Abstract
In several chapters we have analysed the consequences of both internal and international migration of labour in the context of models of international trade. However, in all chapters, except parts of chapter eight, international migration has been treated as legal migration. As noted earlier, illegal migration is a worldwide phenomenon; present both in third world and advanced economies. For example, India receives illegal migrants from Nepal and Bangladesh. Americans receive both legal andlor illegal migrants from its neighbouring countries. Both types of migrants are of great concern to politicians and policy makers, since such migration has an impact on resident welfare1.
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Notes
This issue has been discussed by Ethier (1986). The model can also be used to analyse optimal legal migration by re-interpreting enforcement costs as visa fees and the cost of administrating them.
For example, it is also noted by Ethier (1985) that migrant workers are much more intensively employed in some sector than in others. It has been noted by Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996) that “A disproportionate number of immigrants are high school dropouts, increasing the supply of less-educated workers and potentially contributing to the observed decline in their relative pay” (p. 246).
Note that following Solow (1969) we are also using labour/capital ratios for analysing this problem.
The Mussa (1982) input transformation function is more general than our equation (9.3) and is a subset of the Lancaster (1958) mobility function.
Other tax arrangements to finance E can be specified for example a lump sum tax. We have followed the Ethier (1986) example to facilitate comparison of results.
This income result is similar to that obtained by Ethier (1986).
Since tand L M are fixed by E and are not functions of the wage/rental ratio, for the RHS of equation (9.32) standard concavity conditions apply.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hazari, B.R., Sgro, P.M. (2001). Illegal Migration, Border Enforcement and Growth. In: Migration, Unemployment and Trade. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3379-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3379-2_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4883-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3379-2
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