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Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union

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Power Indices and Coalition Formation

Abstract

This paper provides information on negotiation patterns in the EU and analyzes the influence of qualified majority voting on the formation of coalitions and the distribution of voting power among the EU states as represented in the Council. Important factors for this analysis are the weighting of votes in the Council, the respective majorities (or “quotas”) required to make decisions and the possibility that some members, because of close policy positions, are more inclined to form coalitions or voting alliances. The paper also provides calculations for the situation in which “connected coalitions” are assumed to form. Tools applied for these analyses are adapted versions of the (normalized) Banzhaf power index and of the Shapley-Shubik index. Results are provided and discussed for the EU’s history and for the present.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Michigan, ISR/CPS 4104, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI, 48106-1248, USA

    Madeleine O. Hosli

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  1. Madeleine O. Hosli
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universitat Hamburg, Germany

    Manfred J. Holler

  2. Naval Postgraduate School, USA

    Guillermo Owen

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Hosli, M.O. (2001). Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4893-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-6221-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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