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Kanbur, R., Tuomala, M. (2006). Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn’t Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach. In: de Janvry, A., Kanbur, R. (eds) Poverty, Inequality and Development. Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-29748-0_16
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