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The Choice of Legal Basis for Acts of the European Union pp 99–135Cite as

The Sui Generis Nature of External Competences

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Abstract

External relations and the respective competences have in the past been divided and distributed over three pillars, which informally continues to be the case in the post-Lisbon era: Despite the integration of the former third pillar into the realm of supranational EU law, the field of external relations is still governed by supranational and intergovernmental provisions at once. On the one hand, the Union is equipped with supranational powers to regulate in the external relations sphere. On the other hand, the area of common foreign and security policy has been established which grants Member States competences in external relations. Despite the codification of different types of competence by the Lisbon Treaty, institutional practices continue to blur the lines in the quest for the correct choice of legal basis. As a result, legal basis litigation in this area may easily receive a cross-pillar dimension, particularly since international agreements rarely fall within one policy area only.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cremona (2014), p. 74.

  2. 2.

    I.e. between supranational and intergovernmental competences.

  3. 3.

    Art 275 TFEU. See also Art 24(1) TEU.

  4. 4.

    On a brief overview of the different constitutional concepts of economic sanctions, see Schütze (2007), pp. 13–16. An extensive historical analysis of economic sanctions can be found in Koutrakos (2001); more recently, see Gazzini and Herlin-Karnell (2011).

  5. 5.

    Eckes (2016), p. 493.

  6. 6.

    Cremona observed that third countries could have certain expectations as to the specific outcome in determining the legal basis for a measure which may thus prejudice legal basis litigation, Cremona (2006), pp. 10 and 11. See also Koutrakos who equally states that “[b]y introducing the interests of third parties as an additional factor in the process of the choice of legal basis, the Court rendered a process already fraught with problems even more difficult to predict.” Koutrakos (2008a), p. 183.

  7. 7.

    A discussion on the interactions between legislature and judiciary in EU external relations can be found in De Baere and Koutrakos (2012).

  8. 8.

    Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (2013).

  9. 9.

    Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (EUSFTA) (2015).

  10. 10.

    For an in-depth analysis of EU international relations law, see Koutrakos (2015).

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property (WTO), EU:C:1994:384; Opinion 1/2008, Conclusion of agreements on the grant of compensation for modification and withdrawal of certain commitments following the accession of new Member States to the European Union, EU:C:2009:739.

  12. 12.

    Before the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, cross-pillar mixity did also include international agreements adopted on the basis of both intergovernmental pillars. For an in-depth analysis of intergovernmental agreements in external relations, see Rosas (2011). See also Wessel (2010).

  13. 13.

    See Council Decision 2008/262/EC of 28 February 2008 on the signature, on behalf of the European Union, and on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ 2008 L 83, p. 5).

  14. 14.

    Hillion (2005), p. 58.

  15. 15.

    For a general analysis of the Union’s representation in the external sphere, see Gatti and Manzini (2012).

  16. 16.

    Ruling 1/78, Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, EU:C:1978:202, para 35, emphasis added.

  17. 17.

    Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (OJ 2015 C 140, p. 7). See e.g. Cremona (2015). See also discussion by Organ (2017).

  18. 18.

    Art. 218(6) TFEU. This has been criticised as the “structural ‘democratic deficit’ in the procedural regime for international agreements”, Schütze (2012), p. 211.

  19. 19.

    For a discussion on the institutional balance in relation to Art. 218 TFEU, see Van der Mei (2016); See also Ott (2016).

  20. 20.

    Art. 216(1) TFEU has been the described as a “‘horizontal’ but at the same time ‘residual’ competence for the Union to conclude international agreements, which can only be turned to in the absence of a more specific external legal basis in the Treaties”, Govaere (2015).

  21. 21.

    Schütze (2012), pp. 201–204. See also Craig (2010), pp. 165–167.

  22. 22.

    Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities (ERTA), EU:C:1971:32, para 16.

  23. 23.

    Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, EU:C:1977:63, para 4.

  24. 24.

    Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property (WTO), EU:C:1994:384, para 77.

  25. 25.

    Ibid, para 85. On an analysis of the court’s ruling on the implied aspects of the Union’s powers, see Maunu (1995). See also Hilf (1995).

  26. 26.

    Arena (2016) claims that pre-emption of Member States’ powers was currently more extensive in the external rather than in the internal sphere.

