The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

  • Annalisa Coliva

Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvi
  2. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 1-18
  3. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 19-49
  4. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 51-76
  5. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 77-97
  6. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 99-131
  7. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 133-161
  8. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 163-216
  9. Annalisa Coliva
    Pages 217-242
  10. Back Matter
    Pages 243-288

About this book


This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.


pluralism mental states emotion expressivism Wittgenstein Moore's Paradox

Authors and affiliations

  • Annalisa Coliva
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy IrvineUSA

Bibliographic information