Abstract
The novel multiverse interpretation proposed in chapter 4, the clustered-minds multiverse, has consequences for various discussions in philosophy. Some consequences will be explored in chaps. 5, 6 and 7 (constituting Part II of this book). One of the old as well as contemporary controversies in philosophy circles around the mind-body problem, being at the core of chap. 5. The clustered-minds multiverse suggests a dualistic view where consciousness and the physical (i.e., the wave function) should be described as different realms. However, consciousness is seen as the starting point of decoherence (according to chap. 2) – consciousness is ‘dominant.’ Thus, dualistic idealism is the most appropriate term for the mind-body concept of the clustered-minds multiverse. The answer to the question whether, in narrow terms, consciousness has an impact on the physical finally depends on whether a closed-system or an open-system perspective is taken on the universe or what will be defined as ‘physical.’ This issue is addressed in a box. In another box, the question is answered whether (weak) psychophysical parallelism would be an appropriate label for the consequences of the clustered-minds multiverse for the mind-body problem, too.
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- 1.
I do not, however, follow some of the consequences Kuczynski (2015) derives from his analysis. A thorough discussion is beyond the scope of the book.
- 2.
Note that not all contributions to Saunders et al. (2012) are actually in favor of the Oxford interpretation, and some are even skeptical with respect to the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics.
- 3.
An early treatment of the mind-body problem from the perspective of the multiverse has been proposed by Lockwood (1991). However, his treatment of the problem and mine differ in various aspects allowing only for partial fertilization of my developments with his thoughts. E.g., he supposes an identity of mental states with brain states (e.g., 71–72 ) whereas I see the brain as just one stage in the entanglement chain not necessarily connected in any direct way with the mental states. On the other hand, there are also similarities between our approaches such as an orientation towards many-minds instead of many-worlds theory (see also Lockwood 1996) or using the picture of a light cone, albeit differently (see 73–75 of his book as well as Chap. 4 of mine). See also his interesting discussion of realism and beyond in light of quantum measurement (219–239 ).
- 4.
It is actually quite difficult to classify the position taken by Zeh. Zeh (1999, 83), as a many-minds theorist, is appreciative of the fact that creating an actual irreversibility is finally a matter of the interpretation of quantum mechanics: “The question for the origin of irreversibility is therefore intimately related to the interpretation of quantum theory (…).” [Italicizing by Zeh] It is also clear that—unlike many others—he is fully aware of the lessons to be taken from the timelessness of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (see Zeh 2012, Chaps. 16 and 17). However, according to my—perhaps erroneous—reading of his publications, I felt that Zeh finally opts for an ‘almost objective’ status of irreversibility within the theory of decoherence leading to an ‘almost objective’ status of time, at least for all practical purposes (FAPP) and within our regular domain of life. This all seems to be related to the fact that he has a critical position with respect to Heisenberg’s idealistic view on quantum mechanics and hence would not buy into the top-down-decoherence idea presented in box 2.1, earlier in this book and elsewhere. Again, as a many-minds theorist, Zeh does see part of the subjectivity of the emergence of our picture of the world. So, what probably characterizes Zeh’s position with respect to time would be an ‘almost objective’ time arrow from irreversibility within an open-systems perspective, but within a many-minds view of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the fact in a closed-system perspective, time does not exist.
- 5.
According to McLaughlin (1984, 1995), this style of argumentation might be called ‘argument by appeal to a false implied supervenience thesis’ (or argument by appeal to FIST).
- 6.
Perhaps, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (DeWitt 1967) would be more appropriate, here, since I am talking about an entire cosmos I and an entire cosmos II, but this does not change my basic reasoning. The trouble is that there currently is no ‘world formula’ generally accepted as a complete and accurate description of the cosmos.
- 7.
The rejection of strong supervenience is possible both on the level of the ‘individual’ and on the level of the ‘version.’
- 8.
Even the argument of psychophysical parallelism (see box 5.2 at the end of the chapter) would not be helpful within a singular reality since this postulate would be consistent with supervenience of consciousness on the physical. Thus, if supervenience is rejected, so is psychophysical parallelism.
- 9.
An influence of consciousness on the physical has also been suggested within the collapse view (the so-called standard version of quantum mechanics and part of the umbrella of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics) by Halvorson (2011) as well as Stapp (2009). Consciousness is here seen as responsible for collapsing the wave function.
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Schade, C.D. (2018). Dualistic Idealism: No Supervenience of Consciousness on the Physical. In: Free Will and Consciousness in the Multiverse. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03583-9_5
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