Abstract
How does a government arise from anarchy? In a classic article, Mancur Olson (1993) theorized that it could occur when a roving bandit decides to settle down. This stationary bandit comes to recognize an encompassing interest in its territory, improving its lot by providing governing and committing to stable rates of theft (taxation). The bandits highlighted by Olson (1993) are not individuals but rather groups organized to act collectively. I provide a club-theoretic (Buchanan 1965) analysis of bandits. I characterize the (actual or threats of) violence as a club good, i.e., one that is non-rival but from which out-group members can be excluded. I elaborate on the changes in the club’s group interest and in-group that will likely accompany the roving-to-stationary transition. To illustrate the salient points of the analysis, I provide a case study of the Visigoths: their emergence as a roving confederacy in the late fourth century, their migration and subsequent settlement, and the establishment of the Visigothic Kingdom.
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Notes
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This is to be distinguished from governance of the club’s membership, though that is essential to clubs generally and any banditry organization in particular.
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Indeed, the term “bandit” often connotes an individual as part of a group of thieves; according to definition 1 of Merriam Webster: “an outlaw who lives by plunder; especially: a member of a band of marauders”: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bandit (accessed May 14, 2018). Wiseman (1957) early on emphasized the cost-sharing role of clubs in achieving economies of scale. Of course, there are almost certainly limits to such economies of scale; Olson (1971 [1965]) provides the classic treatment of the increasing costs to collective action as the size of an organization increases, an effect that will dominate at some point.
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Conversely, if one member’s threat of violence causes potential victims to curb or conceal production, then this creates negative spillovers for other members.
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This is also how Congleton (2015, p. 222) characterizes a roving bandit.
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Given a club where the in-group collectively produces violence towards obtaining plunder, the coordination of collective action and the minimization of shirking/free-riding is critical. Presumably, many in-group inputs will be complementary and concerns for metering and monitoring them in the context of team production will be at the fore (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
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Demsetz (1970) recognized the potential for clubs that were organized to profit the in-group to also yield benefits to the out-group. A recent paper by Koyama (2012) provides such an example from nineteenth century England. Private prosecution associations provided members with crime detection, delivery to court of criminals, and payment of court fees. These activities generated benefits to non-members via deterrence effects.
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In addition to the translation of Ammianus Marcellinus listed in the references, I have referenced the original Latin provided by http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ammianus.html. I refer to the Latin, in particular, when various terms that imply subtly different things (e.g., reges, duces, and principes) are often translated into one English word (e.g., “kings”).
- 10.
The standard translation involves Athanaric having sworn an oath never to set foot on Roman soil. Interestingly then, having been defeated by the Huns and his leadership abandoned by his Goths , Athanaric was later received by Theodosius I in Constantinople, where the erstwhile judge died. Wolfram (1975, p. 263) points out that the correct interpretation of the Latin is actually: “the Gothic chief was bound by an especially severe oath and that a paternal order had forbidden him to set foot on Roman soil.” If he did not break and oath, then, the passage begs the question of what exactly this sever oath was!
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As Ammianus (Book 31, pp. 416–417) dryly observes: “[T]he affair seemed matter for rejoicing rather than dread, and the practised flatterers in the emperor’s entourage extolled in exaggerated terms the good fortune which unexpectedly presented him with a large body of recruits drawn from the ends of the earth. […] With these high hopes […] the greatest care was taken to ensure that […] none of those destined to overthrow the Roman Empire should be left behind.” Orosius (Book 7, p. 373) is more concise: the Goths were “received by Valens without negotiating any treaty. They did not even surrender their arms to the Romans.” Athanaric, having proved unsuccessful in his efforts to ward off the Huns, was disgraced and abandoned by most of his followers and remained north of the Danube. Later on, during Theodosius I’s reign, Athanaric reappears (in disobedience to his father’s command) within the Roman Empire . He was invited to Constantinople by Theodosius in 381 and, a few weeks later, was dead.
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Orosius (Book 7, p. 380) counts this a double victory for the Empire: “for the loss of these [the Gothic auxiliaries] was certainly a gain and their [the usurper and his followers] defeat a victory.” The Gothic leading men may have found the federate status more beneficial than the Gothic rank and file, a point to which I will return to in section “A Historical Illustration: How the Visigothic Bandit Settled Down” below.
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This was much to the chagrin of Honorius who, “seeing that nothing could be done against the barbarians when so many usurpers were opposed to him, ordered that the usurpers themselves should be destroyed” (Orosius, Book 7, p. 393).
