Abstract
Growing literature suggests that civil resistance is a strategically superior means of waging a struggle, but why do some movements continue to respond to violent repression with violence? Based on extensive, comparative fieldwork, this chapter sheds light on why some groups transform their tactical responses to police provocation, from riots and arson to disciplined, strictly nonviolent methods of struggle. Ethnographic evidence from two cases of mining conflicts in Peru illustrates how, within a context of legal and discursive criminalization, civil resistance movements learn how their opponents use discourses of “violence” and “terrorism” to delegitimize, repress, and demobilize their struggle. Activists directly cite this mechanism as a key reason why they adopt strictly nonviolent tactics and frames, train their activists in the importance of these methods, and discipline their actions. This research thus contributes an in-depth look at how conflict dynamics, criminalization, and movements’ learning processes affect their tactical and strategic choices.
This research was supported by generous financial assistance and intellectual mentoring from the US Institute of Peace, the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, the Chicanx/Latinx Research Center at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) and the UCSC Department of Politics.
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Notes
- 1.
Peru’s subnational political units are broken down as follows: at the local level, thousands of neighbourhoods (or caseríos) are organized into 1854 districts (or municipalities), which are spread unevenly into 196 provinces, which in turn belong to 24 regions (or departments).
- 2.
Anonymous environmental leader, speaking to the workshop in Otuzco, November 19, 2015. Rondas campesinas, or rondas in short, are rural, autonomous vigilantes whose jurisdiction is enshrined in Peruvian law.
- 3.
In late 2012, Peru’s ombudsperson registered 229 social conflicts, of which more than two-thirds were linked to resource extraction, predominantly in the mining sector (Defensoría del Pueblo 2012). More recently, its January 2017 report found that the overwhelming plurality of conflicts registered (76 of 214) are still those related to mining (Defensoría del Pueblo 2017). The country ombudsperson interprets conflict as a complex social process where actors with contradictory interests might derive into violence. For this chapter, I share its operationalization of violence as a “destructive manifestation of conflict.”
- 4.
I use the terms “transition” and “overt” here to recognize how subtler aspects of conflict may already be present in these cases, although they are less noticeable. Robert Nixon (2011) uses the term “slow violence” to describe the insidious, gradual and invisible ecological violence that is damaging particularly to the world’s poor. Defensoría’s definition (in the previous footnote) recognizes conflict as ever-present and even “inherent” in human relations, in its attempt to emphasize that conflict is not strictly negative.
- 5.
For the purposes of this chapter, “nonviolent” and “civil” resistance are equivalent. While the latter is an academic artefact and may be seen as euro-centric, its use is meant to add precision to the former. It is all too common to confuse everything that is not violent (which could be a number of things, including the act of breathing) with nonviolence (which refers to a refusal to engage in violence, especially as a strategy of political resistance). Therefore, the language of “civil resistance” is analytically and practically useful.
- 6.
For more on these case-level differences across key factors or variables, please see Table 9.1.
- 7.
Common explanations, from within as well as outside Peru, can be roughly classified according to their focal points: institutions, structures and agents. The first of these point to the negative impacts of resource abundance on democracy and development (Arellano-Yanguas 2008; Karl 1997; Ross 1999), such as inefficient and exclusionary institutions (Meléndez 2005; Ponce and McClintock 2014) and eroded state credibility as a mediator of company-community relations (Puma and Bedoya 2015; Urkidi and Walter 2011). Structural explanations centre on the unequal distribution of the benefits and burdens of extraction (Arce 2014; Bebbington et al. 2008) and on social and economic dislocations (Bury 2004; Salas 2008; Weyland 2002). Third, studies focused on agents signal competition among local political factions (Arellano-Yanguas 2011), environmental ideologies (Bebbington and Bebbington 2009; Taylor 2011), and claims about territorial autonomy and identity (Greene 2006; Treakle 1998; Vásquez 2014).
- 8.
One example of this conflation, within the literature on contentious politics, is the correlation—likely multi-directional—between state repression and violent protests (Fox 1996; Ondetti 2006). However, protesters rarely respond to repression with riots, looting, property damage or violence (Huizer 1972).
- 9.
Violent outbursts result from a large number of possible, highly contingent factors. An issue with some of these foci is over-determination. For example, while attention to grievances is useful, these exist in much of the world, but they rarely lead people to violence. In contrast to this overly deterministic perspective, scholars such as Donatella della Porta (2006) have provided path-breaking, contextualized insights into the role of friendship and kinship groups in violent activism, noting that young militants are radicalized by group pressures, social status and personal significance.
- 10.