  27. 27.

    On an extensive discussion of the Union’s competence in external relations, see Rosas (2015).

  28. 28.

    Koutrakos (2008b), p. 684.

  29. 29.

    Case C-377/12, European Commission v Council of the European Union (Philippines Agreement), EU:C:2014:1903; See also discussion in Ott (2015).

  30. 30.

    Arts 79(3), 91, 100, 191(4), 207, 209 TFEU in conjunction with Art 218(5) TFEU.

  31. 31.

    Case C-377/12, European Commission v Council of the European Union (Philippines Agreement), EU:C:2014:1903, paras 34–62.

  32. 32.

    Schütze (2012), p. 211.

  33. 33.

    Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (2013).

  34. 34.

    Council Decision 2014/221/EU of 14 April 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works For Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled (OJ 2014 L 115, p. 1).

  35. 35.

    Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114, para 29.

  36. 36.

    Ibid, para 32.

  37. 37.

    Ibid, para 37.

  38. 38.

    The governments of the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and the United Kingdom.

  39. 39.

    Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114, para 43.

  40. 40.

    Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).

  41. 41.

    Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114, para 89.

  42. 42.

    Ibid, para 90.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, para 101.

  44. 44.

    Ibid, para 121.

  45. 45.

    Ibid, para 129.

  46. 46.

    Due to the fact that the Member States had already signed the Marrakesh Treaty in their own right before this opinion was delivered has been described as “false mixity”, thus lacking legal substance, Kübeck (2018), p. 898.

  47. 47.

    Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (EUSFTA) (2015).

  48. 48.

    Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (EUSFTA), EU:C:2017:376.

  49. 49.

    Ibid, para 166.

  50. 50.

    Ibid, para 305.

  51. 51.

    For a detailed case comment, see Cremona (2018).

  52. 52.

    Kleimann and Kübeck (2016).

  53. 53.

    See e.g. Dimopoulos (2010).

  54. 54.

    See also Larik (2015).

  55. 55.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. The full consolidated version of the text is available online at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/.

  56. 56.

    EurActiv (2016).

  57. 57.

    In fact, CETA was nearly blocked by the Belgium regional parliament of Wallonia, which subsequently sought an opinion from the ECJ, EurActiv (2017).

  58. 58.

    See Koutrakos (2016).

  59. 59.

    See also discussion in Van der Loo and Wessel (2017) who suggest potential alternatives, such as “unsigning”, opt-outs, or declarations.

  60. 60.

    Neframi (2010), p. 354.

  61. 61.

    Opinion procedure 2/15, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, EU:C:2016:992, para 566.

  62. 62.

    Da Conceição-Heldt (2014).

  63. 63.

    Opinion procedure 2/15, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, EU:C:2016:992, para 567.

  64. 64.

    See e.g. Koutrakos (2009), p. 161.

  65. 65.

    See Denza (2002), pp. 126–128; Koutrakos (2001), Chapter 2; Bono (2006).

  66. 66.

    Emphasis added.

  67. 67.

    Art 21 in conjunction with the Art 23 TEU.

  68. 68.

    Cremona (2008b), p. 65.

  69. 69.

    See e.g. Cremona (2003), at page 1354; Schütze (2008), p. 711.

  70. 70.

    See also Streinz et al. (2010).

  71. 71.

    E.g. Art 24(3) TEU.

  72. 72.

    Parallel powers: It is suggested that the only way both, EU and Member States, may exercise parallel powers is on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.

  73. 73.

    Streinz et al. (2010) argue that the Lisbon Treaty classifies parallel competences as a subordinated type of shared competences rather than as an independent category. They describe this as an “Etikettenschwindel”, i.e. a false labelling, p. 88. This reasoning will, however, not be followed here since it could also be possible that an independent parallel competence is implied in Art 4 TEU.

  74. 74.

    E.g. Art 42(2), (6) and (7) TEU.

  75. 75.

    Except joint actions which have existed since the Single European Act, 1986.

  76. 76.

    Art 12 (Amsterdam) TEU.

  77. 77.

    Art 25(a) TEU.

  78. 78.

