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Arbitrage, Incomplete Models, and Other People’s Brains

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Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLB,volume 40))

Abstract

Over the last 50 years, the theory of rational choice bas emerged as the dominant paradigm of quantitative research in the social and economic sciences. The idea that individuals make choices by rationally weighing values and uncertainties (or that they ought to, or at least act as if they do) is central to Bayesian methods of statistical inference and decision analysis; the theory of games of strategy; theories of competitive markets, industrial organization, and asset pricing; the theory of social choice; and a host of rational actor models in political science, sociology, law, philosophy, and management science.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fuqua School Of Business, Duke University, USA

    Robert Nau

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  1. Robert Nau
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of California, San Diego, USA

    Mark J. Machina

  2. Ecole Normal Supérieure de Cachan, France

    Bertrand Munier

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Nau, R. (1999). Arbitrage, Incomplete Models, and Other People’s Brains. In: Machina, M.J., Munier, B. (eds) Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making. Theory and Decision Library, vol 40. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4592-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4592-4_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5096-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-4592-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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