Abstract
This chapter presents a reconstruction of aspects of Arthur Cecil Pigou’s philosophical biography. Utilitarian traditions as they pertain to the study of political economy in Britain are noted and then placed in the context of changes that occurred in philosophy and science during the second half of the nineteenth century. It is argued that the philosophical influences dominant in Britain during the period of Alfred Marshall’s formative intellectual development, which broadly corresponds with the early period of British idealism, are distinct in many ways from the influences that had become prominent by Pigou’s undergraduate years at Cambridge (and in the period up to the First World War). It is argued that these divergent philosophical frameworks explain some of the differences in Marshall’s and Pigou’s respective philosophical visions of the representation of economic theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
That this period, sometimes referred to as the Great Depression of 1873–1896, was a sustained period of economic downturn has been contested (e.g., see S.B. Saul 1969).
- 2.
Backhouse’s and Nishizawa’s (2010) edited compilation, broadly considering the development of welfare economics towards the end of the nineteenth century, casts the emergence of welfare analysis as arising from Sidgwick’s utilitarianism at Cambridge, on one hand, and T.H. Green’s idealist thought at Oxford, on the other. This complements recent works that have asserted the heterogeneous nature of idealist sentiment in Great Britain (Boucher and Vincent 2012; Dunham et al. 2011; Mander 2011). Although various studies highlight the common influence of Sidgwick’s utilitarian thought on Marshall and Pigou (Backhouse 2006; Backhouse and Nishizawa 2010; Medema 2009; O’Donnell 1979; Schultz 2004), fewer studies have compared the impacts of evolutionism and idealism on Marshall’s and Pigou’s ethical thought in a comparative manner. There have been, however, several studies examining the impact of evolutionary science upon the development of Marshall’s ethical thinking (Black 1990; A.W. Coats 1992, pp. 221–224; A.W. Coats and Raffaelli 2006; Whitaker 1977); the impact of idealism on Marshall’s economic thinking (Simon Cook 2009); and the form of, and influences on, Pigou’s utilitarianism that has been described as “ideal utilitarianism” (Yamazaki 2008).
- 3.
Associationism is a psychological reductionist theory that the content of consciousness can be explained by an organism’s causal history (the associate memories of particular mental states with successive mental states arising from the organism’s experience of sense and perception over time), an idea that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle (Mandelbaum 2015). It has been argued, however, that John Stuart Mill should not be thought of as being reductionist in this sense as he had vigorously defended the notion of human beings as active in their own self-determination in his An Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy published in 1865 (Wilson 2014). Mill, however, had little to say about the mind—body problem, unlike Herbert Spencer, who dealt with the issue in detail in his Principles of Psychology (1855) (Wilson 2014).
- 4.
Psychological considerations of moral philosophy had been considered earlier by David Hartley and Adam Smith, though in different ways.
- 5.
From 1871, the hedonistic calculus was developed in a more formal sense when incorporated into the theory of value by William Stanley Jevons, who determined that value was determined solely upon marginal utility.
- 6.
Sidgwick (1874) conceived that it would only be through the existence of a powerful and just being (God), rewarding individuals in the afterlife for taking the right actions, or punishing individuals if the right course of action was not taken, that the conflict inherent in the dualism of practical reason could be resolved. Sidgwick considered, however, that the existence of God and an afterlife was unable to be demonstrated and personally rejected the postulate, the result being that the dualism of practical reason remained irreconcilable.
- 7.
- 8.
Set out in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s categorical imperative takes the form of a series of formulations centred on an individual’s ability to reason through certain objective ethical rules that individuals have a duty to act in ways to uphold.
- 9.
Dunham et al. (2011) view Green’s system as a synthesis of the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies. They present Green as believing that Hegel’s metaphysics must be ‘recreated’ by returning to Kant, but that his system was also underlain by a distinct Aristotelianism, where form and matter are essential to conceptions of substance.
- 10.
Monism is the philosophical view that existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance; as compared to pluralism, which reflects a view that reality consists of many substances, or dualism, which reflects a view that two substances (such as mind and matter) constitute reality.
- 11.
Bosanquet, however, would later develop idealism along naturalist lines as propounded in his Gifford lectures in 1912, The Principle of Individuality and Value.
- 12.
See Mander (2011, pp. 27–34) for a detailed description of the early importation of the German philosophies of Kant and Hegel to Britain.
- 13.
It has been contended that the neo-Kantian movement became fully visible and established during the 1860s with various scholars being influenced by the works of Hermann von Helmholtz (emphasising the scientific and empirical side of Kant’s work), Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (attempting to reorient the subject of philosophy to explain the phenomena of modern science or epistemology), and Hermann Lotze (who attempted reconciliation between the realm of value and the material world), but that the movement’s roots can be traced to the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century in the works of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798–1854), and Beiser (2014, Part I, 1).
- 14.
- 15.
James was one of three scholars who Reba Soffer (1978) identifies as key figures leading a “revolution” in the social sciences in England between 1870 and the Great War. The others were Alfred Marshall (in economics) and Graham Wallace (in political science). James described Lotze “as the most exquisite of contemporary minds” (Perry 1935, ii, p. 16) and was influenced by Lotze’s work in psychology, particularly Medizinische Psychologie (James 1890 II, 523n).