    Art 25(b)(i) and (ii) TEU. It is noticed that this instrument of a TEU decision is distinct from the decision which is available under the TFEU.

  79. 79.

    Art 25(b)(iii) TEU which will be subject to qualified majority voting according to Art 31(2) third indent TEU.

  80. 80.

    De Witte (2008), p. 90.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Arts 24(1) second indent, third sentence and 31(1) first indent TEU.

  83. 83.

    See Chap. 3.

  84. 84.

    On the preclusion of such direct effect, see discussion in Semertzi (2014).

  85. 85.

    For an illustration of this ‘two-stage test’ see Schütze (2012), pp. 339–341.

  86. 86.

    Art 13(3) (Amsterdam) TEU, now Art 26(2) TEU.

  87. 87.

    Arts 14(1), and 15 (Amsterdam) TEU.

  88. 88.

    Art 22(1) (Amsterdam) TEU, now Art 30(1) TEU.

  89. 89.

    Since the High Representative is officially an institution of the EU and part of the Commission it could be argued that this in itself constitutes a shift towards supranationalism within the second pillar. However, it is also observed that the High Representative is further part of the Council which accounts for the intergovernmental nature of its role. The supranational effect will thus be of a rather minor significance.

  90. 90.

    Art 24(1) second indent TEU.

  91. 91.

    Art 18(2) TEU. See also Art 218(3) TFEU.

  92. 92.

    See Art 24(1) second indent TEU.

  93. 93.

    Art 218(3) and (9) TFEU. These tasks may, however, also be conducted by the High Representative.

  94. 94.

    Art 22(2) TEU. It could be argued that the choice of institution to submit proposals already constitutes the first stage of legal basis litigation as this could indicate whether the proposed measure will be adopted on a CFSP legal basis or on a TFEU provision which would then have further implication as regards direct effect, legislative procedure, judicial review, etc.

  95. 95.

    See e.g. Arts 27(3), 36, and 41(3) TEU. This is further supported by the explicit exclusion of the adoption of legislative acts (Arts 24(1) second indent and 31(1) first indent TEU) which require the co-decision procedure. For more in-depth discussions on the European Parliament’s limited role in CFSP matters and the resulting ‘democratic deficit’ in this area, see Wessel (1999); De Baere (2008), Chapter 5; Bieber (2002).

  96. 96.

    Art 24(1) second indent TEU and Art 275 second indent TFEU. On a thorough analysis of the Court’s powers under the second pillar, see Garbagnati Ketvel (2006).

  97. 97.

    Art 31(1) TEU.

  98. 98.

    They need to comprise at least one third of the population of the Union, Art 31(1) second indent TEU.

  99. 99.

    Subject to the exceptions stated in Art 31(2) and (3) TEU.

  100. 100.

    See Schütze (2012), pp. 206 and 207.

  101. 101.

    Art 238(3)(a) TFEU.

  102. 102.

    Art 238(3)(b) TFEU.

  103. 103.

    See Eeckhout (2004), p. 145.

  104. 104.

    See e.g. Lavranos (2008).

  105. 105.

    According to Art 1 third indent TEU which provides that both Treaties shall have the same legal value. This is further supported by Art 4(2) TEU which provides that the “Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties” as well as their national identities and their right of self-determination.

  106. 106.

    On a thorough analysis of the former Article 47 (Amsterdam) TEU see Dashwood (2008).

  107. 107.

    See to this effect Case C-91/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (ECOWAS or Small Arms and Light Weapons), EU:C:2008:288. See also in relation to third pillar measures: Case C-170/96, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (Airport Transit Visa), EU:C:1998:219; Case C-176/03, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (Environmental Crime), EU:C:2005:542; and Case C-440/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (Ship-Source Pollution), EU:C:2007:625. This has been criticised as “‘competence creep’ in the name of ‘effectiveness’” by Herlin-Karnell (2007).

  108. 108.

    See Hillion and Wessel (2009), p. 583.

  109. 109.

    Cremona (2008b), p. 45. Another term would be ‘two-way street’. While ‘Chinese wall’ signifies the blocking of interaction between the two policy-areas, namely CFSP and TFEU, the term ‘two-way street’ refers to the protection now provided in both direction and may also imply the possibility of some interaction.

  110. 110.

