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Fairness and Retaliation

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The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

In this chapter we examine evidence from different social sciences and argue that considerations of fairness and retaliation shape human behaviour to a very large degree. We contend that the importance of fairness and retaliation also extends to many important economic decisions. The incorporation of these motivations therefore helps us to understand economic outcomes in many different institutional environments.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Zurich, Switzerland

    Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter

Authors
  1. Ernst Fehr
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  2. Simon Gächter
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Marseilles, France

    L.-A. Gérard-Varet (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris, France

    S.-C. Kolm (Director) (Director)

  3. Maître de Conférences, University of Paris La Sorbonne, France

    J. Mercier Ythier

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© 2000 International Economic Association

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Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and Retaliation. In: Gérard-Varet, LA., Kolm, SC., Ythier, J.M. (eds) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62747-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62745-5

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