Abstract
This paper considers Thomas Aquinas’s claim that we can use certain habitus at will. Focusing on moral habitus, this claim is interpreted as a claim about the freedom human beings have with regard to their character traits: they can freely choose to act or not act according to their character traits. After giving a brief account of how, for Aquinas, character traits influence our actions via our emotions, the paper examines whether this freedom is of a libertarian or of a compatibilist kind. A libertarian reading is defended on the basis of certain remarks of Aquinas’s about the act of contrition.
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Notes
- 1.
Unless otherwise indicated, all primary texts referred to in the notes are by Thomas Aquinas. Where possible, I rely on the Leonine edition of his works. All translations from Latin to English are my own.
- 2.
This characterization of habitus is still a bit rough. I will provide a more detailed account in Sect. 9.2. I will leave habitus untranslated. “Character trait” is not a good translation because habitus has a broader meaning, for Aquinas. As Aquinas sees it, the dispositional knowledge of first principles, such as the law of non-contradiction, is also a habitus (see ST I–II, q. 50, art. 4). But we would not call this a character trait. “Habit” is not a good translation either because the English word “habit” usually signifies a routine behavioural pattern, such as tugging one’s necktie, to use Bonnie Kent’s (2002, 116) example. In contrast, habitus signifies no observable behavioural pattern but rather a dispositional state causally responsible for a behavioural pattern.
- 3.
See ST I–II, q. 78, art. 2, corp. I will briefly consider the historical roots of this claim of Aquinas’s in n. 29 below.
- 4.
This is in contrast to other aspects of Aquinas’s theory of freedom, which have been studied extensively. References will be provided in Sect. 9.3.
- 5.
In what follows, I shall focus only on those habitus, like courage and cowardice, that Aquinas would classify as moral virtues or vices . According to Aquinas, there are, in addition to moral virtues, also intellectual virtues (e.g., knowledge of first principles, craft) (see n. 2 above) and theological virtues (e.g., faith, charity ). For a discussion of intellectual and theological virtues in Aquinas, see Kent (2002, 120–121) and Goris , Hendriks , and Schoot (2015).
- 6.
ST I–II, q. 49, art. 1, corp.: “[D]icendum est quod habitus est qualitas.”
- 7.
See n. 9 below for the text.
- 8.
ST I–II, q. 49, art. 2, ad 3: “[N]on de facili transmutantur.”
- 9.
ST I–II, q. 49, art. 1, corp.: “[H]abitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum.”
- 10.
ST I–II, q. 49, art. 2, corp.: “[H]abitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.”
- 11.
See ST II–II, q. 125, art. 1, corp.
- 12.
See ST II–II, q. 123, art. 3, corp.
- 13.
ST I–II, q. 49, proem: “nunc restat de habitibus considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt humanorum actuum principia.”
- 14.
See ST II–II, q. 123, art. 1, corp.
- 15.
See ST I–II, q. 6, art. 1, ad 1; q. 49, proem.
- 16.
See ST I, q. 80, art. 2, corp.; De malo q. 6, art. 1, corp. I will here not discuss the difficult question as to whether, for Aquinas, the will necessarily follows the intellect or can deviate. For the view that the will can deviate, see, e.g., Gallagher (1994); for the view that it cannot, see, e.g., MacDonald (1998).
- 17.
See ST I–II, q. 9, art. 1, corp.
- 18.
See ST I–II, q. 20, art. 1, ad 3.
- 19.
De malo, q. 6, corp.: “Quod voluntas feratur in id quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam […] contingit ex dispositione hominis: quia secundum Philosophum ‘qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei’; unde aliter movetur ad aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieti quia non idem est conveniens utrique. […] Si ergo dispositio per quam alicui videtur aliquid bonum et conveniens fuerit naturalis non subiacens voluntati, ex necessitate naturali voluntas praeeliget illud, sicut omnes homines naturaliter desiderant esse, vivere et intelligere. Si autem sit talis dispositio quae non sit naturalis, sed subiacens voluntati, puta cum aliquis disponitur per habitum vel passionem ad hoc quod sibi videatur aliquid vel bonum vel malum in hoc particulari, non ex necessitate movebitur voluntas: quia poterit hanc dispositionem removere, ut sibi non videatur aliquid sic, ut scilicet cum aliquis quietat in se iram ut non iudicet de aliquo tamquam iratus” (italics in original).
- 20.
Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. 3, lect. 13 (Leonina 47.1: 156.55–57).
- 21.
Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. 3, lect. 13 (Leonina 47.1: 156.63–72): “Cum autem appetitus inclinetur in aliquid dupliciter, uno modo secundum animae passionem, alio modo secundum habitum, ex passione contingit quod aliquid iudicetur bonum prout nunc, sicut illi qui timet submersionem, propter passionem timoris videtur bonum ut nunc, quod merces in mare proiciat, et concupiscenti quod fornicetur, sed iudicium quo homo iudicat aliquid esse bonum ut secundum se et simpliciter provenit ex inclinatione habitus.”
- 22.
See ST I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 3: “Contingit enim aliquem iudicare uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum virtutis recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda.”
