Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Syncretistic View of Existence and Marty’s Relation to It

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy

Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

  • 169 Accesses

Abstract

In this paper, I present, first, a syncretistic account of existence, which tries to show not only that the first-order and the second-order notions of existence are compatible, but also why we need all of them in order to properly understand what existence all in all amounts to. Second, I discuss to what extent Marty’s account of existence, which inter alia mobilizes Brentano’s attitudinal approach to it, can be legitimately considered to be a syncretistic account as well.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Bacigalupo, G. 2016. Whose Existence? A Deflationist Compromise to the Fregean/Neo-Meinongian Divide. Argumenta 3: 5–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berto, F. 2013. Existence As a Real Property. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brentano, F. 20122. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013. The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crimmins, M. 1998. Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference. The Philosophical Review 107: 1–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, K. 2009. The Question of Ontology. In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, ed. D.J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, 157–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frascolla, P. 2006. Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. London and New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. 19742. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. 2007. Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21: 307–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Ontological Commitment. Grazer Philosophische Studien 91: 81–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kroon, F. 2011. The Fiction of Creationism. In Truth in Fiction, ed. F. Lihoreau, 203–222. Frankfurt: Ontos.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013. The Social Character of Fictional Entities. In From Fictionalism to Realism: Fictional and Other Social Entities, ed. C. Barbero, M. Ferraris, and A. Voltolini, 87–110. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. Creationism and the Problem of Indiscernible Fictional Objects. In Fictional Objects, ed. S. Brock and A. Everett, 139–171. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. 1990. Noneism or Allism? Mind 99: 23–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marek, J. 20132. Alexius Meinong. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta (Fall 2013 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/meinong/.

  • Marty, A. 1884. Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie, I–III. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 8: 56–94, 161–192, 292–340.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1894. Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie, IV–V. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 18: 320–356, 421–471.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1895. Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie, VI–VII. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 19: 19–87, 263–334.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1908. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, vol. I. Halle: Niemeyer.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDaniel, K. 2009. Ways of Being. In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, ed. D.J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, 290–319. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017. The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. 2000. Logical Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Meinong, A. 1960. On the Theory of Objects. In Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. R. Chisholm, 76–117. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meinong, A. 1978. Über Inhalt und Gegenstand. In Kolleghefte und Fragmente. Ergänzungsband zur Gesamtausgabe, 145–159. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mulligan, K. 2013. Acceptance, Acknowledgement, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgement, Refusal and Rejection. In Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, ed. M. Textor, 97–137. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Predelli, S. 2005. Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G. 20162. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W.V.O. 1952. On What There Is. In Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, ed. L. Linsky, 189–206. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Routley, R. 1980. Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra: Australian National University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. 1905. On Denoting. Mind 14: 473–493.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 19372. The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sainsbury, M., and M. Tye. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S. 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schuhmann, K. 1990. Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty. In Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics, ed. K. Mulligan, 197–214. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, B. 1990. Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth. In Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics, ed. K. Mulligan, 111–149. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szabo, Z. 2003. Believing in Things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 584–611.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Inwagen, P. 2008. McGinn on Existence. The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 36–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voltolini, A. 2012. All Existences That There Are. Disputatio 32: 361–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2016. Tim Crane. The Objects of Thought, Dialectica 70: 245–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2018. Can One Refer to and Quantify Over Nonexistent Intentional Objects (of Hallucination)? In Objects of Inquiry (in Philosophy of Language and Literature), ed. P. Stalmaszczyk, 97–115. Bern: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, K.L. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. 2002. Necessary Existents. In Logic, Thought and Language, ed. A. O’ Hear, 233–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. 1961. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Turin, Turin, Italy

    Alberto Voltolini

Authors
  1. Alberto Voltolini
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alberto Voltolini .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Sciences Humaines et Sociales (SHS), Université de Lille, Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France

    Giuliano Bacigalupo

  2. Département de Philosophie, Université de Genève, Geneva, Switzerland

    Hélène Leblanc

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Voltolini, A. (2019). A Syncretistic View of Existence and Marty’s Relation to It. In: Bacigalupo, G., Leblanc, H. (eds) Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05581-3_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation