Abstract
In the concept of Nash equilibrium and its refinements, players are assumed to be informed about the opponents’ subjective probability distributions about the other players’ strategy choices. In this chapter we investigate the implications of dropping this assumption, while maintaining the assumption that players are informed about the opponents’ utility functions at the terminal nodes. The key concept in this chapter is rationalizability, as each of the other concepts discussed subsequently is based upon it.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Perea, A. (2001). Rationalizability. In: Rationality in Extensive Form Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 29. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3391-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3391-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4918-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3391-4
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