Abstract
The paper aims to investigate some aspects of Ernst Mach’s epistemology in the light of the problem of human orientation in relation to the world (Weltorientierung), which is a main topic of Western philosophy since Kant. As will be argued, Mach has been concerned with that problem, insofar as he developed an original pragmatist epistemology. In order to support my argument, I firstly investigate whether Mach defended a nominalist or a realist account of knowledge and compare his view to those elaborated by other pragmatist thinkers, such as W. James, H. Vaihinger and H. Poincaré. Secondly, the question of what does it mean, for Mach, to orient ourselves in science is addressed. Finally, it will be argued that, although Mach tried to keep his epistemology restricted to a mere operational and economical account of science, that question involves the wider plane of practical philosophy.
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Notes
- 1.
Albert Einstein, “Ernst Mach”, eng. trans. in: John Blackmore (ed.), Ernst Mach – A Deeper Look, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 1992, pp. 154–159, p. 155.
- 2.
Werner Stegmaier, Philosophie der Orientierung, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2008, p. 2.
- 3.
Ibid., p. 5.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 78.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 88.
- 6.
See Julius Baumann, Philosophie als Orientirung über die Welt, Leipzig: Hirzel 1872, and Werner Stegmaier, Philosophie der Orientierung cit. p. 111–12.
- 7.
Ibid., pp. 507 ff.
- 8.
Ibid., p. 519.
- 9.
William James, The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to “Pragmatism”, London: Longmans, Green & c. 1909, p. 57.
- 10.
Ibid., p. 58. See also this excerpt from 1904: “Thus has arisen the pragmatism of Pearson in England, of Mach in Austria, and of the somewhat more reluctant Poincaré in France, all of whom say that our sciences are but Denkmittel – ‘true’ in no other sense that of yelding a conceptual shorthand, economical for our descriptions” (James, Collected Essays and Reviews, ed. Perry, New York 1920, p. 449–450).
- 11.
Christophe Bouriau, “Vaihinger and Poincaré: An Original Pragmatism?”, in: Michael Heidelberger and Gregor Schiemann (eds.), The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences, Berlin: de Gruyter 2009, pp. 221–250, p. 248. James was well aware of the existence of these epistemologies, and in fact he considered pragmatism as “a new name for some old ways of thinking,” as we read in the title of his 1907 book. The definition presented by Bouriau aims to include Hans Vaihinger’s Fictionalism and Henri Poincaré’s Conventionalism among those ways of thinking, but one can also add to them Ferdinand Schiller’s Humanism and Ernst Mach’s Empirio-criticism.
- 12.
Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical, eng. trans. Chicago/London: Open Court 1914, p. 37.
- 13.
Ernst Mach, “Sensory Elements and Scientific Concepts”, in: John Blackmore (ed.), Ernst Mach cit., pp. 118–126, p. 119. The same view of the relationship between the elements can be found in the first chapter of the Analysis of Sensations, § 15, just before Mach’s observation on human orientation through science.
- 14.
Ernst Mach, Knowledge and Error, eng. trans. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel 1976, pp. 2–3.
- 15.
Baumann also wrote a paper on Mach which first appeared in the Archiv für Systematische Philosophie (1898, pp. 44–64) and that has been later included in his book Deutsche und Außerdeutsche Philosophie der letzten Jahrzehnte (1903). On 1899, the paper – titled Über Ernst Mach’s Philosophische Ansichten – received some critical remarks by Hans Kleinpeter, to which Baumann replied the same year (“Ist Mach von mir Mißverstanden worden?”, in: Archiv für Systematische Philosophie, 1899, pp. 367–369).
- 16.
Julius Baumann, Philosophie cit., p. 1.
- 17.
Ibid., pp. 12 ff.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 18.
- 19.
Ibid., pp. 18–19.
- 20.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that Stegmaier only mentions Mach in a footnote devoted to the internal ear (Ohrlabyrinth) and the physiological capacity of orientation (Orientierungsempfindungen). See Stegmaier, op. cit., p. 37 n. 5.
- 21.
See Hans Kleinpeter, “Der Pragmatismus im Lichte der Machschen Erkenntnislehre,” in: Wissenschaftliche Rundschau 1912; Id., Der Phänomenalismus. Eine naturwissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, Leipzig: Barth 1913; Philipp Frank, “Was bedeuten die gegenwartigen physikalischen Theorien fur die allgemeine Erkenntnislehre?”, in: Erkenntnis, I/1930–1931, pp. 126–157.
- 22.
Gerald Holton, “Ernst Mach and the Fortunes of Positivism in America”, in: Isis 83/1, 1992, pp. 27–60, p. 34.
- 23.
See Holton, op. cit., pp. 35–6 and Judith Ryan, “American Pragmatism, Viennese Psychology”, in: Raritan 8, 1989, pp. 45–55.
- 24.
Holton, op. cit., p. 36.
- 25.
See e.g. William James, Pragmatism. A New Name for some Old Ways of thinking, London: Longmans, Green & C. 1907, pp. 57 and 190.
- 26.
Joachim Thiele, Wissenschaftliche Kommunikation. Die Korrespondenz Ernst Machs, Kastellaun: Henn 1978, p. 175.
- 27.
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Boston: Little, Brown 1936, p. 463 (as quoted in Gerald Holton, op. cit., p. 33).
- 28.
Mach, The Analysis of Sensations cit., 37.
- 29.
Mach, Knowledge and Error cit. p. 93.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 98.
- 31.
Mach, Popular Scientific Lectures, eng. trans. Chicago: Open Court 1897, p. 201.
- 32.
See Mach, Popular Scientific Lectures cit., chapter 10, and Ernst Mach, Principles of the Theory of Heat, eng. trans. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel, chapter 25.
- 33.
Supporters of hypothetical realism are, for example, Donald Campbell and Konrad Lorenz. See on this Michael Bradie, “Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology”, in: Biology and Philosophy 1, 1986, pp. 401–459. It is worth noting that Campbell mentioned Mach in his seminal essay “Evolutionary Epistemology” (in: Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, LaSalle: Open Court, pp. 412–463). There are several elements, indeed, to consider Mach as a forerunner of the research program outlined by Campbell; among them, Mach’s idea that the Darwinian theory of development can be applied to thoughts as much as to organisms (see e.g. Principles of the Theory of Heat cit., p. 351).
- 34.
Mach, Principles of the Theory of Heat cit., p. 369.
- 35.
Ibid., p. 370.
- 36.
Ibid., p. 381.
- 37.
Excerpt quoted in Hiebert’s Introduction to Mach, Knowledge and Error, op. cit. p. XXVI. James’s copy of Erkenntnis und Irrtum is conserved in the Houghton Library of Harvard University. See also Mach, Knowledge and Error cit., p. 84: “Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other. A clearly recognized error, by way of corrective, can benefit knowledge just as a positive piece of knowledge can.”
- 38.
Mach, Sensory Elements cit. p. 123.
- 39.
Mach, Knowledge and Error cit. p. 351.
- 40.
Ibid., pp. 351–2.
- 41.
Ibid., p. 354.
- 42.
Ibid.
- 43.
Ibid., pp. 354–5.
- 44.
Ibid., pp. 355–6.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 358.
- 46.
Ibid., p. 356.
- 47.
Ibid., p. 361.
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Gori, P. (2019). What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Science? On Ernst Mach’s Pragmatic Epistemology. In: Stadler, F. (eds) Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04378-0_37
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