Abstract
Bargaining Theory in its present state can be seen as a collection of cooperative and noncooperative models. There is the axiomatic foundation which goes back to Nash [NASH50b]. In this context a bargaining problem is a static setup describing the feasible utility vectors a group of players may agree upon and the status quo point resulting from a failure of agreement.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rosenmüller, J. (2000). Bargaining. In: Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 25. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5114-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3212-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive