Abstract
Chapter 4, directly building up on the theoretical analysis in chapters 2 and 3, specifies the interpretation of the multiverse proposed in this book. Indeed, many scholars have pointed out that Everett’s original ‘many-worlds’ interpretation needs interpretation. Existing versions exhibit different problems. A principle problem of all of them materializes in connection with the probability rule of quantum mechanics: the Born (1926) rule; a problem that my proposal cannot solve either, but where I am suggesting a pragmatic handling. Most of them also have strange ontological consequences, most of them are not free-will friendly, most of them do not offer a satisfactory solution for the so-called preferred-basis problem, etc. Chapter 4 explains the problems that have been dealt with in the literature and then offers an interpretation of the multiverse without severe ontological problems that is also free-will friendly: the clustered-minds multiverse, where individuals’ consciousness will be allocated to different realities to a different extent. The concept will be spelled out in detail. The chapter also contains a box. This box deals with the question whether Menksy’s (2005, 2010) proposal of free will via an individual’s influence on subjective probabilities is theoretically acceptable.
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Notes
- 1.
A preliminary version of this comparison, using less criteria and looking at fewer approaches, is to be found in Schade (2015), 343–351.
- 2.
According to a very critical statement by Zeh (2013, 98), “(…) quantum Bayesianism is the most recent form of a shut-up-and-calculate mentality.” What he wants to say with this is that the wave equation and the Born rule are just seen in quantum Bayesianism as some predictive tools without any explanatory power.
- 3.
The intensive discussion in the literature cannot fully be captured, here.
- 4.
This is an unlikely case with macro-world measurements, anyway.
- 5.
The calculation of them is a mathematical operation, applied to the wave function, leading to classical probabilities for different measurement outcomes (Born 1926).
- 6.
Herewith, I apologize to those mathematicians that might potentially see this as a misuse of terms. I personally feel that the term ‘auxiliary equation’ captures exactly what I want to say, here.
- 7.
He argues that this solution is good enough for all practical purposes (=FAPP). However, such a FAPP solution may not suffice for addressing a severe conceptual problem like this. After all, results of simulations are generally dependent on the specific setup and the parameters chosen as well as the starting conditions selected.
- 8.
He also analyzes this solution within the framework of the Copenhagen interpretation (in the form of the reduction postulate) and arrives at a negative result, too.
- 9.
Galvan (2010) then proposes permanent spatial decomposition as a better solution for the preferred-basis problem. However, permanent spatial decomposition is “the (hypothesized) property of the wave function of the universe of decomposing continuously into permanently non-overlapping parts” (Galvan 2010, 12) which appears to be a niche theory that needs to be further discussed and developed elsewhere.
- 10.
In the words of one of the most vivid proponents of a realist interpretation, David Wallace: “(…) I neither know nor care whether I am describing the historical Everett’s own view” (Wallace 2012c, 2).
- 11.
Perhaps the evaluation of the two different claims is related to the question whether Everett’s original paper (or even his full dissertation [Everett 1973]) or DeWitt’s interpretation of Everett’s thoughts are taken into account. According to Lockwood, “(…) if one were to judge merely by the evidence of his published writings, one might be tempted to classify Everett himself as a many-minds, rather than a many-worlds theorist. For he never speaks of dividing or differentiating worlds or universes, but only of the ‘branching’ and ‘splitting’ of ‘observer states’” (Lockwood 1996, 172).
- 12.
Zeh (2013) would also agree with classifying Everett as a many-minds theorist, and, according to my reading of his publications, this is also the interpretation he follows himself (see the section on the ‘many-minds’ interpretation).
- 13.
As has already been mentioned in Chap. 3’s section “But are times really parallel?”, Wallace avoids self-classifying as a many-worlds or many-minds theorist (Wallace 2012c, 3). As one of the major proponents of a realist version of the multiverse, one could have expected him to self-classify as a many-worlds theorist. And his (somewhat implicit) classification of Everett’s theory as both ‘many worlds’ and ‘many minds’ (Wallace 2012c, 3) contradicts the view by Zeh (2013) (see the previous footnote).
- 14.
I am also not going deeper into Page’s (1995) many-perceptions (or sensible quantum mechanics) theory. Although again ontologically different from many minds, the differences are too subtle to lead to a different evaluation with respect to the criteria than, e.g., Albert and Loewer’s approach. Although assigning a subjective status to probabilities, keeping psycho-physical parallelism (Page 2011, 6) does not open any room for free will: “(…) there [is not] any free will in the incompatibilist sense, and consciousness may be viewed as an epiphenomenon” (Page 2011, 7).
- 15.
This, per se, is neither ‘negative’ nor ‘positive,’ given the fact that there is no satisfactory solution to the problem of probability, right now (see the discussion in the last section).
- 16.
The validity of the Born (1926) rule still has to be assumed.
- 17.
Again, I neither classify this as a ‘negative’ or a ‘positive’ feature, given the status of knowledge with respect to the genesis of the Born rule.
- 18.
‘Sometimes’ is an appropriate description since in many cases choices are surely made by the unconscious leaving nothing left to decide for consciousness (but this is certainly no case for free will).
- 19.
- 20.
More precise than the English term ‘case studies’ would be the German term ‘Probehandeln’ (better translated perhaps as: ‘iterative mental testing of different possibilities to act’) that had originally been used by Sigmund Freud.
- 21.
