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Theoretical and Policy Conclusions

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Rent-Seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality

Abstract

What is unfolding in front of our eyes is the greatest emancipatory achievement of humankind since the Enlightenment. The danger is, however, that countries predominantly and lastingly based on rent-seeking tend to be economically stagnating or declining and socially unstable. The purpose of this book was not to make a case against rent-seeking and for profit-seeking. Pareto’s observation seems to be insightful still today: a modern market economy needs both speculators and rentiers: foxes and lions. But too many foxes, too much speculation, too much unrestrained markets can cause instability, The lowest possible VAT and modest taxes on wages and profits compensated by as high tax rates on inheritance and capital gain taxes as practically possible, seem to serve both social justice and economic dynamism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ricardo ([1817] 2004, p. 110).

  2. 2.

    Jakobsen et al. (2017).

  3. 3.

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-12/tokyo-pushes-back-on-bizarre-death-tax-that-deters-expats.

  4. 4.

    https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx, accessed on 6 August 2018.

  5. 5.

    As Aslund himself formulated in a recent article: “Putin’s regime has degraded the institutions that are essential to the functioning of a modern economy. The judicial system, for example, is largely in tatters. And above all, the ownership and governance of key assets and resources are almost all in state hands.” Aslund and Commander (2016). See also Aslund (2013).

  6. 6.

    Op. cit., p. 328.

  7. 7.

    Robert Solow in Conversation with Paul Krugman: “Inequality: What Can Be Done?”, 1 May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGmUtJkTaqc.

  8. 8.

    https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV, accessed 6 August 2018.

  9. 9.

    In Hungary , for example, inherited property is exempt from inheritance tax, if the property inherited by the testator’s parent or child or spouse since 2010. The same hold for financial assets, like savings accounts, equity or bonds.

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Correspondence to Péter Mihályi .

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Mihályi, P., Szelényi, I. (2019). Theoretical and Policy Conclusions. In: Rent-Seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03846-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03846-5_7

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