Abstract
Richard Kilvington—one of the members of the fourteenth-century English group of scholars called the “Oxford Calculators”—has been widely acknowledged as an original and influential philosopher whose logical and physical works became an inspiration for other masters in England and on the Continent. Kilvington’s logical and mathematical ideas have already gained much attention among historians of philosophy and science, but his interest in ethical problems as well as his original way of providing arguments in the field of practical philosophy have not yet been sufficiently investigated. Therefore, to shed light on Kilvington’s ethical ideas, in this paper I examine his concept of habit. First, I focus on Kilvington’s notions of habit and disposition. Second, I investigate the relationship between habit and the will. Third, I make an enquiry into the nature of virtue and vice in reference to the development of a moral habit. Finally, I examine the interplay between prudence, right reasoning and habit in Kilvington’s account. I conclude that: (1) Kilvington’s accounts of habit and disposition offer an interesting balance between two different theories of habit, namely, habit understood as an innate condition of man’s soul and habit understood as an acquired character trait; and (2) in Kilvington’s view, not only habit but also, to some extent, disposition plays an active role in the process of moral change and becoming virtuous or vicious.
Research for this chapter was supported by National Science Centre (NCN), Poland (project UMO-2014/15/B/HS1/00409).
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Notes
- 1.
See, among others, Sylla (1991).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Jung (2000a, 203).
- 8.
The questions are: (1) Utrum omnis virtus moralis ex operibus generatur; (2) Utrum virtutes morales ex defectu et superabundantia corrumpantur; (3) Utrum quilibet virtuosus in operibus sibi propriis delectetur; (4) Utrum voluntas suos actus producat libere; (5) Utrum fortitudo sit medietas circa audacias et timores; (6) Utrum male operantes sint a legislatoribus puniendi; (7) Utrum liberalitas sit circa pecunias medietas; (8) Utrum magnanimus dignificet se honoribus sibi dignis; (9) Utrum iustitia sit virtus moralis perfecta; (10) Utrum prudentia sit habitus cum recta ratione activus circa hominis bona et mala.
- 9.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum (Eth.), q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 79): “id est, quo posito A est virtus, licet non primo sit in rerum natura.” Cf. Aristotle, NE 2.5–6, 1106a10–25.
- 10.
For more on this subject see Michałowska (2011b).
- 11.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 83–84): “Et causa est, sicut prius, quia cum uno gradu virtutis Socratis coniungitur una dispositio ad vitium per quam naturaliter inclinatur ad vitium, si non foret virtus coniuncta.”
- 12.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 83): “Et quando arguitur sic: virtuosus propter quamcumque operationem malam fit vitiosus; ergo possibile est aliquem virtuosum operationem malam vel vitiosam agere, et tamen non erit vitiosus. − Hoc concedo.” All translations of Kilvington’s text are my own.
- 13.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 81): “post vitii habitum, si debeat corrumpi, prius generatur dispositio ad virtutem quam generatur habitus virtutis.”
- 14.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 80): “Nec ex hoc sequitur quod non sit de difficili mobilis, quia cum non fuerit habitus, manebit dispositio bona per quam dispositionem habens eam inclinabitur ad bene operandum.” Ibid. (68): “tunc B operatio foret satis modica ad corrumpendum dispositionem malam causandam per A operationem.” Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 101): “et inclinatio virtuosi ad malum facta est minor, et inclinatio ad bonum maior.”
- 15.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 81): “quia sicut virtus est habitus sic vitium est habitus”.
- 16.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 63–66); ibid., ad 1 (77–80).
- 17.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1, (ed. Michałowska, 82): “Ideo in tempore medio in quo fit talis transitio, sic transitus est dispositus ad virtutem et vitium, communiter loquendo de dispositione; sed proprie loquendo de dispositione, dispositio solum est respectu termini ad quem transitum est in transire”; ibid. (252) q. 7, “Item, arguitur sic: aliquis potest realiter per aliquod tempus minus continue indigere quam prius, et alius potest per idem tempus continue magis indigere, sicut est de motu alterationis versus terminos oppositos”.
- 18.
Sylla (1991, 308–329).
