Abstract
In ultimatum games two players bargain anonymously to divide a fixed amount between them, using a computer or human intermediary for communication. One player (proposer) proposes a division of the “pie” and the other player (responder) decides whether to accept the proposal. If accepted, the proposal is implemented so both players receive their agreed upon shares; if rejected, players receive nothing.
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Lin, H., Sunder, S. (2002). Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games. In: Zwick, R., Rapoport, A. (eds) Experimental Business Research. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_16
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