- 16.
Further reflections on similarities between Sidgwick’s and Lotze’s philosophical positions appear in Appendix A.
- 17.
Together with Wilhelm Windelband, Lotze has been described as a father of axiology or the philosophy of values (Skowronski 2010, p. 4).
- 18.
Lotze’s development of the idea of “teleo-mechanism” contrasts with, and was a response to, Hegel’s dialectical movement of reality’s unfolding over the course of history. Beiser (2014, p. 298) points out that Lotze found the fundamental problem in Hegel’s philosophy of history to be the intention for the ideal to be absolute. Specifically, he claims that the idea that the meaning of history appears to the absolute spirit alone for the sake of its self-awareness was repellent to Lotze, as it undermined the motivation for human action. In Hegel’s philosophy, it was impossible to specify where and how the idea appears in particular cases. Lotze, instead, was concerned with the questions of to whom, or for whom, the idea appears.
- 19.
It is not unsurprising that Paul Kuntz (1971, pp. 68–87) traces Alfred North Whitehead’s development of process philosophy (drawing on quantum mechanics) back to Lotze’s conception of relational movement towards idealities.
- 20.
- 21.
Lotze’s philosophical and scientific legacies largely fell into obscurity during the course of the twentieth century, though renewed interest in his work has coincided with increased interest in, and research being undertaken on, topics related to the history of analytic philosophy, the history of idealism, and the impact and migration of European thought during the nineteenth century. Discussing the impact of Lotze’s logic, Mathieu Marion (2009, p. 8) notes that “the influence of Lotze is everywhere to be felt in the late nineteenth-century but hardly ever studied”. Lotze’s body of work has been identified as having influenced (1) the neo-Kantians (Milkov 2003); (2) Franz Brentano and his school (Albertazzi 2006); (3) the British idealists (Dappiano 1997; Mander 2011; Milkov 2000); (4) American pragmatism (Hookway 2009; Kraushaar 1938); (5) Husserl’s phenomenology (Hauser 2003 as cited by Milkov 2008); (6) Dilthey’s philosophy of life (Orth 1984 as cited by Milkov 2008); (7) Frege’s logic (Reck 2002, 2013); and (8) the early Cambridge analytical philosophy of Russell and Moore (Bell 1999; Milkov 2008, 2013). By the 1930s, however, Lotze’s pluralist approach had given way to a wave of new philosophical concerns and the likes of Wittgenstein (as cited in Cahill 2011, note 97) would comment that Lotze was “probably a man who shouldn’t have been allowed to write philosophy”.
- 22.
An important exception here is John Cook Wilson, the Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford, who studied directly under Lotze at Göttingen. Cook Wilson has been referred to as the founder of “Oxford Realism”, influencing the likes of H.A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, and J.L. Austin. Cook Wilson was critical of both empiricism and idealism, and was instrumental in weakening the sway of idealism at Oxford (Marion 2010).
- 23.
James Ward had acknowledged the resounding influence that Sidgwick and Lotze exerted on his views, stating that “two men have made me: Hermann Lotze and Henry Sidgwick” (Ward as cited by Bartlett 1925, p. 451).
- 24.
Dappiano (1997, pp. 112–113) finds the features of common sense and critical realism in MacTaggart’s personal idealism consistent with the early Hegelianism adopted by John Grote, who had succeeded Whewell as Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University in 1855. However, this claim must be placed alongside John Gibbins’s contention that the Hegelian origin of Grote’s philosophy is weak and would “have to be built up on unwitting testimony and circumstantial evidence” (Gibbins 2013, chapter 5, electronic edition is without page numbers).
- 25.
Leaving Cambridge in 1888, Sorley held chairs in Philosophy and Logic at Cardiff and later Saint Andrew’s, returning to Cambridge in 1900 when he succeeded Sidgwick as Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy.
- 26.
Outside of Cambridge, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1890) initiated a critique against absolute Hegelianism in his book, Scottish Philosophy: a Comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume (Pringle-Pattison 1890) based on absolute idealism’s failure to deal with human individuality. Hastings Rashdall, a fellow of New College, Oxford, also adopted a type of personal idealism in his main work The Theory of Good and Evil (1907) and expounded a non-hedonistic theory of utilitarianism that he termed “ideal utilitarianism”. Rashdall (1907, Vol II, p. 1) contended that “acts are right or wrong according as they do or do not tend to promote the greatest quantity of [general] good.” He developed a pluralist notion of the Good, as had Lotze. In Rashdall’s case, however, the Good consisted of virtue, intellectual activities, affection or social emotion, and pleasure.
- 27.
