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On Cooperative Connection Situations Where the Players Are Located at the Edges

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Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies (EUMAS 2017, AT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 10767))

Abstract

In classical cooperative connection situations, the agents are located at some nodes of a network and the cost of a coalition is based on the problem of finding a network of minimum cost connecting all the members of the coalition to a source.

In this paper we study a different connection situation with no source and where the agents are the edges, and yet the optimal network associated to each coalition (of edges) is not fixed and follows a cost-optimization procedure. The proposed model shares some similarities with classical minimum cost spanning tree games, but also substantial differences, specifically on the appropriate way to share the costs among the agents located at the edges. We show that the core of these particular cooperative games is always non-empty and some core allocations can be easily computed.

S. Moretti—This work benefited from the support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) projects NETLEARN (grant no. ANR-13-INFR-004) and CoCoRICo-CoDec (grant no. ANR-14-CE24-0007).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, UMR [7243], 75016, Paris, France

    Stefano Moretti

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  1. Stefano Moretti
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Correspondence to Stefano Moretti .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Évry Val d'Essonne, Paris Saclay, France

    Francesco Belardinelli

  2. Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    Estefanía Argente

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Moretti, S. (2018). On Cooperative Connection Situations Where the Players Are Located at the Edges. In: Belardinelli, F., Argente, E. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies. EUMAS AT 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10767. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_24

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01712-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01713-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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