    See e.g. ibid.; Van Vooren (2009b), p. 247.

  111. 111.

    Art 352(4) TFEU.

  112. 112.

    Herlin-Karnell (2008), p. 1007.

  113. 113.

    Van Elsuwege (2010), p. 1005.

  114. 114.

    Van Elsuwege (2009), pp. 545 and 546.

  115. 115.

    Ibid, p. 545.

  116. 116.

    A similar argument has been brought forward by Klamert (2010).

  117. 117.

    Cremona (2010), p. 687.

  118. 118.

    I.e. between the TFEU and the area of common foreign and security policy.

  119. 119.

    This practice has previously already been applied for third pillar measures with a supranational part: e.g. Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (OJ 2002 L 328, p. 17) and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (OJ 2002 L 328, p. 1). See also Hatzopoulos (2008), p. 52.

  120. 120.

    Hillion and Wessel (2009) and Heliskoski (2008).

  121. 121.

    It seems rather unlikely that a measure could be adopted on the joint legal basis of a CFSP and a TFEU, an option which has nevertheless been considered in Eeckhout (2011), pp. 180–186.

  122. 122.

    Case C-91/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (ECOWAS or Small Arms and Light Weapons), EU:C:2008:288. See commentaries e.g. by Van Elsuwege (2009) and Eisenhut (2009).

  123. 123.

    Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (OJ 2004 L 359, p. 65).

  124. 124.

    Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP (OJ 2002 L 191, p. 1).

  125. 125.

    For a discussion on the area of security policy, see Randazzo (2009).

  126. 126.

    Case C-91/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (ECOWAS or Small Arms and Light Weapons), EU:C:2008:288, para 46.

  127. 127.

    Ibid, paras 61 and 62.

  128. 128.

    For more detailed case discussions, see e.g. Van Ooik (2008) and Van Vooren (2009a).

  129. 129.

    Cremona (2008a), p. 32.

  130. 130.

    Dashwood (2008), p. 77.

  131. 131.

    Heliskoski (2008), p. 911.

  132. 132.

    Art 209 TFEU.

  133. 133.

    Art 294 TFEU.

  134. 134.

    As has been established in Case C-300/89, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities (Titanium Dioxide), EU:C:1991:244, para 20; see discussion in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.3.1.

  135. 135.

    Emphasis added.

  136. 136.

    See also Cremona (2008a), p. 32.

  137. 137.

    E.g. if a relation to the internal market can be established.

  138. 138.

    Although in the opinion of the author rather unlikely, this also applies vice versa, i.e. there is a chance that CFSP provisions could also pre-empt TFEU competences under certain circumstances as was claimed in Eisenhut (2009), p. 599.

  139. 139.

    Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2012:472, paras 47–49; See discussion in Chap. 2, Sect. 2.4.2.

  140. 140.

    See Sect. 5.2.1 above.

  141. 141.

    See in this context De Baere (2013).

  142. 142.

    Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates I), EU:C:2014:2025.

  143. 143.

    Case C-263/14, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates II), EU:C:2016:435.

  144. 144.

    Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 July 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer (OJ 2011 L 254, p. 1).

  145. 145.

    Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates I), EU:C:2014:2025, para 23.

  146. 146.

    Ibid, paras 26–28.

  147. 147.

    Ibid, paras 30–36 and para 40.

  148. 148.

    See case analysis in Van Elsuwege (2015).

  149. 149.

    Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates I), EU:C:2014:2025, paras 43–45.

  150. 150.

    Ibid, paras 46–63.

  151. 151.

    See also Matera and Wessel (2014).

  152. 152.

    Case C-263/14, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates II), EU:C:2016:435.

  153. 153.

    Ibid, para 42.

  154. 154.

    Ibid, paras 43–55.

  155. 155.

    De Baere and Van den Sanden (2016), p. 112.

  156. 156.

    I.e. one CFSP and one non-CFSP legal basis.

  157. 157.

    See Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates I), EU:C:2014:2025, paras 64–87; and Case C-263/14, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Pirates II), EU:C:2016:435, paras 57–85.

  158. 158.

    Sánchez-Tabernero (2017), pp. 912–919.

  159. 159.

    Von Bogdandy (1999).

