Abstract
The concept of hexis, in Latin habitus, is of great importance in Aristotle’s ethics. In this paper, I ask the question whether habitus has its place, and which one it is, when the will is said to be free. I examine the doctrines of three thinkers in whose thought the idea of the freedom of the will occupies a crucial place. Firstly, Augustine knows the moral sense of habitus, but does not use it to explain freedom; reading the Categories, he understands that the term “habitus” refers to an accident, and uses this concept to explain modification. Secondly, describing the will, Anselm favours the word affectio, which designates (in the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories) a disposition which is not permanent; indeed, Anselm focuses on the dependence of the rational creature. Finally, Duns Scotus uses the Aristotelian concept of habitus, when he shows how the will, which is a rational power, determines itself freely. Thus, it can be said that Aristotle was a central and unavoidable source for the medieval developments of the concept of habitus and its use in relation with the doctrine of the will.
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Notes
- 1.
Aristotle, NE 2.4, 1106b19–28.
- 2.
Aristotle, NE 2.6, 1106b36.
- 3.
See Brague (1980).
- 4.
See Aristotle, De an. 3.5, 430a14–19.
- 5.
Aristotle, Met. 5.16, 1021b20–23.
- 6.
Aristotle, Met. 9.5, 1047b31–35.
- 7.
Aristotle, NE 2.1, 1103a.
- 8.
For a more detailed description, see supra Bochet ’s paper.
- 9.
See Cicero , De inventione 1.36; Seneca, Ad Lucillium 117.16. See also Marius Victorinus, In Ciceronis Rhetoricam 1.2.
- 10.
Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (De div. quaest.) 73 (BA 10: 320): “Habitus ergo in ea re dicitur quae nobis ut habeatur accidit.”
- 11.
Augustine, De div. quaest. 73 (BA 10: 320): “Nomen hoc ductum est ab illo verbo quod est habere.”
- 12.
See Aristotle, Cat. 8.
- 13.
On the relationship between these two concepts, see Brague (1980).
- 14.
Categoriae decem, §116 (AL 1.1–5: 160): “Habitus est affectio animi longo tempore perseverans, ut est virtus et disciplina quae perseveratione sui et perpetuitate temporis aestimantur.”
- 15.
Aristotle, Cat. 15, 15b21–22.
- 16.
Categoriae decem §147 (AL 1.1–5: 167): “Non uno modo habere aliquid dicimur.”
- 17.
Categoriae decem §147 (AL 1.1–5: 168): Prima est quoties in corpore habere aliquid dicimur, ut albedinem. […] Quinta specie est cum non in corpore sed in parte corpore sed circa corpus habere aliquid dicimur, ut est vestis atque indumenta omnia.”
- 18.
The other types of having are integrated into the account: thus, a ring, which pertains only to a part of the body , is subsequently cited as an example.
- 19.
Augustine, De div. quaest. 73.1 (BA 10: 320): “hominem mutat quem de stulto sapientem facit.”
- 20.
Augustine, De div. quaest. 73.2 (BA 10: 324).
- 21.
Augustine, Contra academicos 3.5 (BA 4: 118–120).
- 22.
Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae 1.6.9 (BA 1: 150): “Aut igitur virtus est praeter animam; aut si non placet vocare virtutem nisi habitum ipsum et quasi sapientis animae qualitatem, quae nisi in anima esse non potest, oportet ut aliquid sequatur anima ut ei virtus possit innasci.”
- 23.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 21.25 (BA 2: 80): “Ipse est enim habitus, quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est.”
- 24.
Augustine, De bono coniugali 30.26 (BA 2: 80): “virtus in habitu etiamsi non sit in opere.”
- 25.
The term habitudo appears in Trinitarian theology .
- 26.
- 27.
Aristotle, Cat. 8, trans. Boethius (AL 1.5: 23–24). Affectio is the term that is also used in the Decem categoriae §§115–116 (AL 1.15: 159–160). William of Moerbeke prefers dispositiones (AL 1.1–5: 102).
- 28.