- 19.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super Physicam, Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Cod. lat. VI 72 (2810), q. II, f. 95vb: “consimiliter de latitudine, nam eadem res realiter est latitudo caliditatis et caliditas, et [caliditas et] latitudo habet partes sicut tempus, et eadem caliditas ut est in transmutari dicitur latitudo caliditiatis. Et quando non transmutatur dicitur caliditas et non latitudo”. (I wish to thank Elżbieta Jung for sharing the transcription of Quaestiones super Physicam with me).
- 20.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 7 (ed. Michałowska, 267).
- 21.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super Physicam, Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Cod. lat. VI 72 (2810), q. I, f. 86vb: “Pro primo articulo dico, quod quilibet excessus sufficit ad motum”.
- 22.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 63): “Tunc sic: A generabitur; vel ergo est assignare primum instans in quo A generabitur vel ultimum instans in quo A non generabitur”.
- 23.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 66): “Item, cuiuslibet rei permanentis est accipere primum instans sui esse; virtus est res permanens; ergo eius dabitur etc”.
- 24.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 64); ibid. q. 5 (210).
- 25.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 80): “Ad aliam rationem, quando dicitur: si A sit habitus indivisibilis, igitur a quacumque operatione vitiosa potest A corrumpi et desinere esse, et ita non foret habitus. − Ad quod dicitur quod prima consequentia non valet, sed ex primo antecedente solum sequitur quod a quacumque operatione vitiosa posset corrumpi esse habitus vel per quamcumque operationem vitiosam posset desinere esse habitus − hoc concedo”.
- 26.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 79–80): “Unde si argumentum istud valeret, posset probari quod non esset aliqua virtus ita firma quin posset statim corrumpi, quia habens illam virtutem non cogitur ad bene operandum; igitur habens talem virtutem posset sine medio dimittere illam, quod non est verum.” Ibid. (70): “Item, virtus est habitus; igitur non potest a quacumque operatione mala corrumpi, quia tunc non foret de difficili mobilis, sed facillime mobilis.”
- 27.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 82): “et ideo cum aliquis scienter et cum aliis circumstantiis recessit a medio, non manebit virtuosus; nec tunc erit vitiosus, sed dispositus ad vitium vel ad virtutem.”
- 28.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 83): “Et causa est quia virtus in eodem gradu potest secum compati dispositiones diversas in gradu ad vitium.”
- 29.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 82): “Ideo in tempore medio in quo fit talis transitio, sic transitus est dispositus ad virtutem et vitium, communiter loquendo de dispositione; sed proprie loquendo de dispositione, dispositio solum est respectu termini ad quem transitum est in transire.”
- 30.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 83): “Et causa est quia virtus in eodem gradu potest secum compati dispositiones diversas in gradu ad vitium, ita quod virtus sub eodem gradu permittet secum unam dispositionem ad vitium et sub eodem gradu dispositionem intensiorem ad vitium.”
- 31.
For more on these conditions, see Drummond (2016, chapters 4 and 5).
- 32.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 83): “Ad quartum principale: responderi potest multipliciter. Uno modo sic: quod virtus ipsa manente virtute non potest remitti nec vitium, tamen possunt intendi per consuetudinem et assuefactionem, sicut videtur argumentum idem quartum probabliliter probare.” Ibid., q. 2 (102): “Et patet antecedens quod sic operans firmat habitum, quia consuetudo per quam firmatur habitus quilibet acquiritur sic operando.” Ibid., q. 10 (318): “Et prima consequentia patet, quia consuetudo est sola circumstantia temporis, ut patet ex significatione termini.” Ibid., q. 3 (126): “Item, si ille virtuosus habeat delectari de una delectatione, et de delectatione illius delectationis, et sic in infinitum, cum delectatio non sit sine cognitione delectabilis, igitur virtuosus cognoscere habet primam delectationem, et delectationem illius delectationis, et sic in infinitum. Tunc quaero, sicut prius: utrum sit eadem delectatio illius delectationis, et sic in infinitum, vel plures etiam infinitae?”
- 33.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 103): “Item, si virtus posset intendi, igitur oportet quod, sicut in aliis formis intensibilibus, scilicet caliditate, frigiditate, albedine et nigredine etc.”