  160. 160.

    Ibid, pp. 888 and 889.

  161. 161.

    Von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (1996).

  162. 162.

    De Witte (1998), p. 59.

  163. 163.

    Ibid, pp. 64–66. On a similar opinion, see Weiler (1993).

  164. 164.

    The Court, however, found such indirect effect in relation to the third pillar in Breier (1995).

  165. 165.

    Pechstein and Koenig (2000), pp. 1–8.

  166. 166.

    It is acknowledged that von Bogdandy’s theory was meant to describe the status quo at that time rather than being a prophecy. However, if denied for the early years of the existence of the pillar structure, the unity theory could be considered as having been ahead of its time, mirroring a reality which better matches the law as it stands post-Lisbon.

  167. 167.

    See also Cardwell and Hervey (2015) who argue that despite the obvious decline of intergovernmentalism, the existence of variable geometry is still evidence of a pluristic order within the EU, p. 82.

  168. 168.

    See e.g. discussion in Wessel (2000).

  169. 169.

    Art 37 TEU.

  170. 170.

    Cremona (2006), pp. 2 and 3.

  171. 171.

    See Booß (2010), pp. 266–268.

  172. 172.

    Lisbon does not provide for an equivalent to the old Art 24 (Amsterdam) TEU which equipped the second pillar with a Treaty-making capacity and thus supported the legal independence of the area of common foreign and security policy.

  173. 173.

    The European Convention Working Group VII—“External Action”, Final Report (2002) CONV 459/02, Brussels, pp. 4 and 5.

  174. 174.

    Ibid, pp. 19–21.

  175. 175.

    See e.g. Wouters et al. (2008), p. 150.

  176. 176.

    The Council is acting by qualified majority voting according to Art 18(1) TEU. Further, the High Representative, like the President as well as other members of the Commission, needs to be approved by a vote of consent by the European Parliament according to Art 17(7) TEU.

  177. 177.

    Art 18(2) TEU.

  178. 178.

    Art 18(4) TEU.

  179. 179.

    Art 18(3) TEU.

  180. 180.

    Art 27(1) TEU.

  181. 181.

    Art 27(2) TEU.

  182. 182.

    Art 34(1) first indent TEU.

  183. 183.

    Art 30(2) TEU.

  184. 184.

    Art 27(3) TEU.

  185. 185.

    Art 18(4) fourth sentence TEU.

  186. 186.

    Art 18(1) second sentence TEU.

  187. 187.

    Art 17(6) TEU.

  188. 188.

    Art 17(8) TEU.

  189. 189.

    “An arrangement in which two or more states share a single head of state. A personal union does not create a single international person; rather, each state retains its separate legal personality. For example, in 1603 James VI of Scotland became monarch of England (styled as James I) but continued to be monarch of Scotland (styled as James VI)”, Martin and Law (2006), p. 393.

  190. 190.

    The European Convention Working Group VII—“External Action”, Final Report (2002) CONV 459/02, Brussels, p. 22. See also Eeckhout (2011), pp. 491–494.

  191. 191.

    Helwig (2013).

  192. 192.

    Or even ‘triple-hatted’, as has been claimed in Piris (2010), p. 243.

  193. 193.

    De Baere (2008), p. 218.

  194. 194.

    For a contribution analysing the relationship between the High Representative and the other institutions, see Kaddous (2008).

  195. 195.

    “Tatsächliche Fortschritte werden entscheidend davon abhängen, inwieweit Friktion angesichts der institutionell angelegten Kompetenzüberschneidungen zwischen dem neu geschaffenen Präsidenten des ER und dem Hohen Vertreter für die GASP, die beide für die Außenvertretung der EU zuständig sind, vermieden werden können und zugleich die MS in ihren nationalen Außenpolitiken tatsächlich bereit sind, an das neue Führungsgespann zunehmend klar umrissene Sachkompetenzen und politische Führungsaufgaben “abzutreten”.”, Bitterlich (2010), p. 180.

  196. 196.

    See e.g. Missiroli (2010), p. 431.

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    Annegret Engel

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Engel, A. (2018). The Sui Generis Nature of External Competences. In: The Choice of Legal Basis for Acts of the European Union. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00274-9_5

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