Note that Mensky’s approach has been criticized in an earlier publication by the author of this book (Schade 2015) for another potential problem, the ‘mindless-hulk’ problem, where an individual might be confronted with other individuals that are not conscious (see also Barrett 1999). However, this criticism is only valid for some verbal statements made by Mensky, e.g., “In the simplest situation, a single alternative is selected” (Mensky 2011, 617). In his mathematical (and older) representations, Mensky (2005, 2010) is more careful in describing the way how consciousness is supposed to generate subjective probabilities. This approach, however, assumes infinite minds, splitting into fractions attached to certain realities, and it has been criticized in Box 4.1. It will also be critically evaluated below. The ‘mindless-hulk’ criticism does apply to one of the two suggestions made by Squires (1988) who is actually aware of the problem (see below).
- 22.
Mensky is very explicit about it and uses the notion of parallel times in his concept of post correction (2007b).
- 23.
It is interesting to note that Albert and Loewer (1988) (besides introducing their many-minds approach described above), also suggest, as an alternative, an approach where consciousness does randomly select one alternative, applying the Born (1926) rule. Since this approach leads to no new insights regarding the topic of this book and also suffers from the ‘mindless-hulk’ problem, it was not described in more detail, here.
- 24.
Although (moderate) solipsism has been proposed by some including Schopenhauer, stating that ‘THE world is my representation’ (Schopenhauer 2010 [1818], 23), Kant, e.g., has strongly argued against such a position, actually using teleological arguments: “It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (…) and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to anyone who may call it in question” (Kant 1996 [1781], B 39). The following, somewhat humorous statement by Karl Popper shows how difficult this discussion in fact is: “I know that I have not created Bach’s music or Mozart’s (…) [,] I just do not have it in me” (Popper 1999 [1956], 83). Although this consideration nicely demonstrates that Popper simply cannot be alone in an absolute sense, it does not lend a clear support to other entities visible to him possessing consciousness. (See Fumerton 2006, for a great overview of different approaches to the problem of solipsism within philosophy.) Philosophically, the solipsism problem, to the best of my knowledge, has not finally been solved; perhaps this is impossible, in a narrow sense. But I have to admit that the solipsism problem (in the very basic form of individuals creating reality within their consciousness) cannot be avoided as a problem of theory, even, within any subjective solution to the measurement problem. The best solution, from my point of view, lies in the concept of shared reality. Other individuals appearing in the focal individual’s films should be conscious. And this is what has to be secured in any subjective interpretation of multiverse quantum mechanics. Shared reality, the solution proposed here, lies at the heart of the concept of the clustered-minds multiverse (see below). This partial solution will, however, turn out to be much more comforting than a situation where the individuals simply must be alone, fully, as is the case with the ‘selection of one alternative.’
- 25.
It would also have to dictate identical perceptions/choices of the preferred basis by all individuals.
- 26.
I am very grateful to Tanja Schade-Strohm for suggesting this solution to me in a discussion.
- 27.
Of course, different degrees of consciousness are also considered with different cognitive operations of humans, with fully unconscious operations marking one end of the spectrum, and perhaps highly conscious deliberations the other.
- 28.
I am not saying that complexity is per se negative, especially if the theory were correct. But, again, this is hard to be decided at this point.
- 29.
The largest difficulty would be the formal restrictions—to be specified—for the vectorial decisions (see formula (1)) introduced in Chap. 8. If, say, allocating away consciousness from a certain, negative reality is almost impossible because of a large mod squared amplitude that pertains to this reality, this would be a severe limitation, in that case, to free will and responsibility (see also Chap. 7). Free will and responsibility would become slightly more situation-dependent than with the theory currently pursued in this book.
- 30.
This allegory has the highest intuitive appeal with an old-fashioned torch light, since LED and laser have a more concentrated cone of light.
- 31.
I am thankful to Adam Taylor, who suggested the usage of the torch light allegory to me after my presentation at IINN’s Free Will Conference in Flint, MI (2015).
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
I would like to leave open here the question as to what extent the phenomenon described within this paragraph is mainly organized within the wave function or mainly (or even solely) within the domain of consciousness. One might be reminded of Squires’ ‘universal consciousness’ required to coordinate individuals’ different perceptions of the world, albeit with far less ‘dictator power’ and much smaller reach. Not everyone is supposed to see the same reality, but individuals in a minds cluster are supposed to share their perception of the world.
- 35.
I would like to argue that this type of a ‘soft restriction’ is not under the sole discretion of the decision maker, although the decision maker has many good reasons not to choose extreme allocations on its own (see Chap. 9). Instead, minds clusters might have an influence on the extremeness/moderateness of allocations. This factor has to be better understood in future research and will not often be referred to in this book. However, responsibility considerations require taking that factor into account (see Chap. 7).
- 36.
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that folie-à-deux or folie- à -trois situations where versions of two or three individuals that possess a large degree of consciousness reside in a reality where all others hardly ‘left’ any consciousness are impossible, too, but this is debatable. It is clear, however, that not every consciousness cluster is necessarily large. The open question is: What should be the minimum number of highly conscious versions of individuals required for a consciousness cluster?
- 37.
In narrow terms, mindless-hulks situations are avoided already by the fact that marginal consciousness has to be allocated to each reality (see above). Herewith, encountering close-to-robotic entities is also excluded.
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Schade, C.D. (2018). How Different Versions of the Multiverse Interpretation Have Different Consequences for Free Will and Ontology: Developing the Concept of a Clustered-Minds Multiverse. In: Free Will and Consciousness in the Multiverse. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03583-9_4
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