Soffer (1978, p. 146) presents the American scholar, William James, as the most prominent proponent of changes in psychological studies in England, arguing that there was “no new psychology in England until James’s theoretical and empirical synthesis”, noting the influence of James’s The Principles of Psychology published in 1890 and his visits to England. She presents an assessment that Ward’s psychology had “sought sanctuary in metaphysics” and excluded the study of emotion, ethics, and social conflict, generally presenting James’s contributions as influential in her study of the revolution in the social sciences between 1870 and 1914. However, scholars have noted the broad influence of Lotze upon the development of James’s thought (Hookway 2009; Kraushaar 1938; Milkov 2008; Woodward 2015).
- 28.
Stout’s A Manual of Psychology (1898) cites Lotze in this regard: “The construction of self-acting machinery has had an important influence in suggesting this line of thought. ‘Our eyes’, says Lotze, ‘cannot rest repeatedly and continuously on this remarkable borderland of self-acting instruments, which derive their material from Nature, but the form of their operation from human volition, without our whole mode of conceiving Nature being affected by these observations … We know in fact that not from within, by spontaneous effort at development, but under extraneous compulsion have the combined bodies acquired this admirable play of mutually adjusted states’” (Stout 1898 p. 637 citing Lotze, Microcosmus, third edition, vol. I, pp. 31–32).
- 29.
The influence of Lotze upon Russell and Moore’s early thought and the birth of analytic philosophy has been traced by several scholars (Bell 1999; Milkov 2000, 2008; Passmore 1966). Bell (1999) sees both as having been influenced by continental scholars of which Lotze was one. Milkov (2000, 2008) discusses Russell’s intellectual debt to Lotze directly. Passmore (1966) refers to Moore’s rejection of the Hegelian view and attributes this to his exposure to Lotze’s philosophy.
- 30.
Additionally, it has been argued that demarcation disputes between idealists on the nature of absolute and personal idealism also contributed to the movement’s internal collapse (see Passmore 1976), whilst Skidelsky (2007) considers the Great War as having highlighted the relationship between state absolutism and Hegelianism and a reason for the general shift to positivism.
- 31.
Thatcher (1970) presents a comprehensive study of the reception of Nietzsche’s ideas in Great Britain. He describes the reception of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which was published in German in 1883 and translated into English in 1896 as slow and negative, but that the popular reading of his work had increased substantially by 1908 (Thatcher 1970, p. 16).
- 32.
Of particular interest on this point is an essay by Stephen John Nash that appears in Backhaus and Drechsler (2006), which provides evidence that the impact of Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals may have influenced the development of Frank Knight’s concept of uncertainty.
- 33.
It is this shared goal that ultimately places Pigou in the Marshallian thought style.
- 34.
Moral sciences studies at Cambridge became a three-year undergraduate course in its own right in 1860.
- 35.
In the year Pigou sat his examinations, one paper was set on each of the subjects in Schedule A (metaphysics, politics, and ethics), two papers on each of the subjects listed in Schedule B (history of philosophy, advanced psychology and psychophysics, advanced logic and methodology, and advanced political economy), and an essay paper set that contained questions on all the above subjects (The University of Cambridge Calendar 1899, pp. xxxix–xli). What choice this final essay paper entailed and which subject Pigou addressed is unknown. Requirements for the new regulations for the Moral Sciences Tripos came into effect for examinations held in 1901 (The University of Cambridge Calendar, 1900).
- 36.
It was in its fifth amended edition by 1899.
- 37.
Vincent Barnett (2015) has recently considered the impact of G.F. Stout and James Sully’s scholarly contributions to psychology upon J.M. Keynes’s economic thought during the time he was preparing for his civil service exams during 1905–1906. Sully, who held academic positions at the University College of London, had studied under Lotze at Göttingen and with Helmholtz at Berlin.
- 38.
Although published in 1908, several of Pigou’s essays had appeared earlier in the International Journal of Ethics and one in the Independent Review.
- 39.
J.E. King (2005, 2007) presents two articles on Bertrand Russell’s interests in and relationship to economics. He argues, however, that Russell did not seem to have read Pigou’s Wealth and Welfare or did not make any detailed assessment of it (King 2005). Yet obviously Russell and Pigou had interchanges on ontological and ethical matters through Russell’s reading of Pigou’s philosophical essays and Pigou was closer to Russell’s assessment of utilitarianism than Moore’s.
- 40.
Arthur Hamilton Moberly was a friend of Pigou’s from King’s. He was ten years his junior and is listed as graduating with a B.A. from Cambridge in 1906. Born into a prominent ecclesiastical family, Moberly’s grandfather was George Moberly, Bishop of Salisbury; his father, Robert Campbell Moberly, Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, and a Canon of Christ Church Cathedral; and his brothers were Sir Walter Hamilton Moberly, a notable intellect in philosophy and political science, and Robert Hamilton Moberly, later the Dean of Salisbury. Moberly later pursued a career in architecture and is probably the young friend who is referred to as having designed Pigou’s house at Buttermere.
- 41.
Sclater had attended Emmanuel College and, like Pigou, was a past president of the Students’ Union. He had graduated in the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1898. Pigou also acknowledges his friend Sclater in the preface to his book Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher in 1901.
- 42.
In effect, by following Russell, Pigou rejects the antimonies of Kant (2002 [1785]).
- 43.