They might do this because they perceive institutions as corrupt and unaccountable (Beyerle 2011, 2014), because their ideas of justice surpass their fear of repression (Thalhammer 2007), because they think of these methods to be superior to others, both ethically and strategically (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Coy 2013; Helvey 2004; Sharp 2005; Zunes 1999), and even because performances and spectacles of “mischief with a purpose” are attractive, entertaining and help to define their social identities (Crawshaw and Jackson 2010, 15). The factors that attract people to civil resistance are clearly embedded in systems of symbolic meaning, encompassing identities, ideologies, commitments and justifications.
- 11.
In 2015, minerals represented roughly 65% of Peru’s export income. Gold alone represented 16%, making it the second largest mineral source of Peru’s income, after copper (23.5%) (see OEC 2017).
- 12.
A common word for these regulations nowadays is “trabas,” which literally means obstructions.
- 13.
- 14.
Critics refer pejoratively to these cluster reforms as “paquetazos ambientales,” which could be blandly translated as “environmental packages,” but the term connotes, because of the -azos suffix, both magnitude and the action of striking or hitting (e.g., as in latigazos, which means “lashes from a whip”).
- 15.
Key cases of these allegations of police-inflicted torture on detained protesters include those of Marco Arana, congressperson since 2016 and, prior to that, a key leader of the protests against Yanacocha in Cajamarca, and of Antonio Coasaca, a farmer detained during a protest against the Tía María mine. Besides being beaten under police custody, Coasaca was also the subject of an exposed attempt by national police to plant weapons on him, incriminate him and frame him as a violent protestor—all with the full complicity of the nationwide daily El Correo (El Búho 2015; CNDH 2015).
- 16.
According to officials from the National Dialogue and Sustainability Office, García’s approach towards mining protests borrowed heavily from the state’s approach in dealing with the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group. That militarized response to internal insurgent groups, infamous for its scant regard for human rights, shaped the response to mining conflicts. I would like to thank Kent Eaton for this insight.
- 17.
That these charges are often trumped up to dissuade other protestors is apparent in cases where members of the rondas campesinas—rural vigilante groups whose authority and jurisdiction are recognized by the Peruvian constitution—are being tried for “kidnapping” when they arguably have a legitimate right to detain suspects and turn them over to police. One example, among many, is the case of Dina Mendoza, a well-known social organizer and community leader who participated in a water march and was condemned to four years in jail (although she was given a suspended sentence) and a fine of 3000 soles (about 1000 USD) for obstructing public roads. (Mirtha Vásquez, personal interview, March 12, 2016.)
- 18.
Out of many examples of this, a recent and exemplary case is the rhetoric adopted by the right-wing economist Hernando de Soto. In mid-2016, de Soto publicized the notion of mining-related activism as being a “Sendero verde” or a “green” version of the Shining Path guerrilla. In his words, “they are former terrorists who have fulfilled their sentences. They are not armed. They are all ecologists.” This same rhetoric has since been adopted by other media observers (see La República 2016.)
- 19.
In my experience and my lecture, the vast majority of protesters are not anti-miners. During my fieldwork, I heard repeatedly that people do not oppose extraction, but rather seek fair treatment. And in some cases, people in favour of extractive projects are the ones who organize protests (Bebbington et al. 2008: 2893). In short, the idea that protesters are “violent anti-miners,” working knowingly or ignorantly for some “NGO conspiracy” against the country’s heroic impresarios, might be easy to digest and to sell. However, it reduces and harms the complex relations between diverse actors in state institutions, companies, local groups and outside organizations. On the other hand, many interviewees, some even from the mining sector, recognized these problems of adopting conspiratorial, demeaning and polarizing discourses.
- 20.
I heard this repeatedly from Lima-based radio and newspapers (e.g., see Ruíz and Pérez 2007).
- 21.
I surveyed conflicts specifically about gold given this mineral’s particularly contentious properties, which are mainly due to two factors. First is the touted importance of gold for Peru’s export income and macro-economic growth. One-fifth of the country’s export income derives from gold alone. As of 2013, Peru was the world’s sixth largest gold producer, and it had been the largest in Latin America since 1996 (Triscritti 2013). The second factor is the immense disparity in the distribution of its benefits and burdens—for example, while gold extraction is known to be hugely destructive to soil and water in the areas of extraction, its monetary gains are highly concentrated. Additionally, gold carries a symbolic salience historically (i.e., one in which it is associated with Pizarro’s conquest of the Inca) and economically (where gold is typically associated with prestige, victory and luxury). It therefore embodies an epicentre of symbolic and material contestation.
