Abstract
Access to an incumbent postal operator’s (PO) delivery network is an instrument for promoting competition in the postal services market. Competition should create more choices for postal users, reduce prices and improve quality. However, compared to other network industries, the postal sector has numerous differences including low sunk costs, the questionable applicability of a “ladder of investment” theory, and a reduced risk of market failure. In addition, the letter market is declining and thus becoming less attractive for new entrants. Therefore, positive effects of (mandatory) access to the postal network should not be presumed. Access to the PO’s network is not only provided to alternative postal operators but also to businesses, bulk mailers, consolidators and other entities that provide services involving mail preparation and/or carrying out part of the distribution process. POs often offer rebates, most typically based on volume and operational work-sharing and presorting activities.
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- 1.
- 2.
See for instance the European Commission webpage http://ec.europa.eu/competition/general/overview_en.html (penultimate sentence in the first paragraph).
- 3.
Geradin (2015, p. 9).
- 4.
Ibidem, p. 3.
- 5.
Parcu and Silvestri (2017, p. 27).
- 6.
Competition law and regulation address some of the same market problems and the use of one does not necessary exclude the application of the other (Dunne 2015, p. 56).
- 7.
OJ C 326, 26/10/2012, pp. 1–390.
- 8.
OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14, OJ L 176, 5.7.2002, p21, and OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3.
- 9.
For the purpose of this chapter, expression “access-seeking operator” refers to mixed-by-pass and access-based alternative postal operators.
- 10.
Craig and de Búrca (2015, pp. 564–566).
- 11.
This understanding of law is prevalent in a legal theory and has strong backing in one of the most influential legal theorist, Ronald M. Dworkin. See e.g. Dworkin (1967).
- 12.
Interpretation rules decide which of the conflicting rules is not valid. The most commonly used interpretation rules include, lex superior derogat legi inferiori, lex posterior derogat legi priori, lex specialis derogat legi generali etc.
- 13.
Craig and de Búrca (2015, pp. 550).
- 14.
Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Oxford, sixth edition, 2015, pp. 932.
- 15.
Case C-401/11 Blanka Soukupová v Ministerstvo zemědělství.
- 16.
A category of general principles of EU law was affirmed for the first time in the Stauder v City of Ulm (Case 29–69).
- 17.
Case 117/76 and 16/77 Albert Ruckdeschel and Others v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, paragraph 7. See also Case, C 441/12 Almer Beheer BV and Daedalus Holding BV v Van den Dungen Vastgoed BV and Oosterhout II BVBA, paragraph 47.
- 18.
From the economic point of view, nondiscriminatory (monopoly) prices can harm consumers more than do discriminatory prices.
- 19.
Recital 12 in the preamble to the PSD 97/67/EC.
- 20.
Point 3 of Article 2 PSD.
- 21.
Okholm et al. (2012, p. 229).
- 22.
Recital 34 in the preamble to the PSD 2008/6/EC.
- 23.
Ibidem, Recital 38.
- 24.
Ibidem, Recital 39.
- 25.
Case C-292/06 Vedat Deniz v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
- 26.
Case C-340/13 bpost SA v IBPT.
- 27.
Vedat Deniz judgment, paragraphs 28, 30, 41–42.
- 28.
This interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination has become settled case law, e.g. see Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, paragraph 55; Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern, paragraph 43; see also bpost judgment, paragraph 2.
- 29.
Bpost judgment, paragraphs 33, 36–38, 47 and 48.
- 30.
See Bpost judgment, paragraph 12.
- 31.
Recital 39 in the preamble to the PSD 2008/6/EC.
- 32.
Opinion of the AG in the bpost case, paragraph 15.
- 33.
Ibidem, paragraph 35.
- 34.
Ibidem, paragraph 41.
- 35.
Ibidem, paragraphs 41–57.
- 36.
Spanish NRA’s Decision of 15 February 2018 put ASOs and BSs on equal footing. [https://www.cnmc.es/en/node/367009].
- 37.
This interpretation is presented as a possible one in the ERGP Report on recommendations and best practices in regulation for access to the postal network of the incumbent operator (in terms of competition, prices and quality of service) 2017, p. 24.
- 38.
ERGP Report on the application in access regulation of the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality as incorporated in the postal services directive (2018, pp. 44–45).
- 39.
These words were used by the Advocate General Nils Wahl in his opinion of 20 June 2018 in the ongoing case C-256/17 (Sandd BV v ACM) to describe different MS interpretations of PSD concepts.
References
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Rozman, T. (2018). Prices and Conditions of Access to the Postal Network: The Principle of Non-Discrimination. In: Parcu, P., Brennan, T., Glass, V. (eds) New Business and Regulatory Strategies in the Postal Sector. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02937-1_13
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