Pigou here distinguishes between the “Kantian view” (we cannot perceive things as they are in themselves), “naïve realism” (the world is what we see), and “critical realism” that he differentiates from naïve realism by drawing on Oswald Külpe (philosopher), William C.D. Whetham (physical sciences), and Stout (psychologist). Pigou concludes that the world of appearance is not identical with the independent reality; therefore, he says “critical realism is master of the field” (1908a, p. 15). It is perhaps worth noting that Tony Lawson (2003) has, in more recent times, brought the term ‘critical realism’ to the fore in economics in his work Reorienting Economics. Lawson argues that economic science should be concerned with the domain of real causal mechanisms, as opposed to positivist economics which has been largely concerned with empirical realities (or confined to the explanation of experienced reality).
- 44.
Russell (1921, p. 11) would later abandon this position and adopt a position of neutral monism—“James is right in rejecting consciousness as an entity, and … the American realists are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material.”
- 45.
Lotze also adopted psychophysical dualism, but for methodological purposes. The pathway to his fully matured position is documented in Beiser (2013, p. 223), where it is described as “spiritualism”.
- 46.
Pigou’s idea of a region of indeterminacy of points in space seems to reflect Max Planck’s path-breaking work in physics in 1900, which changed the notions of classical physics due to the discovery that electromagnetic energy could only be emitted in quantized form (quantum field theory), and also Einstein’s further findings in 1905 of the photoelectric effect. The wave-particle duality concept was not formally distinguished until 1924 by Louis de Broglie, who drew on Einstein’s work on the photoelectric effect to postulate that all matter has wave properties, a theory later enhanced by David Bohm in 1952.
- 47.
Pigou suggests that the properties of such activity are indefinable and conceives it as a simple kind of activity, “just as yellow is a simple kind of colour”.
- 48.
That is, following Lotze, there is an independent reality, the contents of which include consciousness, which is uncaused (like Ward’s ‘field of consciousness’), but events may “be caused by a cause that is itself uncaused” (i.e., proximate events arising from disturbances in the field because of a distinction between parts and wholes and their relationship, for example, like waves in the ocean). This seems to go back to Leibnitz’s and Lotze’s pluralism (or monadism), which was the special subject set for study in metaphysics in the Moral Sciences Tripos when Pigou (and Moore and Russell) were studying these subjects. Pigou’s perception of consciousness in this sense aligns with his article published in the Society of Psychical Research Proceedings, mentioned above, in which he considers access to a collective field of consciousness as a possible alternative to psychical activity of mediumship as communication with disembodied spirits.
- 49.
Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick (2012, p. 195) argue that Nietzsche’s account of willing in Beyond Good and Evil “equates the will with the soul and that this theory of the soul provides a basis for distinguishing what a person values from what she merely desires”, and consider will in Nietzsche as being equivalent to volition.
- 50.
On this point, a letter from Marshall to Pigou about his article demonstrates that on this point, there was no disagreement between them. See Whitaker’s The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, Economist (1996, vol. 3, p. 7).
- 51.
Pigou extended his examination of Marshall’s framework in his 1904 paper “Monopoly and Consumer Surplus”, and again in his 1910 paper “Consumer and Producer’s Surplus”, which provided the basis for some of the key analytical devices underlying his seminal Wealth and Welfare. In the latter paper, Pigou’s concerns for the plurality of conscious states as they pertained to “Good”, embedded in his functional theory of Good, is highlighted by his adoption of Pareto’s notion of ophelimity. ‘Ophelimity’ was a term employed by Pareto to refer to the sensation arising from the satisfaction of desires and wants regardless of their legitimacy, as distinct from the notion of ‘utility’, a term used to describe actions’ usefulness towards wellbeing (McLure 2010, p. 639).
- 52.
Pigou (1910a) had earlier invoked Pareto’s term of ‘ophelimity’ to capture this complexity.
- 53.
Yamazaki (2008) argues that a distinction can be made between what he terms Pigou’s “need satisfaction” principle and his “desire satisfaction” principle and that this distinction underlay Pigou’s stated requirement for a national minimum.
- 54.
A. Skelton (2011) provides a comparison of Rashdall’s and Moore’s versions of ideal utilitarianism, which he argues employ different gamuts of argument.
- 55.
“What is good and evil remains just as incapable of being reached by mere thought as what is blue or sweet” (1908a, p. 82 citing Lotze, Microcosmos, English translation, vol. ii, p. 357). Yamazaki (2008) has noted that Moore in his Principia Ethica makes reference to the example of the perception of things that are “yellow and others red”, and uses that to link Pigou to Moore. However, Pigou read Lotze and refers the reader to the original source, that is, Lotze.
- 56.
Pigden (2014) provides a concise summary of the three major critiques Russell directed at Moore’s logic.
- 57.
Russell argues that Moore reduces “right” to “good” and that, mutadis mutandis, indefinability can likewise be repeated to show the indefinability of “ought”.
- 58.
Consequentialism in this sense is a form of normative ethics that considers the consequences of one’s actions as forming the basis of ethical judgement.
- 59.
- 60.