- 23.
ST I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 3: “Alio modo, per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali posset iudicare de actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem non haberet.”
- 24.
For Aquinas, “inclination ” and “tending towards something” (tendere in aliquid) have the same meaning. See, e.g., ST I, q. 5, art. 5; q. 59, art. 1, corp.
- 25.
For Aquinas, taking pleasure (delectatio) in a certain kind of action is a sign (signum) that the agent has a habitus disposing her to said action. See, e.g., ST I–II, q. 100, art. 9, ad 3; De virtutibus in communi, art. 1, corp.
- 26.
De malo, q. 3, art. 13, ad 6: “[D]ifficile est operari contra id ad quod habitus inclinat.”
- 27.
De caritate, art. 13, ad 1.
- 28.
See De malo, q. 3, art. 13, ad 4.
- 29.
ST I–II, q. 78, art. 2, corp.: “Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum voluerit.” See also ST I–II, q. 50, art. 5, corp.; De virtutibus in communi, q. un, art. 1, corp. In saying that a habitus is something that we can use when we will, Aquinas relies on a statement found in Averroes’s Long Commentary on De anima. See Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima, lib. 3, com. 18 (ed. Crawford, 438.26–29). As Kent (2013, 107–108) notes, Aquinas misrepresents Averroes here because, in the passage in question, Averroes is not concerned with the voluntary actualization of habitus in general, but with Aristotle’s remark that the agent intellect can be actualized at will.
- 30.
De caritate, art. 6, ad 12: “[N]on enim quilibet actus agentis est actus cuiuslibet formae in agente existentis, et praecipue in rationali natura, quae habet libertatem ad hoc quod utatur habitu.”
- 31.
De malo, q. 3, art. 9, ad 7: “[C]um actus peccati et virtutis sit secundum electionem, electio autem est appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium vero est quaedam inquisitio; necesse est quod in quolibet actu virtutis vel peccati sit quaedam deductio quasi syllogistica.”
- 32.
See In Sent. IV, d. 9, q. 1, art. 4, ad q. 1, ad 3 (ed. Moos, 4:387); De ver. q. 24, art. 1, ad 1; ST I, q. 83, art. 3, corp.
- 33.
See De ver., q. 22, art. 15, corp.; ST I, q. 83, art. 4, corp.
- 34.
See ST I, q. 82, art. 1, corp.
- 35.
See De ver., q. 22, art. 15, corp.; ST I–II, q. 13, art. 2, corp.
- 36.
See In Sent. II, d. 7, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3 (ed. Mandonnet, 2: 182); ST I, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3; De malo, q. 16, art. 5, corp.
- 37.
ST I, q. 83, art. 3, corp.: “[E]x hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere.” See also De ver., q. 24, art. 1, corp.
- 38.
For a libertarian reading of Aquinas that emphasizes not so much alternative possibilities, but rather his idea that being free requires being the ultimate source of one’s action, see Stump (1997, 591). In this paper I shall not consider Stump’s position because it is based on Aquinas’s account of the liberum arbitrium of the blessed in Heaven, which is a topic that I cannot deal with here.
- 39.
Strictly speaking, as Michael McKenna (2001, 176) points out, compatibilism is not the claim that we are free despite the truth of determinism , but the weaker claim that we would still be free should determinism be true. I ignore this subtlety here.
- 40.
Williams does not rule out that we are able to alter our beliefs about what is good over time. I will return to this point below.
- 41.
Williams here follows Knuuttila (1993, 144–45), who is the first to speak of ‘synchronic contingency’ in connection with medieval theories of modalities. Knuuttila argues that it was Duns Scotus who first advanced a conception of synchronic contingency in the Middle Ages. Stephen Dumont (1995, 160–66) has shown, however, that Peter John Olivi already had such a conception. I will argue below that Aquinas’s account of character control is best understood as relying on a model of synchronic contingency, though I do not think that Aquinas had a developed account of contingency so understood.
- 42.
For the term ‘diachronic’ in this context, see again Knuuttila (1993, 144–45).
- 43.
Libertarian interpreters conceive of the alternative not-A as a real possibility available to the agent, not as a mere logical possibility or a possibility residing in the divine mind . Whenever I speak of the possibility to not-A in in this paper I am concerned with a real possibility available to the agent.
- 44.
This is, I take it, also an adequate way of understanding the will’s ability to will not-A at the very instant when it wills A, as discussed by Olivi and Duns Scotus (see note 41). Furthermore, such synchronically given alternatives are at the heart of how libertarians today conceive of the ability to do otherwise. Peter van Inwagen, for instance, writes: “We translate ‘It is within my power to keep the money I found and within my power to return it’ as ‘I have access to some world in which I keep the money I found and I have access to some world in which I return it’.” (Van Inwagen 1983, 87).
- 45.
