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In Search of Limits for the Protection of National Identities as a Member State Interest

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Between Compliance and Particularism

Abstract

The tension between commonly agreed EU objectives and Member States’ interests is a characteristic feature of integration in the European Union. Already in the context of the EEC Treaty, Member States were precluded from adopting measures that would obstruct the internal market unless they could invoke very good reasons permitted by the Treaty or the case law of the Court of Justice. Seeing the purpose of the founding Treaties, namely taming nationalism and sovereignty, national identities did not find a place in the initial Treaty framework. However, since the introduction of the principle on the protection of national identities in the Treaty of Maastricht, this concept has been invoked by Member States, quite often for the protection of fundamental national interests. This chapter aims at exploring the constraints in invoking Article 4(2) TEU and does so by looking at the main features indispensable for the application of EU law, at the principle of proportionality and lastly, at the founding values protected in Article 2 TEU.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for instance, Article 2, Article 3 and Title 1 of the EEC Treaty.

  2. 2.

    See Judgment of 16 February 2013, Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, analysed below.

  3. 3.

    See Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014—2 BvR 2728/13, analysed below.

  4. 4.

    See, for example, part from the preamble to the Treaty of Paris which called on the founding Member States to replace their long-standing rivalries with a fusion of their essential interests.

  5. 5.

    “I. Where, in the event of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal from the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the members of the Council will endeavor, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. II. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French Delegation considers that, where very important interests are at stake, the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.”

  6. 6.

    Judgment of 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1; Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v ENEL, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66.

  7. 7.

    Judgment of 11 July 1974, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, 8/74, EU:C:1974:82.

  8. 8.

    See, for instance, Article 36 of the EEC Treaty.

  9. 9.

    Judgment of 20 February 1979, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 120/78, EU:C:1979:42.

  10. 10.

    Judgment of 28 November 1989, Anita Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee, C-379/87, EU:C:1989:599, paragraph 18.

  11. 11.

    For an overview of changes introduced in Maastricht, see de Visser and van der Mei (2013).

  12. 12.

    For a thorough analysis of the workings of this group, see Guastaferro (2012).

  13. 13.

    See also Judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder, 29/69, EU:C:1969:57; Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 10/70, EU:C:1970:114; Judgment of 14 May 1974, Nold, 4/73, EU:C:1974:51, in which the Court respectively established fundamental rights as part of general principles of Community law, and found their source in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and in the international treaties for the protection of human rights.

  14. 14.

    For more, see Judgment of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333; Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614.

  15. 15.

    Due to space limitation, only a few examples from national constitutional case law will be mentioned here. For a comparative overview, see Claes and Reestman (2015).

  16. 16.

    Article 9(2) of the Czech Constitution, Article 89(5) of the French Constitution, Article 79(3) of the German Constitution, Article 110(1) of the Greek Constitution, Article 139 of the Italian Constitution, Article 288 of the Portuguese Constitution, Article 152 of the Romanian Constitution. See Besselink et al. (2014).

  17. 17.

    Order of the Second Senate of 29 May 1974—2 BvL 52/71 (Solange I). At the time and given the deficiencies in human rights protection in the EU, the GCC preserved for itself the task of reviewing EU acts in the light of fundamental rights as protected by the Basic Law. Later, that jurisdiction was suspended in Solange II and then in the Banana Market Organization Constitutionality Case, Order of the Second Senate of 22 October 1986—2 BvR 197/83 (Solange II) and Order of the Second Senate of 7 June 2000—2 BvL 1/97.

  18. 18.

    Among the abundant literature, see Mayer (2011) and Claes and Reestman (2015).

  19. 19.

    “The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.”

  20. 20.

    “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.” Article 1 (Human Dignity) of the Basic Law reads: “(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” Article 20 of the Basic Law reads: “(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.”

    (3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.

    (4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.”

  21. 21.

    Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—Case 2BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08, 182/09 (Lisbon Treaty), paragraph 240.

  22. 22.

    Judgment of the Second Senate of 7 September 2011—2 BvR 987/10 (Greece and EFSF); Judgment of the Second Senate of 12 September 2012—2 BvR 1390/12 (ESM: temporary injunctions); Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014—2 BvR 2728/13 (OMT); Judgment of the Second Senate of 18 July 2017—2 BvR 859/15 (Quantitative Easing).

