition is viewed as a precondition for European market integration.

  2. 2.

    For a critical commentary on Polanyi’s theory see Joerges (2013).

  3. 3.

    See Article 2 TEU on the Union’s values and Article 3 on its aims.

  4. 4.

    See Article 8 TEU on the elimination of inequalities, Article 9 on high level of employment, adequate social protection, fight against social exclusion, high level of education, training and protection of human health, Article 11 on mainstreaming environmental protection, Article 12 on consumer protection, and Article 14 on services of general economic interest.

  5. 5.

    See, in this regard, Judgment of 5 May 1982, Gaston Schul, C-15/81, EU:C:1982:135, paragraph 33 (“The concept of a common market as defined by the Court in a consistent line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market.”).

  6. 6.

    See, in this regard, Judgment of 5 October 2000, Germany v European Parliament and Council, C-376/98, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 84 (“a measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the Treaty must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. If a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to result therefrom were sufficient to justify the choice of Article 100a as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory.”).

  7. 7.

    On the difference between intergovernmentalism and functionalism in theorising EU integration, see Spolaore (2016). On the coordination mechanisms in the post-Maastricht era, see Bickerton et al. (2014).

  8. 8.

    According to Rodrik’s inescapable trilemma of the world economy, democracy, national sovereignty and global economic integration are mutually incompatible phenomena. Any two of the three can be combined, but never all three simultaneously and in full (Rodrik 2012).

  9. 9.

    For the summary of the jurisprudence, see Judgment of 15 November 2016, Fernand Ullens de Schooten, C-268/15, EU:C:2016:874.

  10. 10.

    See, for example, Judgment of the Court of 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49.

  11. 11.

    Judgment of 12 December 1974, Walrave and Koch, C-36/74, EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 18; Judgment of 12 July 2012, Fra.bo SpA, C-171/11, EU:C:2012:453.

  12. 12.

    Judgment of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772; Judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809.

  13. 13.

    For the lack of de minimis effect, see Judgment of 10 July 1985, Commission v the Netherlands, C-16/84, EU:C:1985:309; Judgment of 5 April 1984, Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, Joined cases 177 and 178/82, EU:C:1984:144; Judgment of 18 May 1993, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v Yves Rocher GmbH., C-126/91, EU:C:1993:191.

  14. 14.

    Judgment of 7 March 1990, Krantz, C-69/88, EU:C:1990:97; Judgment of 27 January 2000, Volker Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, C-190/98, EU:C:2000:49.

  15. 15.

    Judgment of 13 March 1984, Criminal proceedings against Karl Prantl, C-16/83, EU:C:1984:101; Judgement of 5 April 1984, Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, Joined cases C-177 and 178/82.,C:1984:144.

  16. 16.

    In the case of free movement of goods and services, the case law relies on the similar market access test; see Judgment of 24 November 1993, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, EU:C:1993:905; Judgment of 2 December 2010, Ker-Optika Bt., C-108/09, EU:C:2010:725.

  17. 17.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 4 December 1974, van Duyn, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133.

  18. 18.

    Judgement of 4 December 1974, van Duyn, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133.

  19. 19.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 23 September 2003, Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, C-452/01, EU:C:2003:493, paragraph 40; Judgment of 16 June 2011, Commission v Austria, C-10/10, EU:C:2011:399, paragraphs 32, 34 and 37; Judgment of 22 October 2013, Essent, Joined Cases C-105/12 to C-107/12, EU:C:2013:242, paragraphs 58–65.

  20. 20.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Portugal, C-367/98, EU:C:2002:326, paragraph 52.

  21. 21.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 28 April 1998, Nicolas Decker and Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, C-120/95, EU:C:1998:167, paragraph 39 (accepting the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system) and Judgment of 28 April 1998, Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie, C-158/96, EU:C:1998:171.

  22. 22.

    See Judgment of 21 October 1999, Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti, C-67/98, EU:C:1999:514; Judgment of 6 November 2003, Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Others, C-243/01, EU:C:2003:597.

  23. 23.

    Judgment of 14 February 2008. Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG, C-244/06, EU:C:2008:85. See, further, Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614.