Rashdall’s ideal utilitarianism echoes Russell’s comment. For Rashdall “the right action is always that which (so far as the agent has the means of knowing) will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole” (Skelton 2011, citing Rashdall from The Theory of Good and Evil, p. 184).
- 61.
Backhouse (2006, p. 38) notes that Pigou, unlike Sidgwick and Marshall, had reflected critically on statistical data on income distribution not available to Sidgwick and Marshall via the work of Arthur Bowley and Vilfredo Pareto.
- 62.
Of course, none of this is intended to suggest that Pigou’s analyses were immune from criticism. Indeed, his distinction between general welfare and economic welfare encountered demarcation issues. This was noted by Ralph Hawtrey (1926, p. 215), who argued that “the aggregate of satisfactions is not an aggregate of welfare at all as it includes good satisfactions which are welfare and bad satisfactions which are the reverse.” This is a criticism essentially of Pigou’s assumption that economic welfare moves, probabilistically, in the same direction as total welfare. However, Pigou (1912, pp. 3–4) acknowledges that economic welfare does not contain all welfare arising in its connection to the national dividend, noting that “various good and bad qualities indirectly associated with income-getting and income-spending are excluded from it. It does not include the whole psychic return, which emerges when the objective services constituting the national dividend have passed through the factory of the body; it includes only the psychic return of satisfaction.” It is the difficulty of measuring “the whole psychic return” that remains an issue in welfare economics. Hicks (1939, pp. x–xi), for example, pointed out that “it is impossible to make ‘economic’ proposals that do not have ‘non-economic aspects’.”
- 63.
Nietzsche underlines this issue from the Darwinian perspective clearly in The Gay Science when he explains: “Nowadays there is a profoundly erroneous moral doctrine that is celebrated in England: this holds that judgements of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ sum up experiences of what is ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’. One holds that what is called good preserves the species, while what is called evil harms the species. In truth, however, the evil instincts are expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a degree as the good ones; their function is merely different” (1974 [1887], p. 79).
- 64.
It must be pointed out that in 1908 Pigou considered Nietzsche’s ‘Beyond-Man’ as the “full and harmonious development of all [human] capacities”. However, writing after the war, Pigou (1923, pp. 81–82) observes: “a world containing nothing but Nietzschian supermen would destroy itself in war: one consisting of nothing but St Francis of Assisi would perish of its own pity.” This suggests that Pigou’s assessment of aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy had perhaps changed after the impacts of the First World War and the different ways in which Nietzsche’s “Übermensch” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra had been translated and (mis)interpreted.
- 65.
Champernowne (1959, p. 264) had earlier recalled that one of Pigou’s enduring strengths as an economist lay “in his sure grasp of logical relations”.
References
Archival Material
King’s College. n.d. Library Listing of Contents of Pigou’s Remaining Private Library After Death. In Pigou Collection, KCAC/6/1/11/36. Cambridge: King’s College Archive Centre.
Published Material
Albertazzi, Liliana. 2006. Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Brentano. In Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. V.F. Hendricks and J. Symons. Dordrecht: Springer.
Aldrich, John. 1996. The Course of Marshall’s Theorizing About Demand. History of Political Economy 38 (1): 15–44.
Aslanbeigui, Nahid. 1992. Pigou’s Inconsistencies or Keynes’s Misconceptions? History of Political Economy 24 (2): 413–433.
Aslanbeigui, Nahid, and Guy Oakes. 2012. On Pigou’s Theory of Economic Policy Analysis. Œconomia 2 (2): 123–150.
Backhaus, Jürgen G., and Wolfgang Drechsler. 2006. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) Economy and Society. In The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus and Frank H. Stephen. New York: Springer.
Backhouse, Roger E. 2006. Sidgwick, Marshall, and the Cambridge School of Economics. History of Political Economy 38 (1): 15–44. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-38-1-15.
Backhouse, Roger E., and Tamotsu Nishizawa. 2010. No Wealth But Life: Welfare Economics and the Welfare State in Britain, 1880–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Balfour, Gerald William. 1911. Professor Pigou on Cross-Correspondence. Society of Psychical Research Proceedings 25: Part 62.
Barnett, Vincent. 2015. Keynes and the Psychology of Economic Behaviour: From Stout and Sully to the General Theory. History of Political Economy 47 (2): 307–333.
Bartlett, F.C. 1925. James Ward 1843–1925. American Journal of Psychology 36: 449–453.
Beiser, F.C. 2013. Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2014. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bell, David. 1999. The Revolution of Moore and Russell: A Very British Coup? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44: 193–209.
Bentham, Jeremy. 1776. A Fragment on Government. London: T. Payne.
———. 1789. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations. London: T. Payne and Son.
Black, R.C. 1990. Jevons, Marshall and the Utilitarian Tradition. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 37 (1): 5–17.
Bohm, David. 1952. A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of “Hidden” Variables. II. Physical Review 85 (2): 180–193.
Bosanquet, Bernard. 1912. The Principle of Individuality and Value. London: Macmillan.
