Abstract
As the essays in this book clearly indicate, Tullock’s 1967 insight was to generate an extensive literature in the political economy of rent-seeking. The debate on this important topic is still comparatively young. The dust has still to settle on a number of controversies that have arisen. Little, as yet, has been finally resolved in detail, as Tullock’s “back to the bog” lament in 1985 would seem to indicate. Yet we now know much more than was the case in 1967. What we have learned, immensely important as it is, does not however give cause for optimism concerning the efficiency of non-market decision-making. It is to this issue that the present essay addresses itself.
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Rowley, C.K. (1988). Rent-Seeking in Constitutional Perspective. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_30
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