  24. 24.

    Judgment of 5 June 2007, Rosengren, C-170/04, EU:C:2007:31, paragraph 39.

  25. 25.

    Judgment of 26 November 2014, Raffaella Mascolo and Others v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Comune di Napoli, C-22/13, EU:C:2014:2401.

  26. 26.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 16 December 2010, Marc Michel Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht, C-137/09, EU:C:2010:774, paragraphs 18–19; Judgment of 13 May 2003, V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, C-385/99, EU:C:2003:270.

  27. 27.

    See Judgment of the Court of 14 March 2000, Association Eglise de scientologie de Paris and Scientology International Reserves Trust v The Prime Minister, C-54/99, EU:C:2000:124, paragraphs 17 and 48; Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v France, C-483/99, EU:C:2002:327; Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Belgium, C-503/99, EU:C:2002:328, paragraph 72; Judgment of 13 May 2003, Commission v Spain, C-463/00, EU:C:2003:272; Judgment of 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49.

  28. 28.

    See, for example, Judgment of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others v The Lord Advocate and The Advocate General for Scotland, C-333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 45.

  29. 29.

    See ibid.

  30. 30.

    See, for example, example Judgment of 13 December 1979, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, C-44/79, EU:C:1979:290.

  31. 31.

    See, inter alia, Judgment of 18 June 1991, ERT, C-260/89, EU:C:1991:254; Judgment of 12 June 2003, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333; Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614.

  32. 32.

    See Judgement of November 2003, Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and others, C-243/01, EU:C:2003:597.

  33. 33.

    See, for example, Judgment of March 2009, Commission v Italy, C-326/07, EU:C:2009:193; Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Portugal, C-367/98, EU:C:2002:326; Judgment of 1 June 1999, Klaus Konle v Republik Österreich, C-302/97, EU:C:1999:271.

  34. 34.

    See, for example, Judgment of 20 February 2001, Analir, C-205/99, EU:C:2001:107; Judgment of 28 February 2018, Sporting Odds Limited v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása, C-3/17, EU:C:2018:130; Judgment of 4 June 2002, Commission v Belgium, C-503/99, EU:C:2002:328.

  35. 35.

    Judgment of 10 February 2009, Commission v Italy, C-110/05, EU:C:2009:66, paragraph 66.

  36. 36.

    Judgment of 12 December 1996, Reisebüro Broede, C-3/95, EU:C:1996:487.

  37. 37.

    See, in the context of the recognition of degrees, Judgment of 7 May 1991, Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg, C-340/89, EU:C:1991:193; Judgment of 18 November 2010, Commission v Portugal, C-458/08, EU:C:2010:692.

  38. 38.

    See, in particular, Judgment of 10 February 2009, Commission v Italy, C-110/05, EU:C:2009:66, paragraph 65.

  39. 39.

    Judgment of 9 March 1999, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, C-212/97, EU:C:1999:126.

  40. 40.

    Judgment of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544.

  41. 41.

    Judgment of 16 December 2008, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA, C-205/07, EU:C:2008:730.

  42. 42.

    See, in this regard, Judgment of 6 September 2012, Deutsches Weintor, C-544/10, EU:C:2012:526, paragraph 49.

  43. 43.

    See AG Cruz Villalón Opinion of 5 May 2010, Santos Palhota, C-515/08, EU:C:2010:245, paragraph 53.

  44. 44.

    See the chapter by written by Sára Hungler in this book.

  45. 45.

    On neoliberalism generally and especially its role after the crisis, see Schmidt and Thatcher (2013).

  46. 46.

    See Article 52(1) of the Charter.

  47. 47.

    See, for example, Judgment of 3 April 2014, Commission v Spain, C-428/12, EU:C:2014:218; Judgment of 11 November 2010, Commission v Portugal, C-543/08, EU:C:2010:669.

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  1. Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law, Budapest, Hungary

    Mónika Papp

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    Marton Varju

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Papp, M. (2019). Member State Interests and EU Internal Market Law. In: Varju, M. (eds) Between Compliance and Particularism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05782-4_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-05781-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-05782-4

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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