Boucher, David, and Andrew Vincent. 2012. British Idealism, Continuum Guides for the Perplexed. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Cahill, Kevin M. 2011. The Fate of Wonder: Wittengenstein’s Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity. New York: Columbia University Press.
Champernowne, D.G. 1959. Arthur Cecil Pigou 1877–1959. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General) 122 (2): 263–265.
Clark, Maudemarie, and David Dudrick. 2012. The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Coats, A.W. 1992. On the History of Economic Thought: American and British Essays. Vol. 1. London: Routledge.
Coats, B.W., and Tiziano Raffaelli. 2006. Economics and Ethics. In The Elgar Companion to Alfred Marshall, ed. Tiziano Raffaelli, Giacomo Becattini, and Marco Dardi. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Collard, David. 1996. Pigou and Future Generations: A Cambridge Tradition. Cambridge Journal of Economics 20 (5): 585–597.
———. 2011. Generations of Economists. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Collini, S. 2011. My Role and Their Duties: Sidgwick as a Philosopher, Professor and Public Moralist. In Henry Sidgwick, ed. Rodd Harrison, 9–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cook, Simon J. 2009. The Intellectual Foundations of Alfred Marshall’s Economic Science: A Rounded Globe of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2012. On Marshall’s Idealism. The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 19 (1): 109–114.
Crisp, Roger. 1996. The Dualism of Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 96: 53–73.
Dappiano, Luigi. 1997. Cambridge and the Austrian Connection. In Itinere: European Cities and the Birth of Modern Scientific Philosophy, ed. Robert Poli, 99–124. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V. Editions.
Dardi, Marco. 2010. Marshall on Welfare, or: The ‘Utilitarian’ Meets the ‘Evolver’. The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 17 (3): 405–437.
De Vries, H. 1904. Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation. Chicago: Open Court.
Deleuze, Gilles. 2006 [1962]. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and ed. Foreword by Michael Hardt. New York: Columbia University Press.
van der Schaar, M. 2013. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dunham, J., I. Grant, and S. Watson. 2011. Idealism: The History of a Philosophy. Abingdon and Oxford: First published by Acumen, Published 2–14 Routledge.
Einstein, Albert. 1905. Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Korper. Annalen der Physik 17: 891–921.
G.F.S. 1924. A Tentative Theory of Light Quanta: Louis De Broglie. (Phil. Mag. Feb.). Elsevier Ltd.
Gibbins, John Richard. 2013. John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Thought. UK: Andrews UK Limited.
Green, T.H. 1883. Prolegomena to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon.
Groenewegen, P. 1995. A Soaring Eagle: Alfred Marshall 1842–1924 / Peter Groenewegen. Aldershot and Brookfield, VT: E. Elgar.
Hauser, K. 2003. Lotze and Husserl. Archive fur Geschichte der Philosophie 85: 152–178.
Hawtrey, R.G. 1926. The Economic Problem. London: Longmans, Green.
Hayward, F.H. 1901. The True Significance of Sidgwick’s ‘Ethics’. International Journal of Ethics 11 (2): 176–177.
Hicks, J.R. 1939. The Foundations of Welfare Economics. The Economic Journal 49 (196): 696–712.
Hobbes, T. 1909 [1651]. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. 1st ed. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Hookway, Christopher. 2009. Lotze and the Classical Pragmatists. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy I 1: 1–9.
James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. Boston: Holt.
Kant, I. 2002 [1785]. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. A. Woods. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Keynes, J.M. 1924. Alfred Marshall, 1842–1924. The Economic Journal 34 (135): 311–372.
King, J.E. 2005. Bertrand Russell on Economics, 1889–1918. The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 25: 5–38.
———. 2007. Popular Philosophy and Popular Economics: Bertrand Russell, 1919–70. The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 27: 193–219.
Kraushaar, O. 1938. What James’ Philosophical Orientation Owed to Lotze. The Philosophical Review 47 (5): 517–526.
Kuntz, P.G. 1971. Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Philosopher and Critic. In G. Santayana, Lotze System of Philosophy, ed. P.G. Kuntz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ladd, G.T. 1886a. Outlines of Aesthetics: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Boston, MA: Ginn and Company.
———. 1886b. Outlines of Psychology: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Boston, MA: Ginn and Company.
———. 1887. Outlines of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Boston, MA: Ginn and Company.
Lawson, Tony. 2003. Reorienting Economics. London: Routledge.
Lindsay, T.M. 1876. Hermann Lotze. Mind 1 (3): 363–382.
Long, E.T. 1995. The Gifford Lectures and the Scottish Personal Idealists. The Review of Metaphysics 49 (2): 365–396.
Lotze, Hermann. 1841. Metaphysik. Leipzig: Weidmann.
———. 1843. Logik. Leipzig: Weidmann.
———. Mikrokosmus: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. 1856–1864. 2nd ed., 1868–1872. 4th ed., 1884–1888.
———. 1874a. Logic, in Three Books: Of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge, ed. and trans. B. Bosanquet. Oxford: Claredon Press.
———. 1874b. System der Philosophie. Part 1. Logik: Drei Bücher. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.
