Abstract
The literature on power indices is very large, but it has had little impact on public debate regarding various aspects of constitutional reform and the design of electoral and voting systems. The need for such an impact is very substantial, as illustrated by three recent examples drawn from New Zealand and the UK. But researchers who use power indices seem to prefer to be scholars (working in ‘ivory towers’) rather than technocrats or emancipators who might engineer or stimulate informed change: their research has very little impact.
I am grateful to Charles Pattie for insightful sommcents on a draft of this polemic.
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Johnston, R.J. (2001). Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_20
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