Abstract
Social science is the study of social facts and phenomena. When studying such phenomena, we need an understanding of social acts from within as well as an external explanation of social patterns and processes. In general, we can regard social research as a form of systematic reconstruction of social facts and phenomena. We have established a convincing reconstruction when there is a congruence between on the one hand the ideas and analytical frames we have in our heads when studying a social phenomenon and on the other hand such data as have been collected and analysed through systematic use of scientific method. This chapter introduces the building stones of this reconstruction. What characterises scientific concepts, theories, models, and data, and what role do they play in the research process?
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There is a dispute between philosophers of science what the defining characteristics of social facts are. Ferraris (2014) agrees with Searle’s division between different types of facts, calling them unchangeable and social. He insists that it is the registration or enrolling that constitutes social facts, through either the writing down of formal rules or the informal “writing” in the memory of those who establish an agreement.
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Clarke and Primo (2007) state that generative models are those that are useful for generating interesting claims and so stimulate new research. Downs’ spatial model for party competition is one example. Game theories and theories about rational choices are other examples of areas where this type of model construction is important, and such models are used extensively in economics.
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Bukve, O. (2019). Social Science as Reconstruction of Social Phenomena. In: Designing Social Science Research. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03979-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03979-0_3
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