Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

1. Articles

   1. Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Dynamics

      1. Equilibrium Selection Via Travelling Waves

         • Josef Hofbauer

         Pages 245-259

      2. Rational vs. Adaptive Egoism in Support Networks: How Different Micro Foundations Shape Different Macro Hypotheses

         • Andreas Flache, Rainer Hegselmann

         Pages 261-275

   2. Ethics and Game Theory

      1. Evolutionary Ethics

         • Ken Binmore

         Pages 277-283

      2. A Preference-Based Theory of Well-Being and a Rule-Utilitarian Theory of Morality

         • John C. Harsanyi

         Pages 285-300

   3. Applications of Game Theory

      1. Variability, Uncertainty, and the Emergence of Firms and Markets

         • Antonio Camacho

         Pages 301-314

      2. A Game Theory of Logic — A Logic of Game Theory

         • Jaakko Hintikka

         Pages 315-323

      3. Learning with Hazy Beliefs

         • Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young

         Pages 325-335

      4. A Game-Theoretic Model of the War in Chechnya

         • Lucian Kern

         Pages 337-347

      5. Information and Uncertainty: Power, Profits and Morality

         • Dennis C. Mueller

         Pages 349-357

2. Report — Documentation

   1. The Spirit of the Vienna Circle Devoted to Questions of Lebens- and Weltauffassung

      • Arne Naess

      Pages 359-367

   2. „Sicher ist Sicher“

      • Christoph Hofinger, Oliver Holle, Markus Knell

      Pages 369-378

3. Review Essay

   1. Scientific Emigration

      • Gerhard Benetka

      Pages 379-386

   2. Reflections on the Austrian Knowledge Bases

      • Karl H. Müller

      Pages 387-395

4. Reviews

   1. Editorial Information

      • Thomas Mormann

      Pages 397-402

   2. Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, volume 3: Unpublished Essays and Lectures, edited by Solomon Feferman et al. Oxford University Press, 1995

      • Ulrich Felgner

      Pages 403-405

   3. John W. Dawson, Jr. Logical Dilemmas. The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel. Wellesley, Mass.: A.K. Peters 1997

      • Helmut Veith

      Pages 406-408

   4. Bruno de Finetti, Filosofia della probabilità, ed. by Alberto Mura, Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1995

      • Maria Carla Galavotti

      Pages 408-411

   5. Friedrich Stadler, Studien zum Wiener Kreis. Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus im Kontext, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1997

      • Hans Sluga

      Pages 411-414

   6. Paolo Parrini: Conoscenza e Realtà. Saggio di filosofia positiva, Roma & Bari: Laterza, 1995. An English translation appears under the title Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy within the Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science at Kluwer, Dordrecht

      • Michael Stöltzner

      Pages 415-420

   7. Michael Heidelberger, Die innere Seite der Natur. Gustav Theodor Fechners Wissenschaftlich-philosophische Weltauffassung, Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1993

      • Veronika Hofer

      Pages 420-423

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover­ ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

• agents
• decision theory
• ethics
• game theory
• probability

`... the book is recommended to all who want to get first-hand information on rationality and what game theory can and cannot contribute.'
OR News, 8 (2000)

• University of Nebraska and University of Graz, Austria

  Werner Leinfellner

• Institute Vienna Circle, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

  Eckehart Köhler

Policies and ethics