© 2013

The Politics of IMF Lending


Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-x
  2. Introduction

    1. Michael Breen
      Pages 1-9
  3. Theory

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 11-11
    2. Michael Breen
      Pages 13-26
    3. Michael Breen
      Pages 27-42
  4. Evidence

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 69-69
    2. Michael Breen
      Pages 71-84
    3. Michael Breen
      Pages 85-104
    4. Michael Breen
      Pages 105-122
    5. Michael Breen
      Pages 123-140
    6. Michael Breen
      Pages 141-157
  5. Implications

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 159-159
    2. Michael Breen
      Pages 161-169
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 170-219

About this book


As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.


Asia Europe IWF

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.Dublin City UniversityIreland

About the authors

Michael Breen is Lecturer at Dublin City University, Ireland, specializing in International Relations and International Political Economy. His recent work on the IMF has been published in the European Journal of International Relations and his work on the politics of sovereign debt is forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly.

Bibliographic information

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