Abstract
My role in connection with the efficient rent-seeking model (Tullock 1980) is, I think, a rather ill-omened one. I began the discussion by inventing a model with an apparent paradox. The market does not clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). Corcoran and Karels (1985) and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are further efforts to solve the problem.
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References
Corcoran, W.J. “Long-run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-seeking.” Public Choice 43, 1 (1984): 89–94.
Corcoran, W.J., and Karels, G. V. “Rent-seeking Behavior in the Long-run.” Public Choice (1985): 227–246.
Higgins, R.S.; Shughart II, W.F.; and Tollison, R.D. “Free Entry and Efficient Rent-seeking.” Public Choice (1985): 247–258.
Tullock, G. “Efficient Rent-seeking.” In: J.M. Buchanan R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society. College Station: Texas A and niversity Press, 1980: 97–112.
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Tullock, G. (1988). Back to the Bog. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_12
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