- 34.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 121): “Ad sextum principale: dicitur concedendo quod virtus potest intendi. Pro isto tamen est intellegendum quod non consimiliter in omnibus est virtus intensibilis et remissibilis sicut qualitates primae.”
- 35.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 11): “Ad sextum principale: dicitur concedendo quod virtus potest intendi. Pro isto tamen est intellegendum quod non consimiliter in omnibus est virtus intensibilis et remissibilis sicut qualitates primae, nam in qualitatibus primis est talis intensio et remissio quod duobus contrariis approximatis sufficienter necessario unum agit in aliud per suas qualitates intendendo vel remittendo sic quod necessario sequitur intensio vel remissio alterius; sed non sic est virtus intensibilis vel remissibilis quod necessario virtuosus qui est subiectum virtutis patiatur ab aliquo movente ipsum ut sua virtus intendatur vel remittatur, quia tunc virtus alicuius ipso invito intenderetur vel remitteretur. Ex hoc arguitur magna perfectio virtutis quod nihil potest ipsam remittere suo subiecto invito.”
- 36.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 246): “Ad quaestionem dicitur distinguendo de ly ‘ex’, quia ‘ex aliquo’ potest denotare causam praecisam vel deminutam seu partialem.”
- 37.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 108): “Item, ‘defectus’ et ‘superabundantia’ sumi possunt pro operationibus earum vel pro habitibus generatis per tales operationes.”
- 38.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 108): “Item, supponatur quod iste terminus ‘corrumpi’ sumatur pro isto termino ‘corruptibilis’. Unde dicitur ad quaestionem quod si terminus ‘ex’ denotet causam praecisam ut praecise corrumpatur virtus ex defectu vel superabundantia, primo modo quaestio est falsa, quia ad corruptionem virtutis in suo subiecto requiruntur voluntas et liberum arbitrium , quae simul stant cum operationibus defectus vel superabundantiae. […] Si autem ly ‘ex’ denotet causam partialem et ‘defectus’ et ‘superabundantia’ sumantur primo modo, id est pro operibus, non habitibus, sic secundo modo dico quod quaestio est vera, quia virtutes morales corruptibiles sunt ex operibus superabundantiae et defectus.”
- 39.
- 40.
For a detailed analysis of this approach see Michałowska (2011a).
- 41.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 111): “Ad secundum principale: dici posset quod sic operans nec simpliciter est prodigus nec simpliciter illiberalis; est tamen prodigus secundum quid, quia respectu illius cui dat plus quam oportet est prodigus, et respectu alterius illiberalis.”
- 42.
For more on this subject see Jung (2016, 114) and Richard Kilvington, Utrum unum infinitum sit maius alio, Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 4353, ff. 39v–42r.
- 43.
For more on the secundum imaginationem method see Jung (2016, 115–118).
- 44.
For other examples used in this reasoning see Michałowska (2011a, 476).
- 45.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 112): “Unde sicut non sequitur: albedo est albedo simpliciter, albedo est in Socrate , sic igitur Socrates est albus simpliciter, sic in proposito non sequitur, et propter eandem causam, quia cum albedine coniungitur alius color.”
- 46.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 112): “Et negatur consequentia ulterius: ‘igitur habens illum habitum est prodigus simpliciter’, quia cum tali prodigalitate in eodem subiecto coniungitur illiberalitas.”
- 47.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 119): “Saepe ex eodem habitu provenit quandoque actus ferventior et quandoque remissior.” Ibid., q. 3 (149): “Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur quod virtuosus actualiter delectatur intensius, quia, ut patet in responsione una in proxima quaestione, ex eodem habitu quandoque provenit actus ferventior quandoque minus fervens, et hoc est quia habens illum potest magis et minus distrahere et applicare se secundum talem habitum.”
- 48.
For different views on this subject see Pelletier’s contribution in the present volume, p. 285–299.
- 49.
It seems that Kilvington’s interest in this issue evolved from Ockham’s considerations of a similar kind. More on Ockham’s analyses see Roques’s contribution in the present volume, p. 263–283.