Anselm, De casu diaboli 12 (ed. Schmitt, 1: 252–253): “Scio duas esse potestates, unam quae nondum est in re, alteram quae iam est in re. Sed et hoc non possum nescire quia quidquid ita potest esse ut iam sit: si aliquando non fuit, potuit prius esse. Si enim non potuisset, numquam esset. Bene ergo aestimo me respondisse, quia qui ideo potest velle quia iam vult, necesse est prius eum potuisse quam vellet.” English translation by Thomas Williams (Anselm 2007, 189), slightly modified.
- 29.
See Boethius , In Perihermeneias, secunda editio (ed. Meiser, 2: 453–454): “Duae ergo significationes sunt possibilitatis: una quae eam possibilitatem designat quae est potestate, quae scilicet actu non sit, altera quae eam possibilitatem significet quae iam actu sit.”
- 30.
Anselm, De casu diaboli 13 (ed. Schmitt, 1: 255.23).
- 31.
Anselm, De casu diaboli 14 (ed. Schmitt, 1: 258.8).
- 32.
Anselm, De conceptu virginali 4 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 144).
- 33.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 279.6–10): “Quoniam ergo singula instrumenta habent et hoc quod sunt, et aptitudines suas, et suos usus: discernamus in voluntate propter quam ista dicimus instrumentum, et aptitudines eius, et usus eius. Quas aptitudines in voluntate possumus nominare ‘affectiones’.” Trans. Williams (Anselm 2007, 388).
- 34.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 279.10–12): “Affectum quippe est instrumentum volendi suis aptitudinibus. Unde dicitur hominis anima, cum vehementer vult aliquid, affecta esse ad volendum illud, vel affectuose velle.” Trans. Williams (Anselm 2007, 388).
- 35.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 279.15–17): “Instrumentum volendi est vis illa animae qua utimur ad volendum, sicuti est ratio instrumentum ratiocinandi quo utimur cum ratiocinamur, et visus instrumentum videndi quo utimur quando videmus.” Trans. Williams (Anselm 2007, 388).
- 36.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 279.17–27) “Affectio huius instrumenti est, qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad volendum aliquid – etiam quando illud quod vult non cogitat – ut si venit in memoriam, aut statim aut suo tempore illud velit. Nam sic est instrumentum volendi affectum ad volendum salutem – etiam quando illam non cogitat – ut mox cum venerit in memoriam, statim eam velit. […] In iusto quoque homine similiter est affectum idem instrumentum ad volendum iustitiam – etiam cum dormit – ut cum eam cogitat, statim illam velit.” Trans. Williams (Anselm 2007, 388).
- 37.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 279.27–28): “Usus vero eiusdem instrumenti est, quem non habemus, nisi cum cogitamus rem quam volumus.”
- 38.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 281).
- 39.
In this respect, Anselm’s doctrine of the two affectiones, as it was taken up again in the thirteenth century, cannot be reduced to the Aristotelian doctrine of habitus. Nevertheless, in his Notabilia super Metaphysicam, Duns Scotus understands the Anselmian affectio commodi as a habitus: “Voluntas enim habet unum habitum concreatum, scilicet affectionem commodi, secundum Anselmum” (V, 157, ed. Pini , 66). On the reception of the doctrine of the two affections, see Alliney (2013). On Scotus and the Anselmian affectiones , see Boler (1993), Lee (1998), Cervellon (2004).
- 40.
Anselm, De concordia 3.11 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 284.3–4): “ipsa vero se suis affectionibus movet. Unde dici potest instrumentum se ipsum movens.” Trans. Williams (Anselm 2007, 390). Note that Anselm concedes self-motion here in at most a provisional way (dici potest).
- 41.
See also Anselm, Cur Deus homo 2.10 (ed. Schmitt, 2: 108) on the way in which a form of aseity can be conceded in a rational creature. The aseity that is conceded in a certain way does not imply any autonomy, but presupposes an essential receptivity.
- 42.
