Abstract
This is an edited version of a longer paper, from which I have excised the first three sections. Section 1 noted the recurrent and familiar yearning among criminal law theorists for a grand, unitary theory of criminal liability—a yearning both admirable and dangerous—and the way in which it has recently taken an Aristotelian turn.1
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Notes
See for example H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968);
A. J. Ashworth, ‘Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability’ in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (J. Eekelaar and J. Bell eds, 3rd Series, 1987); M. S. Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’, 7 Soc. Phil. Pol. 29 (1990).
See for example M. D. Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’, 1 Law & Phil. 5 (1982); G. Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 Yale L. J. 1661 (1987); N. Lacey, State Punishment, chapter 3 (1988). For discussion see J. Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’, 12 Law & Phil. 193 (1993); R. A. Duff, ‘Choice, Character and Criminal Liability’, 12 Law & Phil. 345 (1993).
See for example R. Solomon, The Passions (1993);
M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (2001).
See for example Kahan and Nussbaum, supra note 1; J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992).
J. F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873), p. 152.
For two versions of this thought, one roughly Platonic and one roughly Aristotelian, see I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970);
L. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (1980).
For two recent useful contributions on either side of this ongoing debate, see J. Gardner, ‘Justifications and Reasons’ in Harm and Culpability (A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith eds, 1996);
P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (1997), pp. 95–124.
This is another issue that I cannot pursue here: compare Robinson, supra note 21, at 129–137, with G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), pp. 475– 478, 553–554, 695; see also R. A. Duff, ‘Rule Violations and Wrongdoings’, in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (S. Shute and A. Simester eds, 2002) 47, at 68–74.
See S. H. Pillsbury, ‘Crimes of Indifference’, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 105 (1996), pp. 116–123, 174–182; see also G. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (M. Christie ed., 3rd edn, 2000–2001), pp. 286–300.
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© 2008 Antony Duff
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Duff, A. (2008). Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability. In: Farrelly, C., Solum, L.B. (eds) Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-60073-1_8
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