Internal Affairs

Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism

  • Keith L. Butler

Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 21)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xiv
  2. Introduction

    1. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 1-10
  3. Externalism and the Propositional Attitudes

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 11-11
    2. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 12-24
    3. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 25-63
    4. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 64-82
  4. Anti-Individualism and the Cognitive Sciences

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 83-83
    2. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 84-130
    3. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 131-176
    4. Keith L. Butler
      Pages 177-225
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 227-257

About this book

Introduction

This book is not written for posterity. It is meant to constitute part of my contribution to a continuing debate at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the philosophy of cognitive science. The debate is over how mental states are individuated. Many philosophers, call them externalists (or anti­ individualists), believe that the individuation of mental states requires appeal to an individual's social and/ or physical environment. I am not among them; I am an internalist ( or individualist). This book attempts to show that the leading proponents of externalism make a lot of mistakes in defending their view. This is either because the view is false, so any defense of it is bound to make some mistake or another, or it is because the people defending externalism have not been very careful, or both. I have included some introductory material so that those not already familiar with the issues involved might nevertheless gain entry into the debate. The intended audience, however, consists in those professional philosophers and students of philosophy who are already familiar with and interested in the question of how mental states are individuated. I do not spend much time trying to motivate an interest in this issue. Like all philosophy, it is interesting and worthwhile if one is blessed (or cursed) with the appropriate kind of intellectual curiosity. Those who do not meet this requirement proceed at their own risk.

Keywords

Evaluation cognitive science epistemology knowledge mind subject

Authors and affiliations

  • Keith L. Butler
    • 1
  1. 1.Western Washington UniversityUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1921-6
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1998
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-481-5104-2
  • Online ISBN 978-94-017-1921-6
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-0780
  • About this book