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Orosius claims that “Wallia succeeded to the kingdom, having been chosen by the Goths to break the peace, but appointed by God to establish it” (Book 7, p. 396). A less romantic view is that the Visigothic rank and file found themselves on the wrong side of an agency problem.
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Heather (1998, p. 66) refers to “the rise of groups of specialist armed retainers was a social development of the greatest importance [and] weapon burials became common from at least the first century AD.”
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The ways that emperors dealt with these small-scale raids suggests that they did not think of them as centrally organized. For example, Gothic raids into Moesia and Thrace did not provoke overwhelming responses; Anonymous Valesianus (Chap. 5, p. 523) refers simply to Constantine’s “check of their attack”. Similarly, Valentinian and Valens did not offer any strong responses to sporadic raids into Moesia and Thrace. Alternatively, when a larger army of Goths (presumably a confederacy) attacked a group of Sarmatians (another barbarian group) with federate status in 323, Constantius (II; Constantine’s son and later co-emperor) carried out a winter campaign that resulted in “almost a hundred thousand of the Goths […] destroyed by hunger and cold” (Anonymous Valesianus, Chap. 6, p. 528). Even if this is an exageration, there is no doubt that Constantius crushed a sizeable enemy. Similarly, when 3000 Goths joined in support of the usurper Procopious, Valens responded with three years of campaigning across the Danube. This campaigning “reduced the barbarians to such want that they sent a number of delegations to beg for pardon and peace” (Ammianus, Book 27, p. 337). The reference to delegations also suggests that the emperor was dealing with a Gothic confederacy. This conclusion also is supported by Ammianus’ (Book 27, p. 332) statement that the initial 3000 Goths supporting Procopious were sent by “their kings, now reconciled to Rome[.]” That the plural, “kings”, is used indicates, again, a confederacy.
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This is consistent with Wickham’s view (2009, p. 45): “war encouraged the temporary development of alliances or confederacies of separate tiny tribes, each with its own permanent leader, but choosing a temporary leader for that confederation.” Contemporary Roman sources understandably emphasize the larger military conflicts, leading some historians to emphasize the temporary confederacies relative to their constituent retinues. For example, Heather (1998, pp. 18, 57–58, 2006, p. 90) concludes: “By the fourth century… especially in areas close to the Roman frontier… smaller units had given way to fewer larger ones”. However, Heather (2006 p. 81) also acknowledges: “in the fourth century, major conflicts also occurred only about once in a generation on Rome’s European frontiers”.
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Given that the confederacy was rooted in a general exodus of Goths —including women, children, and the elderly—it likely gave the Visigothic leadership some experience in governance beyond that narrowly applicable to an armed retinue. Thompson (1982, p. 38) remarks: “The actual division of land in Moesia [where the Goths crossing the Danube initially were settled] must have been carried out in the main under the direction of the chiefs and councils, and we may be sure that the optimates [leading men; elites] thereby obtained executive power which would hardly have been theirs in the normal course of tribal life. Again, the annual subsidies of grain and cash paid over at times during the years 382-418 by the Roman government were delivered in the first instance into the hands of the chiefs and councils, who then proceeded to distribute them, or part of them, to the tribesmen in general.”
- 20.
Interestingly, following the first promulgation of laws (circa 480: the Code of Euric), in 506 King Alaric II promulgated his Breviary (Lex Romana Visigothorum) containing laws that applied specifically to Gallo-Romans. Hence, a distinction existed between laws applying to the in-group versus those applying to the out-group.
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Wickham (2009, p. 88) observes: “Visigothic […] kings legislated, taxed, shipped grain around, used Roman civilian officials, and created integrated Roman and ‘barbarian’ armies, including Roman generals.” The Visigoths , then, also incorporated other elements of Gall-Roman society into their in-group. Regarding military offices, also see Heather (1998, p. 193).
- 23.
The incorporation of Gall-Roman nobles into the Visigothic administration is reminiscent of Leeson’s (2007b, p. 306) study of “strategies employed by permanently weaker individuals to alter the incentive of stronger agents for trade versus banditry.” By becoming essential components of that administration, Gallo-Romans were able to trade their services with the Visigoths , rather than be mere prey to them. Relatedly, Gallo-Roman nobles came also to dominate ecclesiastical positions. The spiritual authority of the Church provided a check on the secular authority of the (Christian) Visigoths (Mathisen 1993).
- 24.
As are several studies cited in section “Introduction” above.
- 25.
Leeson (2007c) provides evidence that key indicators of economic development actually improved in the wake of Barre’s fall.
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Young, A.T. (2018). When Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government. In: Wagner, R. (eds) James M. Buchanan. Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_37
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