———. 1879. System der Philosophie. Part 1. Metaphysik: Drei Bücher. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.
———. 1884. Metaphysics, In Three Books: Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology, ed. and trans. Bernard Bosanqet (English Translation). Oxford: Claredon Press.
———. 1885. Microcosmus, translated from the German by Elizabeth Hamilton, and ed. E.E. Constance Jones. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
Mandelbaum, Eric. 2015. Associationist Theories of Thought. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/associationist-thought.
Mander, W.J. 2011. British Idealism, A History. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Marion, Mathieu. 2009. Theory of Knowledge in Britain From 1860 to 1950, a Non-Revolutionary Account. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4 (200 Years of Analytical Philosophy): 1–34.
———. 2010. John Cook Wilson. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/wilson/.
Marshall, C. 2013. Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism in the Context of the Rise of Idealism: A Reappraisal. Revue d’études benthamiennes [En ligne], 12.
Martinoia, Rozenn. 2003. That Which Is Desired, Which Pleases, and Which Satisfies: Utility According to Alfred Marshall. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 25 (03): 349–349.
McLure, M. 2010. Pareto, Pigou and Third-Party Consumption: Divergent Approaches to Welfare Theory with Implications for the Study of Public Finance. The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 17 (4): 635–657.
McLure, Michael. 2013. Assessments of A.C. Pigou’s Fellowship Theses. History of Political Economy 45 (2): 255–285.
Medema, Steve G. 2009. The Hesitant Hand: Taming Self-Interest in the History of Economic Ideas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Milkov, Nikolay. 2000. Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy. Prima Philosophia 13: 133–153.
———. 2003. A Hundred Years of English Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2008. Russell’s Debt to Lotze. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39: 186–193.
———. 2013. Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881). In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden. http://www.iep.utm.edu/lotze/.
Mill, John Stuart. 1863. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son and Bourn.
———. 1865. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green.
———. 1874. Three Essays on Religion. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer.
Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1896. Thus Spake Zarathustra, translated and introduced by Alexander Tille. London: Henry & Co.
———. 1907. Beyond Good and Evil. London: Henry & Co.
———. 1974 [1887]. The Gay Science With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vantage Books.
O’Donnell, Margaret G. 1979. Pigou: An Extension of Sidgwickian Thought. History of Political Economy 11 (4): 588–605. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-11-4-588.
Orth, E.W. 1984. Dilthey und Lotze: Zur Wandlung des Philosophiebegriffs in 19 Jahrhundert. Dilthey-Jahrbuch 2: 140–158.
Passmore, John. 1966. A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
———. 1976. G.F. Stout’s Editorship of Mind (1892–1920). Mind LXXXV (337.17): 17–36.
Perry, R.B. 1935. The Thought and Character of William James. Vol. 1, 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
Pigden, Charles, ed. 1999. Russell on Ethics. London: Routledge.
———. 2014. Russell’s Moral Philosophy. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/russell-moral/.
Pigou, A.C. 1901. Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher, Being the Burney Essay for 1900. London: C. J. Clay and Sons.
———. 1903. Some Remarks on Utility. The Economic Journal 13 (49): 58–68.
———. 1907. Some Points of Ethical Controversy. International Journal of Ethics 18 (1): 99–107.
———. 1908a. The Problems of Theism, and Other Essays. Macmillan and Co. Limited.
———. 1908b. The Ethics of Nietzsche. International Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 343–355.
———. 1909. Psychical Research and Survival After Bodily Death. Proceedings of the Society of Psychical Research 23: 286–303.
———. 1910. Producers’ and Consumers’ Surplus. The Economic Journal 20 (79): 358–370.
———. 1911. Cross-Correspondences: A Reply to Mr Gerald Balfour. Journal of Society for Psychical Research 66 (May): 66–70.
———. 1912. Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan.
———. 1913. The Interdependence of Different Sources of Demand and Supply in a Market. The Economic Journal 23 (89): 19–24.
———. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. 1st ed. London: Macmillan and Co.
———. 1923. Essays in Applied Economic. London: P.S. King and Sons.
———. 1927. Industrial Fluctuations. London: Macmillan.
———. 1933. The Theory of Unemployment. London: Macmillan.
———. 1941. Employment and Equilibrium: A Theoretical Discussion. London: Macmillan & Co.
———. 1945. Lapses from Full Employment. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
———. 1952. Essays in Economics. London: Macmillan.
Preti, Consuelo. 2008. On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore’s Early Theory of Judgment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39: 176–185.
Pringle-Pattison, A.S. 1890. Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.
———. 1908a. Henry Sidgwick. A Memoir by A. Sidgwick and E. M. Sidgwick. Mind 17 (65): 88–97.
———. 1908b. Review Article: Henry Sidgwick, by A.S. and E.M.S.; Memoir of Thomas Hill Green by R.L. Nettleship; T.H. Green. Mind New Series 17 (65): 88–97.
Raffaelli, Tiziano. 1994a. Marshall’s Early Philosophical Writings. Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology Archival Supplement (4): 51–158.
———. 1994b. Marshall on “Machinery and Life”. Marshall Studies Bulletin 4: 9–22.
