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Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background

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Book cover Legal Conventionalism

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 126))

Abstract

In his paper Celano argues that there exist conventions of a peculiar sort which are neither norms nor regularities of behavior, partaking of both. He proceeds as follows. After a brief analysis of the meaning of “convention”, Celano gives some examples of the kind of phenomena he has in mind: bodily skills, know-how, taste and style, habitus (P. Bourdieu), “disciplines” (M. Foucault). Then he groups some arguments supporting his claim: (i) considerations about the identity conditions of precedents (D. Lewis) and about the projectibility of predicates in inductive inference generally (N. Goodman); (ii) thoughts about rule-following (L. Wittgenstein); (iii) an examination of some of J. R. Searle’s ideas about the “Background” of intentionality. Celano concludes with some remarks about the time-honored antithesis “nature” v. “convention”.

Translated by Marco Segatti. The Italian original of this text was published in Ragion Pratica (2014) 2, pp. 605–632. A previous version of this contribution in English was published in Revus (2016) 30, pp. 9–32.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Celano (1994).

  2. 2.

    What I say in this section does not necessarily apply, in unrevised form, also to the English word “convention” (stemming, of course, from the same Latin root as the Italian “convenzione”).

  3. 3.

    Hume (1777), p. 257.

  4. 4.

    The mere possibility of reconstructing the relevant actions as having such a structure is not enough. This would make the notion too generic.

  5. 5.

    This is how one may come to the paradoxical interpretation of Hume as a contractarian (Gauthier 1979, pp. 3–38).

  6. 6.

    Celano (1995), pp. 173–231 and Celano (2014), pp. 597–667.

  7. 7.

    Hume (1740).

  8. 8.

    Lewis (1969).

  9. 9.

    Proponents of an inflexible rational choice-based methodological individualism will (implausibly) deny this. But I shall not go here into the controversy between advocates of homo economicus and defenders of homo sociologicus. It is enough for my purposes that the one indicated in the text is in fact a coherent conceptual possibility—even if the concept turned out to be an empty class.

  10. 10.

    These are, by and large, the traits that Kahneman (2011) attributes to the workings of System 1. I say “by and large” because the workings of System 1 include biological phenomena as well.

  11. 11.

    See—albeit confusedly—Murphy (2007), especially at p. 54: “custom /…/ must be analyzed into two more basic notions, habit and convention” (“customs are habitual conventions and conventional habits: custom naturalizes conventions just as it conventionalizes human nature”). (Here, “custom” expresses the notion of convention I am interested in). Notice the usual ambiguity between “custom” and “convention” (noted in Sect. 2, above).

  12. 12.

    Sugden (1998), p. 379.

  13. 13.

    See in general Lycan (1986), pp. 61–82. The example is taken from Wittgenstein (1969).

  14. 14.

    The example is taken from Casey (1998), pp. 208–212.

  15. 15.

    Casey (1998), p. 211.

  16. 16.

    If these things were rules, we should say that they are “constitutive conventions”. (This notion has been worked out by Marmor (2009), exploiting Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule). But they are, in fact, constitutive conventions which are not rules.

  17. 17.

    Casey (1998), p. 212.

  18. 18.

    A comment is in order here. As remarked above (see Sect. 2), Hume’s account is usually regarded as the paradigm case of an account of “conventions” in the sense of tacit agreements backed by a train of reasoning. Hume’s well known example of the two rowers (1976, p. 490) who mutually adjust the pace of their rowing, however, is an example of the exercise of a physical ability. True, the two rowers’ actions are guided, as Hume says, by the perception of a common interest: the two want the boat to proceed, and to proceed as fast and smoothly as it can; and they realize that, in order to accomplish this, they need to synchronize their rhythm. But what they do—synchronizing their actions, that is, their convention—consists in a bodily activity that, in it and of itself, does not—not necessarily—include a train of reasoning. Hume’s account has a wider scope than it is usually believed.

  19. 19.

    Searle (1983), pp. 150–151. Italics are mine.

  20. 20.

    Ryle (1949).

  21. 21.

    Fantl (2012).

  22. 22.

    Fantl (2012).

  23. 23.

    See for example Wallis (2008), pp. 123–153.

  24. 24.

    Bourdieu (1979).

  25. 25.

    Bourdieu (1979), p. 199.

  26. 26.

    Bourdieu (1977), p. 214.

  27. 27.

    Bourdieu (1977), p. 72.

  28. 28.

    Bourdieu (1977), p. 78.

  29. 29.

    Bourdieu (1977), p. 78.

  30. 30.

    Foucault (1975), part III.

  31. 31.

    It is true that these two senses have not been defined, but merely illustrated (at the beginning of the present section). But, as I said, the problem—which is an hard one, and that I am unable to resolve—of satisfactorily defining them does not specifically concern the phenomena that we are discussing; it affects, rather, the whole domain of intentional phenomena. I hope that a simple illustration is enough.

  32. 32.