- 43.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 32, q. 2, n. 22 (Vat. 6: 230): “Licet non sit proprie habitus in inanimatis, possunt tamen denominari ab aliquo adiacente, quod (in quantum est aliqua motio ornamentum vel tegumentum eorum) potest reduci ad genus habitus.”
- 44.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, pars 2, q. 3, n. 401 (Vat. 7: 596): “habitus non generatur in naturaliter inclinatis sive determinatis ad unum (sicut non generatur in gravi, per quotiescumque ‘descendere’, ratio descensus), neque generatur in violenter motis inclinatio conformis operanti sive operationi habitus (ut patet si grave quotiescumque proiciatur sursum), − sed generatur in potentiis, in se indeterminatis ad actum frequenter elicitum.”
- 45.
On habitus as what determines an undetermined power to one act or another, see Thomas Aquinas , ST I–II, q. 55, art. 1: “Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet.”
- 46.
See John Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 33, n. 30 (Vat. 10: 156): “a puris naturalibus agentibus omnes removent habitus, quia sunt summe inclinata ex se.”
- 47.
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 50, art. 5: “Respondeo dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.”
- 48.
John Duns Scotus, Rep. III, d. 33, q. un. (Wadding 11.1: 544–550); Ord. III, d. 33, q. un. (Vat. 10: 141–175).
- 49.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 33, n. 2 (Vat. 10: 141): “I Ethicorum dicit Philosophus quod sunt in parte irrationali animae.”
- 50.
John Duns Scotus, Rep. III, d. 33, q. un., §1 (Wadding 11.1: 544b): “dicit intellectuales virtutes esse in parte rationali animae, morales in irrationali.”
- 51.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 33, n. 7 (Vat. 10: 143): “‘Virtus est habitus electivus ’ ex definitione sua, ex II Ethicorum, − electio autem est actus vel voluntatis vel rationis, secundum Philosophum VI Ethicorum: ‘est enim vel appetitus consiliativus vel’ etc.; haec pertinent ad voluntatem, quae operatur praesupposita cognitione rationis. Habitus est illius potentiae cuius est per se illa operatio; ergo habitus moralis est per se ipsius voluntatis.”
- 52.
Aristotle, NE 2.6, trans. Robert Grosseteste (AL 26.1–3: 404).
- 53.
Henry of Ghent , Quodl. I, q. 16 (Opera Omnia 5: 105).
- 54.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 33, n. 44 (Vat. 10: 162): “In illo ergo priore potest voluntas ex rectis electionibus (cum sit aeque indeterminata et determinabilis sicut intellectus) generare in se ipsa habitum inclinantem ad recte eligendum.”
- 55.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 33, n. 74 (Vat. 10: 174): “non repugnat quod libere agat et tamen quod habitus agat in ea per modum naturae.”
- 56.
John Duns Scotus, Rep. III, d. 33, q. un, §22 (Wadding 11.1: 549a): “principalior causa activa est in potentia subiectiva habitui et habens causalitatem habitus in potestate sua, sicut causae partialis; et imperfectior non necessitat causam perfectiorem, licet eius causalitatem determinate, et inquantum potest, inclinet.”
- 57.
See Trego (2015).
- 58.
See Trego (2017).
- 59.
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, lib. 9, q. 15, n. 31 (OPh 4: 683): “Secundo dubitatur circa praedicta quomodo reducetur talis causa ad actum si indeterminata est ex se ad agendum et non agendum.”
- 60.
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, lib. 9, q. 15, n. 31 (OPh 4: 683): “est quaedam indeterminatio insufficientiae, sive ex potentialitate et defectu actualitatis, sicut materia non habens formam est indeterminata ad agendum actionem formae; est alia superabundantis sufficientiae, quae est ex illimitatione actualitatis, vel simpliciter vel quodammodo.”
- 61.
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, lib. 9, q. 15, n. 32 (OPh 4: 683): “Primo modo indeterminatum non reducitur ad actum nisi prius determinetur ad formam ab alio; secundo modo indeterminatum potest se determinare.”
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Trego, K. (2018). Habitus or Affectio: The Will and Its Orientation in Augustine, Anselm, and Duns Scotus. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_5
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