I here neutralize two passages. First, one might think that the following passage commits Aquinas to the view that a choice is determined at the instant of its occurrence: “Electio autem nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum” (ST I–II, q. 13, art. 5, corp.). However, the context of the passage makes it clear that Aquinas intends something different here. Here is what the whole passage states: “Et ideo perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur, quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium” (ST I–II, q. 13, art. 5, corp.). Aquinas is here interested in determining what a “complete volition ” is, which is a volition that concerns what is possible for the agent. A volition concerning the impossible, in contrast, is “incomplete.” The latter is a volition for A, if A were possible. Aquinas’s statement to the effect that choice is an act of the will “iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum,” in this context, means that choice is a “complete” volition directed to what is possible as opposed to an incomplete volition directed to what is impossible. Aquinas does not want to say that choice is a “determined” volition here, i.e. that all alternatives are eliminated. Rather, he wants to say that it is a fully “determinate” as opposed to an incomplete volition.
I consider a second claim in Aquinas’s work that might be taken to commit him to the view that choices are determined at the instant of their occurrence, namely, what has been called the “necessity of the present.” This is the De int. 9 claim, accepted by Aquinas, that “everything which is, when it is, necessarily is” (omne quod est necesse est esse quando est). To this the following should be said: Aquinas indeed accepts the necessity of the present, but not in a way that makes choices necessary in the determinist sense. He interprets “everything which is, when it is, necessarily is” as a hypothetical claim involving a necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent (In Periherm., lib. 1, lect. 15 [Leonina 1: 72b–73a]: “et haec est necessitas non absolute , sed ex suppositione”). That is, he understands the claim, “Everything which is, when it is, necessarily is” as the claim, “Necessarily (if p at t, then p at t)” (where the necessity operator attaches to the whole conditional). He does not understand it as the claim, “If p at t, then necessarily p at t” (where the necessity operator attaches to the consequent only). Now, someone can accept the necessity of the present understood along the lines of the necessity of the consequence and still be a libertarian adhering to synchronic contingency . For understood along the lines of the necessity of the consequence, the necessity of the present is not the claim—as it would be when understood along the lines of the necessity of the consequent—that the present instant could not be otherwise than it is. Rather it is the claim that, necessarily, given that the present instant is the way it is (though it could have been otherwise), the present instant is the way it is (though it could have been otherwise). Even Duns Scotus , who clearly adheres to synchronic contingency (see n. 41), accepts the necessity of the present understood along the lines of the necessity of consequence. See John Duns Scotus , Ord. I, d. 39, n. 19 (Vat. 6: 422).
But here one might object that Aquinas, in his account of De int. 9, is in fact concerned with denying prospective necessity and not with developing the necessity of the consequence. Consider this passage (P): “Si ergo ponitur verum esse id quod dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non potest esse quin illud sit praesens vel futurum” (In Periherm., lib. 1, lect. 13 [Leonina 1: 68b–69a]). In this passage, Aquinas evidently wants to deny prospective necessity. Aquinas is worried that if a contingent future tense proposition is now determinately true, then what it states to be the case will inevitably be the case. But this does not go against my reading of Aquinas’s interpretation of De int. 9 in terms of the necessity of the consequence. On the contrary, (P) seems to me an application of the necessity of the consequence. For (P) can be plausibly read as stating: ‘Necessarily, if a contingent future tense proposition ‘Fp’ is now true, then whatever ‘Fp’ states to be the case will be the case.’ This is simply the necessity of the consequence applied to contingent future tense propositions.
- 46.
In Sent. IV, d. 20, q. 1, art. 1, ad q. 1, ad 1 (ed. Moos, 4: 1014): “[N]on est facile ut affectus qui hominem toto tempore vitae suae inclinavit in aliquid subito ad contrarium retrahatur; nec tamen est impossibile, quia liberum arbitrium non cogitur ex habitu acquisito.”
- 47.
In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 2, art. 1, ad q. 1, ad 1 (ed. Moos, 4: 858–859): “[D]icendum quod dolor non est nisi de eo quod aliquo modo praesens est Peccatum autem praeteritum, etsi non sit praesens actus, est tamen praesens quantum ad aliquem effectum ejus, vel dispositionem ad peccandum, vel reatum aut maculam.”
- 48.
In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 2, art. 1, ad q. 2, ad 1 (ed. Moos, 4: 861): “Alius dolor est in voluntate, qui nihil aliud est quam displicentia alicujus mali. […] Et sic contritio est dolor.”
- 49.
In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 2, art. 1, ad q. 1 (ed. Moos, 4: 858): “[M]anifestatur in praedicta definitione […] electio quae requiritur ad actum virtutis, in hoc quod dicit ‘assumptus’.” Aquinas here refers to the then established definition of contrition as “an assumed pain for the sins with the intention to confess and to make satisfaction” (In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 2, art. 1, arg. 1 [ed. Moos, 4: 855]: “dolor pro peccatis assumptus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi”). Aquinas believes that the successful act of contrition also requires God’s grace; see In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 2, art. 1, ad q. 1, ad 6 (ed. Moos, 4: 860). But this issue will not concern me here; I am here only interested in the free contribution made by the human agent.
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Löwe, C.L. (2018). Thomas Aquinas on Our Freedom to Use Our Habitus . In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_9
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