NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949–90

Abstract

During the Cold War, NATO planners assumed that early use of nuclear weapons would be authorized to respond to a major Soviet attack. NATO strategy was critically dependent upon that assumption. This paper will briefly describe how that came to be the case, as seen and influenced by officials in Washington. The American perspective is chosen because, notwithstanding the important contributions of other Allies, it was the nuclear weapons supplied by (and ultimately controlled from) Washington that made the strategy possible. American interests thus had special importance in NATO’s strategic debates.

I wish to express my appreciation to several individuals who were especially helpful in the study I conducted preceding this chapter. Retired American generals David Jones and Andrew Goodpaster and retired Vice Admiral Jerry Miller read the draft of a much longer version of the study, confirming for me that the scope and focus was appropriate. Robert Bowie was most kind in discussing with me on several occasions the perspective of the Eisenhower years and the circumstances of the MLF. Leon Sloss shared with me his recollections of the early workings of the McNamara Committee and the NPG. Doug Lawson, a longtime student of NATO, pointed me in several interesting directions. And Dr. Kori Schake convened a seminar at National Defense University in Washington where I discussed the emerging framework of the study. Their help is most appreciated. Responsibility for what is said in the paper, of course, resides solely with the author.