———. 2012. On Marshall’s Presumed Idealism: A Not on the Intellectual Foundations of Alfred Marshall’s Economic Science. A Rounded Globe of Knowledge. European Journal of Economic History 19 (1): 99–108.
Raffaelli, Tiziano, Giacomo Becattini, and Marco Dardi, eds. 2006. The Elgar Companion to Alfred Marshall. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Rashdall, Hastings. 1907. The Theory of Good and Evil. Vols. 1 and 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reck, Erich H. 2002. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2013. Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3): 242–265.
Russell, Bertrand. 1903. Principles of Mathematics. New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc.
———. 1904. Review of Mr G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica. Independent Review 7 (March): 328–333.
———. 1921. The Analysis of Mind. London and New York: G. Allen and Unwin and Macmillan.
———. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster.
———. 1959. My Philosophical Development. London: Allen and Unwin.
———. 1994. Foundations of Logic, 1903–05. In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, ed. Alasdair Urquhart and Albert C. Lewis, vol. 4. London: Routledge.
———. 2014. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Foundations of Logic. Vol. 4. Routledge: The McMaster University.
Saul, S.B. 1969. The Myth of the Great Depression, 1873–1896. London: Macmillan.
Schneewind, J.B. 1977. Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schultz, B. 2004. Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Senn, Peter R. 2006. The Influence of Nietzsche on the History of Economic Thought. In Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) Economy and Society, ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus and Wolfgang Drechsler, 9–38. New York: Springer.
Shionoya, Y. 1991. Sidgwick, Moore and Keynes: A Philosophical Analysis of Keynes’s ‘My Early Beliefs’. In Keynes and Philosophy – Essays on the Origin of Keynes’s Thought, ed. Bradley W. Bateman and John B. Davis, 6–29. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Company.
Sidgwick, Henry. 1874. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
———. 1886. Outlines of the History of Ethics. London: Macmillan and Co.
———. 1900. Criteria of Truth and Error. Mind 9 (33): 8–25.
Skelton, A. 2011. Ideal Utilitarianism: Rashdall and Moore. In Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, ed. T. Hurka, 45–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skidelsky, Edward. 2007. The Strange Death of British Idealism. Philosophy and Literature 31 (1): 41–51.
Skowronski, K.P. 2010. Review of Josiah Royce in Focus Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 11 (1): 1–7.
Soffer, Reba N. 1978. Ethics and Society in England: The Revolution in the Social Sciences 1870–1914. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California and London: University of California Press, Ltd.
Sorley, William R. 1885. On the Ethics of Naturalism. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons.
Sorley, W.R., and G.F. Stout, eds. 1927. Essays in Philosophy By James Ward: With a Memoir by Olwen Ward Campbell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spencer, H. 1855. Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.
Stewart, Herbert. 1909. Some Criticisms of the Nietzsche Revival. International Journal of Ethics 19 (4): 427–443.
Stirling, J. 1865. The Secret of Hegel. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd; London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. Ltd.
Stout, G.F. 1898. A Manual of Psychology. Foxton, near Cambridge: University Tutorial Press Ltd.
———. 1905. Things and Sensations. London: British Academy: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press Warehouse.
Sullivan, Stephen J. 2009. Nietzsche’s Anticipation of Russell. The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, 140–141 (November 2008–February 2009). http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ/09feb/in-this-issue.htm.
Thatcher, David S. 1970. Nietzsche in England 1890–1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
The University of Cambridge. 1899. The Cambridge University Calendar for the Year 1899–1900, ed. The University of Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Co.
———. 1900. The Cambridge University Calendar for the Year 1900–1901. Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Co.
Ward, James. 1886. Psychology. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Edinburgh: Black.
———. 1893. The Moral Sciences Tripos, Student’s Guide Part IX, ed. The University of Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co.
———. 1899a. Naturalism and Agnosticism. The Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of Aberdeen in the Years 1896–1898. London: Adam and Charles Black.
———.1899b [1893]. Student Guide, Moral Sciences Tripos, ed. The University of Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Co.
———. 1911. The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Years 1907–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whitaker, John K. 1975. The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall, 1867–1890. London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society.
———. 1977. Some Neglected Aspects of Alfred Marshall’s Economic and Social Thought. History of Political Economy 9 (2): 161–197.
———. ed. 1996. The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall Economist. Vols. 1–3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wicks, R. 2015. Arthur Schopenhauer. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/schopenhauer/.
Wilson, Fred. 2014. John Stuart Mill. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mill/.
Woodward, William Ray. 2015. Hermann Lotze, An Intellectual Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Yamazaki, Satoshi. 2008. Pigou’s Ethics and Welfare. Japan: Hitotsubashi University.
———. 2012. Need and Distribution in Pigou’s Economic Thinking. Working Papers. Japan: Kochi University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lovejoy Knight, K. (2018). Balancing the Material and the Ideal. In: A.C. Pigou and the 'Marshallian' Thought Style. Palgrave Studies in the History of Economic Thought. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01018-8_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01018-8_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01017-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01018-8
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)