- 50.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 115): “Aliter tamen respondetur concedendo, sicut prius dicitur, quod vitium et virtus sunt eiusdem speciei. Et ulterius negatur consequentia: ‘igitur unum non est corruptivum alterius’, quia magis calidum et minus calidum sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen unum agit in alio; et calidum et frigidum sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen calidum corrumpit frigidum. Et sic de vitio et virtute est quod vitium potest remittere virtutem, et econverso sic eam remitteret quod desineret esse virtus. Et moraliter loquendo talis est corruptio virtutis quando res quae fuit virtus nunc non est virtus. Vel posset dici quod superabundantia et defectus primo modo loquendo, ut ponitur in positione, sunt operationes quae non sunt eiusdem speciei cum virtute, et tales corrumpunt virtutem; et haec videtur verior responsio.”
- 51.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 78): “Aliter tamen posset dici quod in aliis qualitatibus primis unum contrariorum remissum non est nisi per suum contrarium. Et hoc non requiritur in vitio et virtute, quae sunt contraria, quia virtus potest intendi in aliquo qui nunquam fuit vitiosus et minui sine coniunctione vel admixtione vitii.”
- 52.
- 53.
See Michałowska 2011b.
- 54.
William of Ockham, Quaestiones variae, q. 6, art. 10 (OTh 8: 282.233–241): “Similiter prudentia accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo proprie pro notitia evidenti alicuis propositionis singularis quae solum habetur mediante experientia. Verbi gratia, notitia haec evidens ‘iste est mitigandus per pulchra verba’ quae est evidens virtute huius contingentis ‘ille est mitigandus per talem viam’ et hoc cognoscitur per experientiam. Alio modo accipitur communiter pro notitia evidenti alicuius universalis practice quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, ut quod omnis iracundus est sic leniendus.” Ibid. (OTh 8: 282.248–283.251): “Sed sic adhuc distinguitur [scientia moralis] a prudentia proprie dicta, quia haec prudentia est circa singularia, alia circa universalia. Et patet quomodo scientia moralis et prudentia distinguuntur.” See also Adams (1999, 258).
- 55.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 10 (ed. Michałowska, 320): “Hic forte dicitur quod istud argumentum bene probat quod prudentia concomitatur scientiam et etiam quod prudens sit sciens. Sed non sequitur quod prudentia sit scientia, quia non quilibet habens huiusmodi scientiam considerandi circa futura contingentia habet prudentiam, quia multi habent scientiam dictantem quod talis actus bonus sit agendus et talis actus malus sit vitandus, et tamen per suum habitum, qui est scientia, non inclinantur ad prosequendum bonum et vitandum malum.”
- 56.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 10 (ed. Michałowska, 329): “Et quando probatur quod prudentia universaliter consistit circa hominis bona et mala, negandum est de virtute sermonis, quia nulla prudentia universaliter consistit circa hominis bona et mala.”
- 57.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 10 (ed. Michałowska, 329): “Ad quaestionem: conceditur ad istum intellectum quod ille, qui prudens est, est habituatus ut sit activus per veram rationem.” Ibid. (ed. Michałowska, 333): “Ad quartum principale: conceditur conclusio prima quod prudentia summe inclinante per aliquod tempus et per veram rationem ad agendum prudens exsequatur actum necessario, sic quod ly ‘necessario’ denotaret consequentiam, quia haec consequentia est necessaria: ‘prudentia summe inclinat per veram rationem prudentem ad aliquid agendum, igitur prudens exsequetur.’ Et causa est quia prudentia non potest summe inclinare per aliquod tempus nisi assit voluntas, sine qua non est possibile quod prudentia summe inclinat, quia si prudens nolit exsequi actum ad quem per veram rationem inclinat prudentia, tunc talis non est summe prudens. Et ita sequitur quod eius prudentia non summe inclinat etc.”
- 58.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 10 (ed. Michałowska, 333): “Ad aliam formam, quando arguitur quod tunc prudentia sic summe inclinans cogeret voluntatem, dicitur quod non sequitur.”
- 59.
Richard Kilvington, Eth., q. 10 (ed. Michałowska, 332): “Et quando quaeritur numquid scientia et prudentia sunt idem habitus et eadem res vel diversae, dicitur quod sunt unus habitus simplex in anima.”
- 60.
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Michałowska, M. (2018). The Concept of Habit in Richard Kilvington’s Ethics. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_19
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