Abstract
Experience in safety-critical systems has shown that deviations from assumed behaviour can and do cause accidents. This suggests that the development of requirements specifications for such systems should be supported with a risk analysis. In this paper we present an approach to the development of robust requirements specifications (i.e. specifications that are adequate for the risks involved), based on qualitative and quantitative analyses.
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References
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© 1993 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Saeed, A., de Lemos, R., Anderson, T. (1993). Robust Requirements Specifications for Safety—Critical Systems. In: Górski, J. (eds) SAFECOMP ’93. SAFECOMP 1993. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2061-2_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2061-2_23
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