  23. 23.

    Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014—2 BvR 2728/13 (OMT), paragraph 28.

  24. 24.

    It all started with Decision no. 2004-496 DC of 10 June 2004—Loi pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique in which the Council ruled that, under certain circumstances, it will assess the constitutionality of French laws implementing Directives, unless there was a contrary express constitutional provision. In its commentary on this decision, the Constitutional Council mentioned that these would have to be explicit constitutional provisions anchored in the French bloc de constitutionnalité and not a jurisprudential interpretation (Conseil constitutionnel 2004). This was further clarified in Decision no. 2004-498 DC of 29 July 2004—Loi relative a la bioéthique in which the Council refrained from reviewing certain provisions of the implementing law against Article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of the Men, providing for freedom of expression, on grounds that the observance of this express provision of the French Constitution was guaranteed at the EU level in a general principle of community law based on Article 10 ECHR. Other relevant case law include Decision no. 2004-499 DC of 29 July 2004; Decision no. 2011-631 DC of 9 June 2011; Decision no. 2015-520 QPC of 3 February 2016. More recently, in see Decision no. 2017-749 DC of 31 July 2017 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), in which the Council, without giving further explanation, ruled that the stipulations of CETA concerning to the exclusive competence of the Union “do not call into question any rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of France”.

  25. 25.

    Decision no. 2006-540 of 27 July 2006—Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la societé de l’information.

  26. 26.

    See also for a similar approach the French Council of State in Arcelor, Decision no. 287110 of 8 February 2007—Societé Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine.

  27. 27.

    Judgment of 18 December 1973, 183/1973, Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze.

  28. 28.

    Order of 23 November 2017 no. 24 Year 2017 (Ordinanza no. 242017) (M.A.S. order).

  29. 29.

    Judgment of 8 September 2015, Criminal proceedings against Ivo Taricco and Others, C-105/14, EU:C:2015:555.

  30. 30.

    Decision of 24 November 2010—K 32/09 (Lisbon Treaty), point 2.1.

  31. 31.

    The CCC stated that “the Constitutional Court does not consider it possible, in view of the position that it holds in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, to create such a catalogue of non-transferrable powers and authoritatively determine ‘substantive limits to the transfer of powers’, as the petitioners request. It points out that it already stated, in judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08, that ‘These limits should be left primarily to the legislature to specify, because this is a priori a political question, which provides the legislature wide discretion’.” Decision of 3 November 2009—Pl. ÚS 29/09 (Lisbon Treaty II). paragraph 111. Pl. ÚS 19/08 is Decision of 26 November 2008—Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Lisbon Treaty I) and the quoted part is from its paragraph 109.

  32. 32.

    Decision of 24 November 2010—K 32/09 (Lisbon Treaty).

  33. 33.

    Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—Case 2BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08, 182/09 (Lisbon Treaty).

  34. 34.

    Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014—2 BvR 2728/13 (OMT).

  35. 35.

    See Sect. 3.2.

  36. 36.

    Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v ENEL, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66.

  37. 37.

    Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 10/70, EU:C:1970:114.

  38. 38.

    Judgment of 16 February 2013, Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 59.

  39. 39.

    Judgment of 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1.

  40. 40.

    Judgment of 6 Mach 2018, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 38. For previous case law, see Opinion of 14 December 1991, EEA Agreement, 1/91, EU:C:1991:490; Opinion of 28 March 1996, Accession to the ECHR, 2/94, EU:C:1996:140; Opinion of 18 April 2002, European Common Aviation Area, 1/00, EU:C:2002:231; Judgment of 20 May 2006, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (Mox Plant), C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345; Opinion of 8 March 2011, Unified Patent Litigation System, 1/09, EU:C:2011:123; Opinion of 18 December 2014, Accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; Judgment of 3 September 2008, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461.

  41. 41.

    Order of 23 November 2017 no. 24 Year 2017 (Ordinanza no. 242017) (M.A.S. order), paragraph 6.

  42. 42.

    Ibid. paragraphs 48–58.

  43. 43.

    Judgment of 5 December 2017, Criminal proceedings against M.A.S. and M.S., C-42/17, EU:C:2017:936, paragraph 59.

  44. 44.

    Ibid. paragraph 60.

