Abstract
The rent-seeking literature and the literature on directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities both focus attention upon individual or group economic behavior of a rational, solipsist nature which nevertheless destroys rather than enhances the resources available to society. As such, both contributions have radically changed our understanding of the positive behavior of political and bureaucratic markets and have shifted many of our views on normative politcal economy. Yet the two approaches differ significantly in important respects, not least in terms of their coherence within the broader framework of public choice.
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Rowley, C.K. (1988). Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_2
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