- 22.
Interviews cast a broad net, and include mining area residents in various occupations; movement leaders and participants; mining employees, managers and executives; members of local, national and international organizations (such as Cooperacción, EarthWorks, the US Agency for International Development, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and Earth Rights International); government officials, in various levels and offices; and journalists and academics (including those near the mines, in regional capitals and in Lima). Archived documents include stakeholder publications, signed agreements, proclamations and hundreds of news media clippings.
- 23.
Early protests decried the low prices the company paid for land. Then in 2000, a semi-trailer carrying mercury from the mine spilled its contents on several miles of a road, including near the urban centre of Choropampa, where at the time of writing residents continue to suffer from the health effects of mercury poisoning. For more on the spill in Choropampa, see the New York Times’ (2010) follow-up coverage.
- 24.
Newmont owns 51.35% of Yanacocha, Buenaventura has 43.65% and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation owns 5%. In contrast, La Zanja is a dual-partnership, in which Buenaventura is the majority holder and operator (with 53% of stocks), and Newmont is the minority shareholder (47%).
- 25.
Anonymous, personal interview, March 28, 2016.
- 26.
Journalists’ language is indicative. La República reported how “the attack that locals effected last night on the La Zanja campsite left one person dead and various wounded” (Mayorga and Roncal 2004).
- 27.
Robert Santillán, personal interview, March 11, 2016.
- 28.
Adolfo Orejuela Chirinos, personal interview, March 8, 2016.
- 29.
Anonymous, personal interview, February 11, 2016.
- 30.
Jimmy Guarnizo, personal interview, February 11, 2016.
- 31.
La República’s journalist wrote that “The Court of San Miguel has issued arrest warrants for 26 locals who were found guilty of the fire in the mining campsite, damaging the Buenaventura company” (emphasis added). Perhaps the word choice (“were found guilty” versus “are suspects”) is a minor detail, an unconscious mistake attributed to lack of legal expertise—but it is still inaccurate and criminalizing.
- 32.
Rodolfo Orejuela Chirinos, personal interview, March 8, 2016.
- 33.
Anonymous member of Cajamarca’s regional government, personal interview, March 8, 2016.
- 34.
Anonymous member of the mothers’ club, personal interview, March 27, 2016.
- 35.
Anonymous environmental activist, personal interview, March 28, 2016.
- 36.
Anonymous, personal interview, March 27, 2016.
- 37.
Anonymous group of elderly women, personal interviews, March 4, 2016.
- 38.
Anonymous academic and social movement leader in Cajamarca, personal interview, February 29, 2016.
- 39.
Anonymous official in the municipal development office, personal interview, November 11, 2015.
- 40.
Anonymous local attorney, personal interview, November 9, 2015.
- 41.
Anonymous rondero and miner, personal interview, November 12, 2015.
- 42.
However, an area mayor lamented how the company provided very little of the work opportunities and social development investment it had promised to quell conflict. He also argued that the social movement had not been violent, unlike police. Anonymous area mayor, personal interview, November 9, 2015.
- 43.
Anonymous municipal environmental officer, personal interview, November 11, 2015.
- 44.
Anonymous official in the municipal development office, personal interview, November 11, 2015.
- 45.
Anonymous Ministry of Energy and Mining official, personal interview, November 23, 2016; anonymous rondero and activist, personal interview, November 13, 2016.
- 46.
Gandhi himself was influenced by Tolstoy, as well as by Jainism’s principle of ahimsa, or nonviolence. However, scholars have found a far longer history of nonviolent resistance traditions in many parts of the world, including in Islamic and Christian teachings (see Bartkowski 2013).
- 47.
About 69,280 people died as a result of this conflict, and countless people were injured and otherwise affected by it. Throughout the conflict, Peruvians endured terrorism, corruption and authoritarianism. For a thorough review, see the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report (CVR 2003).
- 48.
To be sure, these cases are quite distinct. In the United States, news about protest events circulates through alternative and social media—even if mainstream media refuses to cover the brutality of state force. Most people in countries like the United States have greater access to devices, and social media is far more ingrained in their lives, than most people in rural Peru. There is also a thicker stream of English-based activist media that disseminates activist-journalism, which is lacking in places like most of the Andes and the Amazon. While these findings may apply elsewhere, locally situated research is needed to develop complex analyses.
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Wilson Becerril, M.S. (2019). Frames in Conflict: Discursive Contestation and the Transformation of Resistance. In: Mouly, C., Hernández Delgado, E. (eds) Civil Resistance and Violent Conflict in Latin America. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05033-7_9
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