  45. 45.

    For a more critical view, see Sicurella (2018).

  46. 46.

    Ibid. paragraphs 48–58.

  47. 47.

    See the discussion in Sect. 2.2 of this chapter.

  48. 48.

    For more, see Sect. 3.3 of this chapter.

  49. 49.

    See Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB on the interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

  50. 50.

    Decision 9/2018 (VII. 9.) AB on the interpretation of Article E) paragraphs (2) and (4), Article Q) paragraph (3) and Article 25 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

  51. 51.

    Judgment of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C-673/16, EU:C:2018:385. Other examples of this approach include Judgment of 1 March 2012, Dermod Patrick O’Brien v Ministry of Justice, formerly Department for Constitutional Affairs, C-393/10, EU:C:2012:110, paragraph 49 and Judgment of 17 July 2014, Angelo Alberto Torresi and Pierfrancesco Torresi v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Macerata, C-58/13 and C-59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 56.

  52. 52.

    Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77.

  53. 53.

    AG Wathelet Opinion of 11 January 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C-673/16, EU:C:2018:2, paragraph 40.

  54. 54.

    Judgment of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C-673/16, EU:C:2018:385, paragraph 45.

  55. 55.

    Judgment of 28 November 1989, Anita Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee, C-379/87, EU:C:1989:599, paragraph 18. See also Judgment of 12 May 2011, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others, C-391/09, EU:C:2011:291 and Judgment of 16 April 2013, Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV, C-202/11, EU:C:2013:239.

  56. 56.

    Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, [1968] OJ L257/2.

  57. 57.

    AG Stix-Hackl in C-193/05 Commission v Luxembourg distinguishes the situation in the case before him, which dealt with language requirements for lawyers wanting to practice under the home title in Luxembourg, from the situation of Groener because in his view “the profession of lawyer is not comparable with that of lecturer. It is not his task, nor is he in a position, to safeguard the language as an expression of national identity and culture.” AG Stix-Hackl Opinion of 11 May 2006, Commission v Luxembourg, C-193/05, EU:C:2006:313, paragraph 52. The judgment of the Court did not mention the issue of national identity.

  58. 58.

    Judgment of 2 July 1996, Commission v Luxembourg, C-473/93, EU:C:1996:263, paragraph 35.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Namely, Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, [1993] OJ L199/54.

  61. 61.

    Judgment of 16 December 2008, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, C-213/07, EU:C:2008:731, paragraph 44.

  62. 62.

    Ibid. paragraph 56.

  63. 63.

    Ibid. paragraphs 61–69.

  64. 64.

    Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, paragraph 32.

  65. 65.

    Judgment of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paragraph 79.

  66. 66.

    Judgment of 14 October 2004, Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, paragraph 39.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Judgment of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paragraphs 81–93.

  69. 69.

    AG Maduro Opinion of 8 October 2008, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias, C-213/07, EU:C:2008:544, paragraph 33.

  70. 70.

    Judgment of 14 October 2010, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, C-208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 74.

  71. 71.

    Ibid. paragraph 83.

  72. 72.

    Ibid. paragraph 87.

  73. 73.

    Ibid. paragraph 93.

  74. 74.

    Judgment of 2 June 2016, Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe and Zentraler Juristischer Dienst der Stadt Karlsruhe, C-438/14, EU:C:2016:401.

  75. 75.

    Ibid. paragraph 64.

  76. 76.

    Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, [2015] OJ L248/80.

  77. 77.

    Judgment of 6 September 2017, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631.

  78. 78.

    Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB on the interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

  79. 79.

    Ibid. paragraph 64.

  80. 80.

    Ibid. paragraph 65. It lists the following as examples: “freedoms, the division of powers, republic as a form of government, respect of autonomies under public law, the freedom of religion, exercising lawful authority, parliamentarism, the equality of rights, acknowledging judicial powers, the protection of nationalities living with us.”

  81. 81.

    Ibid. paragraph 67.

  82. 82.

    Ibid. paragraph 63.

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  1. Leiden University, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden/The Hague, The Netherlands

    Darinka Piqani

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    Marton Varju

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Piqani, D. (2019). In Search of Limits for the Protection of National Identities as a Member State Interest. In: Varju, M. (eds) Between Compliance and Particularism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05782-4_2

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