    I wish to clarify, once and for all, that there is nothing inherently nice, or good, or just, or holy, in pre-conventions. A pre-convention may well be abhorrent. The fact that a pre-convention is normative does not entail, or in any way imply, that it conforms to justice. It does entail, presumably, that it somehow expresses one or more values. But the connection might be a distorted, a perverted, or a paradoxical one. Or, in any case, it may well be that, in the circumstances, its value is very low, or close to irrelevant.

  33. 33.

    Celano (1995), pp. 35–87 and Celano (2014), pp. 597–667.

  34. 34.

    Celano (1995), pp. 35–87; for a detailed exploration of the main possibilities, see Celano (2014), pp. 597–667.

  35. 35.

    The problem is formulated very clearly, concerning language, in Millikan (2008), pp. 87–99 who follows Lewis. See also Canale (2008), pp. 109–136 and the definition of the problem in Schauer (2007), pp. 23–26. Schauer calls this difficulty “Wittgenstein’s problem” in the interpretation of custom. The reason for this reference to Wittgenstein will be clear in what follows. The fact that both Canale and Schauer discuss the problem when dealing with customs, and not conventions, is explained by the usual ambiguity (see above, Sect. 3) between the two notions.

  36. 36.

    Sugden (1998), p. 379.

  37. 37.

    Sugden (1998), pp. 396–397.

  38. 38.

    Lewis (1969), pp. 37–38. Italics are mine.

  39. 39.

    Sugden (1998), p. 387.

  40. 40.

    It is worth emphasizing a point that, in light of what I have said so far, should be rather obvious. Here, the question is not whether we should or shouldn’t follow R, and why (this depends on whether the further conditions specified by a Lewis-type definition are met or not; here, we are assuming that they are). The question is, rather, what counts, each time, as complying with R: which action would be following the precedent (doing the same thing that we did in the past).

  41. 41.

    See Schelling (1960) and Sugden (1998), p. 404.

  42. 42.

    If two individuals take as salient different traits, then neither of them is right (this simply follows from the definition of the relevant concept of salience).

  43. 43.

    This is noticed and explained in Sugden (1998), pp. 386–387.

  44. 44.

    Goodman (1983).

  45. 45.

    The order is not chronological. Chronologically, Goodman’s argument comes first.

  46. 46.

    Sugden (1998), p. 404.

  47. 47.

    I follow J. McDowell’s interpretation of these passages of Wittgenstein’s. See especially McDowell (1979), p. 60 ff, and McDowell (1984), pp. 238–254.

  48. 48.

    Wittgenstein (1969).

  49. 49.

    Wittgenstein (1969).

  50. 50.

    On the mastery of concepts (the ability to use them correctly) as a “second nature” see McDowell (1996), pp. 123–124.

  51. 51.

    Rosch (1973, 1975). Usually, people relate the theory of prototypes to Wittgenstein’s idea that the identity conditions and the conditions of the use of concepts, or at least of many concepts, are not sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, but depend on family resemblances. The convergence of this idea and the conclusions stemming from the rule-following argument are apparent.

  52. 52.

    Searle (1992), p. 177.

  53. 53.

    Searle (1992), p. 175. Searle puts forward various arguments and considerations in favor of this claim in Searle (1983, ch. 5 and 1992, ch. 8); here, I cannot discuss them.

  54. 54.

    Searle (1999), p. 109.

  55. 55.

    Searle (1999), pp. 107–108. On know-how in the Background, see Searle (1983, p. 143; 1992, p. 194; and 2010, p. 155). Remember that “know-how” is one of the territories that can host pre-conventions, that I have indicated above, at 4.

  56. 56.

    Searle (1999, p. 109). See also Searle (1983, pp. 143–144; and 1992, p. 194). In Searle (2010, pp. 155–160), Searle shows that within the Background (but the notion is used here in a wider sense than in the text) one can find elements, which may vary from one community to the other, that impose “normative constraints”, or that in general establish the way in which, in situations of a certain kind, people “should” behave.

  57. 57.

    For a critical presentation of Searle’s theory on institutional facts, see Celano (1997).

  58. 58.

    Searle (1995), pp. 125–126.

  59. 59.

    Searle (1995), p. 126.

  60. 60.

    Searle (1995), p. 128, and pp. 142–143.

  61. 61.

    If we restrict our view to a naïve, pre-Wittgensteinian, picture of what it is to follow a rule, of course.

  62. 62.

    Searle (1995), pp. 127–128 and p. 137.

  63. 63.

    Searle (1995), p. 129.

  64. 64.

    Searle (1995), pp. 141–142.

  65. 65.

    Searle (1995), p. 144.

  66. 66.

    In this paragraph too, “rule-following” should be understood in a naïve, pre-Wittgensteinian, way. As we have seen, Searle’s argument is aimed precisely at demonstrating that rule-following in fact requires, just as Wittgenstein himself claimed (supra, 6), “practice”, “habits” (among these, possibly, the entities that I called “pre-conventions”); that is, it requires sharing a “form of life”.

  67. 67.

    Aristotle (1980, 1957), V, 4.

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  1. Law Faculty, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Bruno Celano

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  1. Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

    Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña

  2. Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

    Josep M. Vilajosana

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Celano, B. (2019). Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background. In: Ramírez-Ludeña, L., Vilajosana, J. (eds) Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_2

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